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CSEF - Center for Studies in Economics and Finance

Current Position: CSEF Director
Professor of Finance
University of Naples Federico II

Contact Information: Department of Economics and Statistics
Via Cintia Monte S. Angelo
80126 Napoli, Italy
Tel: +39 081 675306
Fax: +39 081 7663540
E-mail: marco.pagano@unina.it

3 November 2016 Yi Huang, Marco Pagano and Ugo Panizza, Public debt and private investment in China , High levels of public debt are correlated with lower economic growth across countries, but questions remain about whether this relationship is causal. Using Chinese data, this column explores whether increasing public debt crowds out private investment. City-level investment ratios are found to be negatively correlated with local government debt for private manufacturing firms, but not for state-owned or foreign-owned manufacturers. This suggests that as well as the short-term benefits of fiscal stimulus, there might also be negative longer-term effects, such as the crowding out of more efficient firms. READ MORE

17 June 2016 Andrew Ellul, Marco Pagano, and Fabiano Schivardi, Employment and wage insurance within firms: Worldwide evidence , Most countries feature some form of government-provided unemployment insurance, but there is an alternative provider of insurance for employees – the firm they work for. This column asks whether the provision of implicit insurance by family firms in particular to employees is a substitute for the provision of explicit insurance by governments. Family firms stabilise employment more than non-family firms, and their insurance provision is greater when the insurance provided by the public sector is less generous. READ MORE

19 April 2016 Markus Brunnermeier and Marco Pagano, The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies , The euro-area crisis illustrates that the sovereign-bank diabolic loop really consists of two distinct but mutually reinforcing feedback loops: a “bailout loop” and a “real economy loop.” First, the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness reduced the market value of banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt. This reduced the perceived solvency of domestic banks, which in turn increased the chances that banks would have to be bailed out by their (domestic) government, and thus increased sovereign distress even further, engendering a bailout loop. Second, as distressed banks cut back on lending, they triggered a reduction in economic activity and tax revenue, which also contributed to weakening government solvency in these countries, triggering a real-economy loop. READ MORE

1 February 2016 Sam Langfield and Marco Pagano, Financial structure and growth revisited , Why is growth in Europe so low? Among the contributing factors, this column highlights the role of financial structure. Intermediation in Europe is heavily bank-based, and the authors' novel empirical findings indicate that such a structure exerts a negative effect on long-run economic growth and exacerbates its response to sharp drops in real estate prices. The findings support policymakers’ efforts to rebalance financial structure towards securities markets. READ MORE

30 April 2015 Marco Pagano, La crisi greca del 2015 , La Grecia è nuovamente l’epicentro di una crisi economica e finanziaria nell’Unione Europea. Il governo di Alexis Tsipras si rifiuta di proseguire l’attuazione degli impegni che i suoi predecessori avevano preso con la Troika formata dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale (FMI), dalla Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) e dalla Commissione UE: ha annunciato il blocco dei programmi di liberalizzazione e privatizzazione, l’aumento delle pensioni e dei salari minimi, l’abbandono delle politiche di ristrutturazione del settore pubblico, e soprattutto la volontà di rinegoziare il debito pubblico greco. READ MORE