

# Should one reject the natural rate hypothesis?

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
## 50 years ago: The natural rate hypothesis

- Friedman's presidential address. 1967
- In effect, application of general long-run neutrality of money proposition
- Two sub-hypotheses:
  - The natural unemployment rate independent of monetary policy.  
``Independence hypothesis''
  - Maintaining actual rate below natural rate leads to increasing inflation.  
``Accelerationist hypothesis''
- Strong policy implications:
  - Booms fully offset by busts
  - Monetary policy can smooth, but no more.


## Acceptance, old and new grumblings

- Quickly accepted.
  - Empirically: Increase in Phillips curve coefficient, from 0 to 1.
  - Conceptually: Dominant framework
- Basis for inflation targeting framework.
- But:
  - The disinflations of the 1980s, and hysteresis.
  - More recently:
    - The effects of the Great Financial Crisis on output.
    - The disappearance of the accelerationist Phillips curve.

## Advanced Economies log Real GDP and extrapolated trend (Index, 2000=100)



## Advanced economies CPI inflation vs. Unemployment rate




# Map

- The independence hypothesis.
  - Persistence versus permanence
  - Macro evidence
  - Micro evidence
- The accelerationist hypothesis.
- Policy implications

# 1. Persistence versus permanence

- Need to clarify the issues. Discussion often presented as
  - Standard models: zero effect of m pol on potential output versus
  - Hysteresis: permanent effect of m pol on potential output
- In fact:
  - All models have some, persistent, effect of m pol on potential output
    - Recessions, capital accumulation, potential output
    - State variables. Capital, Unemployment (if matching frictions).
  - Hysteresis models often do not imply permanent effects
    - R&D, TFP, and potential output
    - Disenfranchised workers.
- Bottom line: Issue is the degree of persistence. High or low?

### Impulse Responses to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock (50 Annual Basis Points)






## Macro evidence. Unemployment.


- Effects of monetary policy shocks?
  - Look at recessions caused by intentional disinflations
  - Clearly monetary shocks. Large. Plausibly exogenous
- Data set. 22 advanced economies, 50 years.
  - Identify recessions. 122
  - Caused by disinflation decision. 22.
- Methodology
  - Look at average unemployment rate pre- and post-recession
  - Time intervals. Pre-recession. -2 to -6, ..., -2 to -12  
Post-recession. +3 to +7, ..., +10 to +14<sub>9</sub>
- Caveats:
  - Time fixed effects, heterogeneity, actual or natural rate?

Disinflation recessions - Change in Unemployment rate  
(Average unemployment rate x to y years after the recession - Average unemployment rate 2 to z years before the recession)




## Macro evidence: Output

- Similar approach for output.
  - Why not look at output?
- Compute a pre-recession log-linear time trend.
- Extrapolate.
- Look at post-recession output gap.
- Do it over various pre- and post-recession intervals
- Complication. Underlying decreasing time trend.
  - If not corrected, will find negative output gaps on average
- Evidence.
  - Less impressive than for unemployment
  - Decomposition: employment, productivity



### Disinflation recessions - Output gaps by pre-recession/post-recession windows


(Average output gap x to y years after the recession. Extrapolated trend estimated 2 to z years before the recession)




## Can we learn from other recessions?

- Can we learn from the other recessions, say, caused by oil shocks, financial crises, etc?
- Yes, with one additional strong assumption:
  - Zero long run elasticity of labor supply/wage curve
  - If so, can look at unemployment. (not output. Why?)
- Evidence.
  - Strong effects for both oil shocks, and financial crises.
  - Similar caveats. Largely bunched in time, so potential time effects.

## Oil related recessions



## Financial crisis recessions



Note: The 7-7 specification covers 11 out of 21 recessions


## Micro evidence. Persistence channels. 1.

- The initial hysteresis argument (Blanchard-Summers). Insiders
  - Unions set wages. (eventually) do not care about the unemployed members.
  - No pressure of (some) unemployment on wages.
  - Natural rate has a unit root
- Too strong. Unemployment matters
  - Unemployment threat if fired
  - Unemployment threat from hiring unemployed
  - Role of employment protection: Firing/hiring costs
- DMP framework. Now incorporated in some DSGE
- How much persistence?
  - A function of labor market institutions.
  - Employment protection, u benefits, structure of bargaining





## Ratio of long term unemployment against U rate, 1990-2016




## Micro evidence: Persistence channels. 3

Focus at this point on low labor force participation (rather than unemployment rate, which is very low) in the US.

Largely a downward trend, but is there more?

- The evidence from disability insurance
  - Applications highly cyclical. \*
  - Once accepted, low probability of coming back.
  - Over last 10 years, 20% “excess unemployment”
  - 2.4 m applications more.
  - Acceptance rate: 35%, so 0.8 million. (0.6% of labor force)

# Applications to disability insurance vs U rate, 1960-2014



## Micro evidence: Persistence channels. 4


Turning to persistent effects of recession on productivity.

- No evidence that it plays a role in disinflation-caused recessions
- R&D cyclical. But effect of cycle is small. 1% less growth. 1% less R&D.
- Speed of adoption. Evidence. Some cyclical elasticity. Gertler et al.
- Recessions and reallocation. Schumpeterian cleansing or inefficient closures? Foster et al: small positive effect (except during the GFC)

# The accelerationist hypothesis

- The simple Phillips curve.  
$$\Pi = a \Pi(-1) + b (U-U^*)$$
- Friedman: If try to use the trade off,  $a=1$ .
- (Lucas/Sargent. Rational expectations version)
- The evidence. Estimation with 15-year rolling sample
  - Dramatic increase after Friedman's address
  - Dramatic decrease since early 2000s.

### Lagged inflation coefficient +/- 1 std 15-year rolling samples



# Credibility or lack of salience?

- Why has the coefficient decreased back to zero?
  - Credibility? Inflation target, and inflation targeting.
  - Lack of salience? At low, stable inflation, inflation ignored
- How to test? Not easy
  - If credibility, response to core, but not to (headline – core)
  - If salience, response to (headline – core), but not to core.  
(e.g. response if price of gas increases/decreases a lot)
- Evidence from behavior of professional forecasters (SPF)  
households (Michigan survey).



Table 1. Regressions of professional and consumers' forecasts of inflation

|                 | 1981-3 to 1995-4    |                     | 1996-1 to 2016-1    |                    |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
|                 | SPF                 | Michigan            | SPF                 | Michigan           |
| Core            | 0.498***<br>[0.034] | 0.375***<br>[0.035] | 0.547***<br>[0.073] | -0.111<br>[0.145]  |
| Headline – Core | 0.125*<br>[0.126]   | 0.288*<br>[0.127]   | 0.077**<br>[0.035]  | 0.231**<br>[0.069] |
| Constant        | 2.024***<br>[0.207] | 1.873***<br>[0.209] | 1.098**<br>[0.158]  | 3.13***<br>[0.314] |
| Observations    | 58                  | 58                  | 83                  | 83                 |
| R-squared       | 0.676               | 0.508               | 0.396               | 0.111              |

# Policy implications. 1

- Long way from knowing enough. Strength, persistence, asymmetries...
- Nevertheless, a simple formalization:

$$(1) \quad y^{*}(+1) = a y^{*} + b (y - y^{*})$$

Pure independence hypothesis:  $b=0$ .

Pure hysteresis hypothesis :  $a=1, b>0$

Realistic models: coefficients in between.

$$(2) \quad \Pi = c(y - y^{*}) + E \Pi, \quad E \Pi = 0 \text{ if } -x \leq \Pi \leq +x, \text{ RE otherwise }^{26}$$

Saliency if  $x>0$

## Policy implications. 2

- Optimal policy, with commitment, if CB maximizes output:

$$y^* = b x/c(1-a)$$

$$y-y^* = x/c$$

- Strict hysteresis and lack of salience: Endogenous growth...

$$\Delta y^* = \Delta y = b x/c$$

Interpretation.

The higher a, or b.                      The higher potential output.

The higher x, the lower c.      The higher potential output

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What if only one of the hypotheses fails? (say salience)

Return to an increase in output higher.

# Conclusions

- On the independence hypothesis
  - M policy (“demand shocks”) affects potential output/natural rate.  $a, b$  positive. But precise values?
  - Macro/micro evidence for highly persistent effects mixed.
    - Most convincing is disenfranchising.
- On the accelerationist hypothesis (or its rational expectations version)
  - Some evidence of lack of salience.
- On policy implications. Not quite there yet.
  - We really do not know the relevant values of  $a, b, x$ <sub>28</sub>
  - Need to work much more on wage bargaining channel.
  - Micro evidence on disenfranchising fairly strong.
- Is the current US labor participation case strong enough?