

# Income, consumption and remittances: evidence from immigrants to Australia\*

Giulia Bettin<sup>†</sup>   Riccardo Lucchetti<sup>‡</sup>   Alberto Zazzaro<sup>§</sup>

November 17, 2009

For many countries, remittance behaviour by migrants is an important component of their overall international financial flows. To date, the empirical literature has analysed the propensity to remit as a function of migrants' socio-economic characteristics. However, no studies have fully addressed the empirical implications of remittance behaviour being determined in the broader context of migrants' labour, income and consumption allocation strategy. On the contrary, the migrant's income has almost always been treated as exogenous in this context. The aim of this study is to estimate a remittance equation that detects the main determinants of remittance behaviour while addressing endogeneity and reverse causality relationships between remittances, income, consumption and savings. Moreover, since a large share of individuals do not remit money at all, an instrumental variable variant of the double-hurdle selection model is proposed and estimated by LIML.

A sending country perspective is adopted in the empirical analysis by considering the first cohort of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia. We find that endogeneity is substantial and that estimates obtained by the methods previously employed in the literature may be very misleading if given a behavioural interpretation. Our results confirm some theoretical predictions and shed light on others; notably, we show that "selfish" motives in remitters are at least as important as "altruistic" motives.

---

\*We wish to thank Tommaso Frattini, Oded Stark and the participants to the conferences "Third TOM Conference" (Hamburg) and "Poverty Traps" (Naples) for comments and suggestions. All errors are ours.

<sup>†</sup>Hamburg Institute of International Economics - Heimhuder Strasse 71, 20148 Hamburg (Germany) - [bettin@hwwi.org](mailto:bettin@hwwi.org)

<sup>‡</sup>Dipartimento di Economia, Università Politecnica delle Marche - P.le Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona (Italy) - [r.lucchetti@univpm.it](mailto:r.lucchetti@univpm.it)

<sup>§</sup>Dipartimento di Economia, Università Politecnica delle Marche - P.le Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona (Italy) - [a.zazzaro@univpm.it](mailto:a.zazzaro@univpm.it)

Keywords: Double-hurdle model, migration, remittances  
JEL classification: F24, F22, C21, C24.

## 1 Introduction

The history of industrialisation and economic development intertwines inextricably with the history of migration and remittance flows. In some countries, the industrial take-off was financed, directly and indirectly, by the remittances of their emigrants. For example, in Italy during the first 15-year period of the twentieth century the average amount of remittances was estimated to be around 450 million lire per year, a value greater than the annual internal revenue from tax on earned income (De Clementi, 1994; Masullo, 2001), approaching 6 percent of the Italian GDP (Esteves and Khoudur-Castéras, 2009). In other countries, the immigrants' labour supply, consumption, investments and the stimulus they produced to national savings and foreign capital were primary growth engines (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Solimano, 2003).

Nowadays, the situation is not very different from the past. Remittance flows represent a major source of income and foreign exchange revenue for many developing countries. According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook, remittance flows to developing countries increased from 84.5 billion US dollars to 221.3 billion in 2006, representing 1.9% of developing countries GDP, 22% of global foreign direct investments and almost 245% of official development aid. At the same time, for immigration countries remittances can be a sizeable and costly outflow of capital. For example, remittance outflows from Australia rose from 1,053 million US dollars in 2000 to 2,815 million in 2006 (equivalent to 0.4% of GDP) <sup>1</sup>.

In this perspective, a proper understanding of the individual motivations and determinants of remitting behaviour is a key step in analysing the dynamics of remittance flows at the aggregate level and in designing policies to attract remittances from abroad or, conversely, to keep incomes and savings of migrants in the host country. In this paper, we analyse the remittance strategy of a panel of recent immigrants coming to Australia from 125 different countries. We estimate a simultaneous-equation model with double censoring, where immigrants' earnings, consumption and remittances are jointly determined. Moreover, we test whether the financial development and institutional quality of the country of origin boost or weaken migrants' propensity to remit.

In their path-breaking study on motivations to remit, Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest a taxonomy distinguishing three main drives of remittances: "pure altruism", when migrants derive utility from the utility of family and friends at home, "pure self-interest", when migrants are moved by the desire to acquire material and immaterial (reputation, prestige) assets at home; "tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest", when remittances are the result of contractual arrangements between migrants and parents left at home enforced by a mix of altruistic and self-interested forces<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup>Migration and Remittances Factbook (2008). Similarly, Dustmann and Mestres (2009) report that in Germany remittance outflows were 0.3% of GDP in 2003.

<sup>2</sup>Rapoport and Docquier (2006), Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007), Carling (2008) and Stark (2009) pro-

Discriminating among remittance motivations empirically has proved to be a very challenging task. Theoretical predictions on remittance determinants seldom translate into clear-cut empirical tests. On the other hand, available datasets are often largely incomplete, devoid of a time profile and collected either at the sending or receiving end, hence lacking important information to match migrants' and recipients' households<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, any attempts to build empirical models, capable of identifying the driving factors behind remittance behaviour in a satisfactory way, have been stumped by the problems of the endogeneity of the major determinants of remittances and the influence of unobserved third factors.

Recently, a few studies have addressed the issues of reverse causation and omitted variables with regard to the wealth and income of relatives back home (Osili, 2007; Yang and Choi, 2007) and the migrants' intention to return to the home country (Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). Surprisingly enough, however, no previous studies have been concerned with the endogeneity of immigrants' income<sup>4</sup> and saving behaviour<sup>5</sup>. Yet it is highly conceivable that people who wish to remit a greater amount of money agree to increase the number of hours worked per week. In addition, greater earnings by immigrants in the host country are arguably the output of the unobserved family-of-origin investments in their education, thereby causing a (gratitude or money) debt for immigrants that remittances repay. Similar concerns hold for consumption: immigrants could choose to reduce consumption in the host country in order to increase transfers to the home country or could prefer to invest their savings in earning assets rather than in buying property or other durables.

Were immigrants' income and consumption truly endogenous, non-IV estimates of the effect of income and other explanatory variables on remittances would merely amount to a conditional mean, with no possible behavioural interpretation. Notably, the neglect of a proper treatment of endogeneity might explain why estimates of income elasticity on microeconomic data are surprisingly smaller than one (Menjivar, Da Vanzo, Greenwell, and Valdez, 1998; Sinning, 2007; Yang, 2009), which would suggest that remittances are a basic good. On the other hand, empirical models based on macroeconomic datasets provide elasticities greater than one (Lianos, 1997). This difference may be due to the fact that in those models immigrants' income is proxied by per capita GDP or industrial hourly wage rate in the destination country, so the endogeneity issue does not apply.

---

vide exhaustive and updated reviews of modern microeconomic theoretical and empirical literature on remittances.

<sup>3</sup>An exception is represented by the paper by Osili (2007), where migrants are considered together with their respective origin-families. Such complete information, on the other hand, comes together with a very limited number of observations (61 pairs).

<sup>4</sup>A notable exception is Hoddinott (1994). However, in that paper the problem is dealt with simply by showing that for Hoddinott's dataset the Hausman exogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis that migrants' earnings are exogenous.

<sup>5</sup>A number of papers have analysed remittance and saving decisions of migrants jointly (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Sinning, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). However, without exception, these papers proceed by estimating separate reduced-form models for the different types of transfers and savings, among which the income of migrants can be allocated.

In this paper, we set remittances in the broader context of work and consumption decisions, by estimating a three-equation model. The censored nature of remittances is dealt with by using a double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971). This model is similar to the better known Tobit and Heckit models, typically used in the remittance literature (Funkhouser, 1995; Brown, 1997; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002); in fact, it nests Tobit as a special case, and arguably provides higher generality than both, since absence of remittances by an individual may be ascribed either to unwillingness or to a financial constraint. However, this choice also poses an econometric issue. Although considered by theoretical econometric literature (Blundell and Smith, 1994), the double-hurdle model with instrumental variables has not yet been used in the applied literature: in this paper, we develop a LIML estimator for the double-hurdle model with endogenous regressors, so as to address endogeneity and the selection mechanism at the same time.

In the second part of the paper, we exploit the cross-country dimension of our dataset to explore the relationship between the flow of remittances and the financial sector and institutional development in the home country. While a growing number of macro studies are devoted to the finance- and institutions-remittance nexus<sup>6</sup>, as far as we know, ours is the first paper in the literature which provides microeconomic evidence on the causal effect of the development of formal financial intermediaries and the quality of institutions on migrants' remittances.

By way of preview, although our results cannot exclude the existence of an altruistic motivation to remit, they indicate a prevalence of the exchange motives in governing remittances. First, once endogeneity is taken into account, the hypothesis of unit elasticity of remittances to pre-transfer income (predicted by the selfish model) cannot be rejected, while individual consumption is negatively correlated to remittances. Second, the amount of money sent to the country of origin increases with immigrants' education but the likelihood of remittances does not, which is consistent with the loan repayment hypothesis. Third, the home country per capita GDP (that we use as a proxy for the pre-transfer recipients' income) positively affects the amount transferred but decreases the likelihood of remittances, once again in line with the exchange hypothesis.

As for the macro-determinants of migrants' remittances, a well-developed financial sector in the country of origin seems to exert a positive effect on remittances. In the same way, financial risk in the home country is negatively correlated with the amount remitted. By contrast, remittances seem to be positively correlated to higher political and economic risks, which suggests the existence of a sort of substitution effect between financial assistance to home-family and the quality of local non-financial institutions.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the double-hurdle maximum likelihood estimator with instrumental variables. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of our dataset, the variables and the models we estimate. Results are presented in Sections 4, 5 and 6. In Section 7, we conclude.

---

<sup>6</sup>Amongst others, see Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjaha (2005), Freund and Spatafora (2005), Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Künt, and Martinez Peria (2006), Niimi and Ozden (2006), Bettin and Zazzaro (2009), Cătrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin (2009), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and Esteves and Khoudur-Castéras (2009).

## 2 Econometric methods

### 2.1 Motivation

The task of building an empirical model for migrants' remittances is a complex one: on the one hand, one has to take into account the fact that the decision of whether to remit money at all may be partly separated from the decision on the amount of the remittance<sup>7</sup>. On the other, the latter decision is likely to be made jointly with other choices on labour supply and consumption.

The first aspect can be dealt with by using empirical models with some form of endogenous censoring, such as the Heckman selection model (Hoddinott, 1994; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002). In our view, however, it is more appropriate to use a double-hurdle model, since an individual who does not send money abroad is not necessarily uninterested in doing so, but may be constrained by lack of financial resources.

The double-hurdle model is a commonly employed technique for estimating models with double censoring. In the literature, the earliest reference is Cragg (1971), in which the following model is analysed:

$$y_i^* = x_i' \beta + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$s_i^* = z_i' \gamma + u_i \quad (2)$$

$$y_i = \begin{cases} y_i^* & \text{if } y_i^* > 0 \text{ and } s_i^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

In its original formulation, the two disturbances were assumed to be independent Gaussian variates (of course,  $V(u_i) = 1$  is assumed for identification). Hence the name "independent double-hurdle" model.

Subsequent literature has extended the base model in a number of ways, the most notable of which is doubtlessly the so-called "dependent" model, in which the zero correlation constraint between  $u_i$  and  $\varepsilon_i$  is removed and the two disturbance terms are assumed distributed as

$$\begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_i \\ u_i \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left[ 0, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_u^2 & \rho\sigma_u \\ \rho\sigma_u & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right] \quad (4)$$

This model has been used in countless applications, such as labour market studies (the classic reference here is Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987), but recent examples are Cardoso, Fontainha, and Monfardini (2008) or Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2007)) or, most notably, demand analysis for certain type of goods such as tobacco or alcohol, from Jones (1989) onwards. Estimation is typically carried out by maximum likelihood<sup>8</sup>.

The use of a double-hurdle model in the empirical modelling of transfer decisions, although uncommon, is not new: a double-hurdle model is used in a similar context by

<sup>7</sup>In Delpierre and Verheyden (2009) a theoretical model is presented, in which the decision where to make remittances is at least partly separated from the decision on the actual amount remitted.

<sup>8</sup>A common reference is Jones (1992), who popularised a reasonably simple technique for maximising the log-likelihood numerically.

Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998), via a somewhat *ad-hoc* two-step method instead of maximum likelihood. A recent paper by Sinning (2007) also uses a double-hurdle model, but only in its restricted independent version. Neither article tackles the problem of endogeneity of the explanatory variables.

## 2.2 The double-hurdle model with endogenous regressors

In order to accommodate the problem at hand, the above model must be modified to handle endogenous regressors in equation (1). The general problem of the estimation of simultaneous-equation systems with censoring has been comprehensively analysed in Blundell and Smith (1994). However, our problem is considerably simpler: as an explicit reduced form exists<sup>9</sup>, estimation can be carried out via a LIML-like strategy.

Assume you have

$$\begin{pmatrix} s_i^* \\ Y_i \end{pmatrix} \Big| Z_i \sim N \left[ \begin{pmatrix} \alpha' Z_i \\ \Pi Z_i \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \lambda' \\ \lambda & \Sigma \end{pmatrix} \right]$$

where  $s_i^*$  is the latent ‘‘hurdle’’ variable (in our context, the latent propensity to remit),  $Y_i$  is the vector of endogenous regressors (in our context, pre-transfer immigrants’ income and consumption) and  $Z_i' = (X_{1i}', X_{2i}')$  is the vector of exogenous variables.

The reduced form for  $(s_i^*, Y_i)$  is

$$s_i^* = \alpha' Z_i + u_i \quad (5)$$

$$Y_i = \Pi Z_i + \eta_i = \Pi_1 X_{1i} + \Pi_2 X_{2i} + \eta_i \quad (6)$$

As  $u_i$  has unit variance and  $u_i | \eta_i \sim N(\lambda' \Sigma^{-1} \eta_i, \omega^2)$ , with  $\omega^2 \equiv 1 - \lambda' \Sigma^{-1} \lambda$ , we can write

$$s_i^* = \alpha' Z_i + \lambda' \Sigma^{-1} \eta_i + w_i$$

where  $w_i \equiv u_i - E(u_i | \eta_i)$  and  $V(w_i) = \omega^2$ .

We then have

$$y_i^* = \gamma' Y_i + \beta' X_{1i} + \varepsilon_i \quad (7)$$

which is our structural relation. Note that  $\varepsilon_i$  may be correlated to  $\eta_i$  (causing endogeneity) and/or to  $u_i$  (giving rise to the dependent double-hurdle model, as opposed to Cragg’s formulation). Assume now that the correlation between  $\varepsilon_i$  and  $\eta_i$  can be modelled as

$$\varepsilon_i = \theta' \eta_i + v_i \quad (8)$$

which, for example, would be the case under joint normality. This way,  $v_i$  is linearly independent from  $\eta_i$ , although it may be correlated with  $u_i$ . As a consequence, we have

$$y_i^* = \gamma' Y_i + \beta' X_{1i} + \theta' \eta_i + v_i.$$

<sup>9</sup>See Blundell and Smith (1994), footnote 1.

With the joint normality assumption, one may write

$$y_i^* | (Z_i, \eta_i) \sim N(\gamma'Y_i + \beta'X_{1i} + \theta'\eta_i, \sigma^2)$$

Conditionally on  $\eta_i$  (that is, treating  $Y_i$  as given), the censoring mechanism works exactly as in the ordinary double-hurdle model: define a binary variable

$$d_i = \mathbf{I}[(s_i^* > 0) \wedge (y_i^* > 0)]$$

where  $\mathbf{I}(A) = 1$  if  $A$  is true and 0 if  $A$  is false. The observed amount of remittances is  $R_i = d_i y_i^*$ , which reads as: an individual will send a positive amount overseas only if she intends to do so in the first place ( $s_i^* > 0$ ) and has enough money to do it ( $y_i^* > 0$ ). This variable may be rewritten as

$$d_i = \mathbf{I} \left[ (w_i > -(\alpha'Z_i + \lambda'\Sigma^{-1}\eta_i)) \times \right. \\ \left. \times \mathbf{I} [(v_i > -(\gamma'Y_i + \beta'X_{1i} + \theta'\eta_i))] \right]$$

Hence,

$$P_i^r = P(d_i = 1) = \\ = \Phi_2 \left( \frac{\alpha'Z_i + \lambda'\Sigma^{-1}\eta_i}{\omega}, \frac{\gamma'Y_i + \beta'X_{1i} + \theta'\eta_i}{\sigma}, \rho \right)$$

where  $\Phi_2(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function of the double normal,  $\sigma^2 = V(v_i)$  and the  $\rho$  is the correlation between  $w_i$  and  $v_i$ .

Hence, the log-likelihood (conditional on  $\eta_i$ ) for individual  $i$  can be written as

$$\ell_i^c = (1 - d_i) \ln(1 - P_i^r) + \\ + d_i \ln \left[ P(s_i^* > 0 | v_i) \times \frac{1}{\sigma} \varphi \left( \frac{\gamma'Y_i + \beta'X_{1i} + \theta'\eta_i}{\sigma} \right) \right]$$

The full log-likelihood can be recovered by adding to  $\ell_i^c$  the marginal log-likelihood for  $\eta_i$ , which is

$$\ell_i^m = \text{const} - 1/2 \left[ \ln |\Sigma| + (Y_i - \Pi Z_i)' \Sigma^{-1} (Y_i - \Pi Z_i) \right].$$

It is worth noting that we are not estimating a structural form for the selection equation, but rather its unrestricted reduced form. In our opinion, the theoretical arguments which suggest treating income and consumption as endogenous in the remittance equation do not apply in the selection equation (5): the selection equation models the *ex ante* psychological propensity of an individual to send money abroad and imposing over-identifying restrictions here would be adventurous at best.

## 2.3 Numerical issues

Since the first-order conditions for a maximum cannot be solved analytically, a numerical maximisation procedure is needed<sup>10</sup>. Although our estimation technique is a fairly straightforward application of numerical maximum likelihood, in some cases standard numerical procedures may not yield optimal results, since the log-likelihood function may have multiple maxima. Consistency of maximum likelihood estimators is known to stem from the fact that the expected value of the log-likelihood has a unique maximum at  $\theta_0$  and uniform convergence of the observed log-likelihood to its expectation<sup>11</sup>. However, the observed log-likelihood may well have multiple maxima in finite samples. In these cases, it is reasonable to take the global maximum as the ML estimator. Numerical methods, however, do not guarantee that the algorithm stops at the global maximum, since they may get stuck in a local maximum.

With our dataset, we found that in several instances this was indeed the case. For some specifications, there were two maxima, corresponding to two different values of the correlation coefficient  $\rho$ .<sup>12</sup> In order to circumvent this problem, we used the following computational strategy: given a value of  $\rho$ , carry out the maximum likelihood estimation of the remaining parameters, thus obtaining a restricted estimate  $\hat{\psi}(\rho)$  (where  $\psi$  is a vector gathering all the other parameters). This procedure was repeated over a grid of values for  $\rho$  from -0.9 to 0.9 with increments of 0.1; the value of  $\hat{\psi}(\rho)$  yielding the maximum likelihood was then used as the starting point for the maximisation of the unrestricted log-likelihood. We found this procedure to be mildly time-consuming, but very effective.

<sup>10</sup>We used the BFGS implementation provided by gretl; see Cottrell and Lucchetti (2009). In order to ensure that parameter  $\sigma$  remains positive during the numerical search, the log-likelihood is reparametrised in terms of  $\ln \sigma$ . For similar reasons, the unconstrained parameters on which the marginal log-likelihood function  $\ell_i^m$  is based are not the elements of  $\Sigma$  itself, but rather those of the Cholesky factorisation of  $\Sigma^{-1}$ . In practice,  $\ell_i^m$ , the second component of the log-likelihood, is computed as

$$\ell_i^m = \text{const} + \ln |K| - \frac{\zeta_i' \zeta_i}{2}$$

where  $K$  is a lower-triangular matrix such that  $KK' = \Sigma^{-1}$  and  $\zeta_i = K'(R_i - \Pi'Z_i)$ . This has two advantages: not only is a matrix inversion avoided, but the determinant of  $K$  (which is by construction  $|\Sigma|^{-1/2}$ ) is trivial to compute since  $K$  is triangular, via

$$-0.5 \ln |\Sigma| = \sum_{i=1}^m \ln K_{ii}.$$

Finally, the correlation coefficient between  $u_i$  and  $v_i$  was reparametrised via the hyperbolic tangent transformation as

$$a = 0.5 \ln \left( \frac{1 + \rho}{1 - \rho} \right).$$

<sup>11</sup>A classic exposition of the argument is found in Amemiya (1985).

<sup>12</sup>This appears to be a little-known feature of the dependent double-hurdle model. To our knowledge, no systematic investigation has been carried out on this matter.

## 2.4 Hypothesis testing

Once estimation is carried out, it becomes possible to test for several hypotheses: the hypothesis of exogeneity of  $Y_i$ , which is particularly interesting for the interpretation of the results, can be easily carried out via a Wald test on  $\theta$  and poses no particular problems.


Another test of interest is a test for the over-identification restrictions implied by equation (7). This has no obvious economic interpretation, but is nevertheless important to judge the appropriateness of the choice of instruments. To see how the test is carried out, substitute (6) and (8) into (7) to get

$$y_i^* = (\gamma' \Pi_1 + \beta) X_{1i} + \gamma' \Pi_2 X_{2i} + (\gamma + \theta)' \eta_i + v_i = \mu_1' X_{1i} + \mu_2' X_{2i} + \mu_3' \eta_i + v_i$$

once the structural parameters are estimated by LIML, all it takes is to compute the score matrix of the unrestricted model for the corresponding values of  $\mu_1$ ,  $\mu_2$  and  $\mu_3$  and perform a score (conditional moment) test via an OPG artificial regression (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1984)).

Testing for the existence and the actual working of the selection mechanism is a more complex matter: on the one hand, it should be ascertained whether a selection mechanism is in fact present. This could be accomplished by comparing the double-hurdle model to an ordinary Tobit model. On the other, a comparison with a sample selection model *à la* Heckman would shed light on the nature of censoring. If a Heckit-type censoring occurred, then each individual who chooses to remit would generate a non-zero figure for the actual remittances sent; put differently, zero remittances would indicate unambiguously that the individual has no intention to remit money home, and there are no individuals who are financially constrained. By contrast, if the censoring mechanism is double-hurdle, zero remittances could result from potential, but income-constrained remitters.

Figure 1: Selection mechanism: comparison between the double-hurdle model and its alternatives



The difference between the Tobit, Heckit and double-hurdle models can be illustrated considering Figure 1. An individual is represented by a point on the plane, where the X-axis indicates the amount that the individual could afford to send abroad and the Y-axis indicates her psychological propensity to make remittances. The Tobit model assumes that non-remitters belong to the area A or, equivalently, that areas B and C contain no individuals (anyone would remit if they could); in the Heckman sample selection model observable non-remitters belong to areas B and C and no individuals belong to A (so that the only thing that matters is the *a priori* decision whether to remit or not). In the double-hurdle model, a non-remitter could belong to any of the three areas A, B and C: there may be some people who, although inclined to make remittances, cannot afford to.

Testing procedures to discriminate between competing models of selection are more difficult to set up for two reasons: first, the three models are non-nested (the double-hurdle model being of the dependent variety); second, a comparison on the structural form would entail estimation of IV varieties of the Tobit and Heckman model, which is far more difficult than the ordinary. These difficulties were circumvented by running Vuong’s test (see Vuong (1989)) for comparing non-nested models on the unrestricted reduced form of the three models. Vuong’s test is used for comparing non-nested models in terms of the difference in their respective Kullback-Leibler distance from the (unknown) “true” model: define the log-likelihood-ratio for observation  $i$  as

$$LR_i = \ell_i^A - \ell_i^B$$

where  $\ell_i^A$  ( $\ell_i^B$ ) is the  $i$ -th contribution to log-likelihood for model A (B). Under the null hypothesis that the two models offer an equivalent representation of the data, the statistic

$$VT = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}\sqrt{V(LR_i)}} \sum_{i=1}^n LR_i$$

is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal random variable. Large positive (negative) values are taken as evidence in favour of model A (B).

### 3 Data and variables

#### 3.1 The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia

The dataset we use is the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA), a longitudinal study of recently arrived visaed immigrants undertaken by the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.

We consider the first cohort of the LSIA (LSIA1), that was selected from visaed immigrants aged 15 years and over, who arrived in Australia between September 1993 and August 1995<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup>The sampling unit is the Primary Applicant (PA), the person upon whom the approval to immigrate was based. The population for the survey consisted of about 75,000 PAs and was stratified by the major visa

Questionnaires cover different topics: the migrant's family in Australia, the immigration process, the initial settlement, financial assets and transfers (remittances), working status, income, consumption expenditures, education and English knowledge, health, citizenship and return visits to the former country. All this information gives an incomparable socio-economic picture of immigrants, that is essential to understand their remittance behaviour.

Individuals were interviewed three times between six months and three years from their arrival in Australia. In the first two waves remittances are designed as a discrete ordered variable, while in the third wave they are continuous. In principle, it would be possible to exploit all three waves by using an interval IV regression model, as proposed by Bettin and Lucchetti (2009). However, the estimation of an instrumental variable interval double-hurdle model would be quite hard to implement. Moreover, we would lose precious information by transforming the continuous remittance variable from the third wave into a discrete one. Therefore, we chose to limit our analysis to the third wave.

The initial sample included 5,192 individuals, but due to sample attrition immigrants interviewed in the third wave fell to 3,752 (2,160 men and 1,592 women). The interviewees came from 125 countries. The most represented region is Asia, followed by Europe, Africa and the Middle East, which taken together represent the origin for almost 90% of immigrants in the sample. Table 5 shows that five out of the ten main countries of origin are located in South-East Asia, suggesting that geographic distance plays an important role in migration choices. However, the largest number of immigrants come from the United Kingdom (8.40% of the sample), which suggests that cultural affinities, common language and past colonial relationships also affect the locational choice of migrants.

In all, 1,154 immigrants (31%) responded positively when asked about their attitude towards remittances. Half of them sent less than 1000 AUS \$ since the previous interview, while the average amount of money remitted is around 2,550 AUS \$. Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern: immigrants from richer (poorer) countries are less (more) likely to send remittances, but if they do, they send larger (smaller) amounts (see Table 5 and Figure 2).

Analysing the number of remitters by country of birth, the Iraqis are the most likely to send money back home (62.5% of Iraqi immigrants in LSIA1) followed by the Afghans (58.7%) and the Filipinos (58%); the share of remitters is much lower for immigrants from high-income countries (as an example, the figure is 10.7% for the USA and 14.3% for the UK). Conversely, the average amount remitted by Japanese immigrants (11100 AUS \$) is the largest in the sample, and is also much larger than the amount that immigrants coming from similar countries (in terms of per capita GDP) like the UK, Germany or Italy send back home. By contrast, among poor countries Cambodians' remittances (1061 AUS \$) are lower than the average.

---

groups and by individual countries of birth.

## 3.2 The empirical model

### 3.2.1 Remittance equation variables

The main remittance equation in the model we estimate is:

$$R_i = \alpha + \beta_y Y_i + \beta_c C_i + \delta' X_{1i} + \gamma' Z_{j(i)} + \varepsilon_i \quad (9)$$

where  $R_i$  is the amount of money sent home every year by the immigrant  $i$ <sup>14</sup>,  $Y_i$  is the yearly pre-transfer income of immigrants' household in Australia and  $C_i$  the yearly household's consumption expenditures (all variables are in logarithm). Consumption is calculated as the sum of all the different consumption items singled out in the questionnaire: food, transports, clothes, health, expenditures for the children and for the house (gas, electricity etc.). As immigrants' income and consumption are recorded by intervals in the survey, we take the midpoints of the intervals.

$X_1$  is a vector of exogenous immigrant characteristics that theory and previous empirical literature indicate as possible explanatory variables of remittance behaviour: (i) the immigrant gender, by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant is a male (*MALE*); (ii) the age of the immigrant and its square (*AGE*, *AGE2*); (iii) the time (in years) elapsing from the arrival in Australia (*TIME*); (iv) a citizenship indicator that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant has obtained, applied to obtain or has the intention to apply for Australian citizenship (*CITIZENSHIP*); (v) the formal qualification of the immigrant (*SCHOOLING*) proxied by four dummies corresponding to PhD/MA degree, BA degree or diploma, 10/12 years of schooling, and 9 or less years of schooling (the excluded category is the immigrant with a PhD or an MA degree); (vi) a dummy for the presence of close relatives in the country of origin<sup>15</sup> (*RELATIVES*).

Finally,  $Z_{j(i)}$  includes variables relative to the home country  $j$  of individual  $i$ , which aim to capture parental family characteristics for which the LSIA survey does not keep records. In the baseline specification, we consider the log of the mean per capita GDP over the period 1992-2000 (*GDP\_PC*) as a proxy for the economic conditions of relatives at home<sup>16</sup>.

Furthermore, the log of the distance between Australia and the country of origin (*DISTANCE*) is considered because of its influence on the relations with the home country. Being far away raises the cost of visiting home and also reduces the frequency of contacts at a distance, due to different time zones, thus weakening the strength of altruistic feelings. At the same time both costs associated to migrating to the host country and to transferring money back to the origin family increase with the distance from the

---

<sup>14</sup>In the questionnaire, immigrants were originally asked about the amount of money sent back home from the previous interview. However, since data concerning income and consumption are reported on a yearly basis, we also transformed remittances accordingly. In addition, there were a few observations reporting a positive amount of remittances but equal to 1 AUS \$ per year. Since we interpreted these either as due to misreporting or as transfers whose rationale is beyond the scope of our analysis on the traditional motives to remit, we set them to zero.

<sup>15</sup>It refers to partner/spouse, children, parents and siblings.

<sup>16</sup>GDP data are from the World Development Indicators database.

home country<sup>17</sup>.

Other country-specific variables were also considered as possible additions to the baseline model. In particular, sections 5.3 and 6 contain an analysis of other several macroeconomic, financial and institutional quality indicators.

### 3.2.2 Instrumental variables

The set of instruments for pre-transfer immigrants' income  $Y_i$  and consumption  $C_i$  includes  $X_{1i}$ ,  $Z_{j(i)}$  and  $X_{2i}$ . The first two subsets contain the regressors just illustrated above for the remittance equation.  $X_{2i}$ , instead, is a vector of five variables to address endogeneity of income and consumption. The first two instruments refer to the knowledge of the English language. In particular, we build two indicator variables taking the value of 1 if the first spoken language of the immigrant is English (*FIRST\_ENG*) and if the immigrant states he/she has a good knowledge of English (*GOOD\_ENG*). The third instrument is a dummy variable stating whether the immigrant lives in an urban (*CITY* = 1) or a rural environment (*CITY* = 0). The last three instruments refer to the composition of the immigrant household in Australia: a dummy for the presence of children in the immigrant household (*CHILD*), a dummy for the presence of the partner in the immigrant household (*SPOUSE*) and the log of the number of members in the immigrant household plus one (*FAMILY\_N*)<sup>18</sup>.

Our assumption is that a higher level of English proficiency would affect immigrants' income in a positive way but without any direct effect on the amount of remittances. Similarly, we expect the composition of the family in Australia to contribute to determining earned income and consumption patterns, and via such variables, remittances. In particular, we expect income to increase with the number of household members and with the presence of a partner and to decrease in the presence of children. Consumption, on the other hand, should be positively affected by all the three instruments regarding household composition. Finally, consumption patterns also depend on the location of residence and expenditures might be higher if the immigrant's household lives in an urban instead of a rural environment. This is especially the case for a country such as Australia where the outback is not densely populated.

## 4 Results: the baseline model

### 4.1 Income and consumption

In table 1 we report the results from our basic specification for the remittance model, while in table 7 in the Appendix we report the first-stage regressions for income and

---

<sup>17</sup>Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) show that distance is indeed a key determinant of remittance bilateral flows at aggregate level, with a negative effect.

<sup>18</sup>As always, the hypothesis of exogeneity for any particular variable is open to criticism; however, it should be kept in mind that we are estimating a structural form only for the remittances equation. As a consequence, we are assuming that our instruments do not affect *directly* the amount of money sent abroad. Instead, their direct effect on the propensity to remit is taken into account.

Table 1: IV dependent double-hurdle model

| Main equation      |        |          |        |           |                  |
|--------------------|--------|----------|--------|-----------|------------------|
|                    | coeff. | std.err. | z-stat | p-value   | non-IV estimates |
| const              | 16.912 | 3.703    | 4.567  | 0.000 *** | 1.048            |
| MALE               | 0.244  | 0.105    | 2.332  | 0.020 **  | 0.194            |
| AGE                | 0.395  | 0.418    | 0.946  | 0.344     | -0.378           |
| AGE2               | -0.061 | 0.052    | -1.171 | 0.242     | 0.041            |
| TIME               | 0.167  | 0.329    | 0.508  | 0.611     | 0.123            |
| CITIZENSHIP        | -0.588 | 0.262    | -2.244 | 0.025 **  | -0.575 ***       |
| RELATIVES          | 0.508  | 0.251    | 2.026  | 0.043 **  | 0.337 ***        |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.337 | 0.137    | -2.454 | 0.014 **  | -0.221           |
| SCHOOLING_3        | -0.678 | 0.179    | -3.795 | 0.000 *** | -0.574 *         |
| SCHOOLING_4        | -0.913 | 0.195    | -4.686 | 0.000 *** | -0.691 **        |
| GDP_PC             | 0.186  | 0.084    | 2.221  | 0.026 **  | 0.227 *          |
| DISTANCE           | -0.329 | 0.147    | -2.230 | 0.026 **  | -0.165           |
| INCOME             | 0.871  | 0.325    | 2.682  | 0.007 *** | 0.143            |
| CONSUMPTION        | -1.935 | 0.560    | -3.457 | 0.001 *** | 0.471            |
| Selection equation |        |          |        |           |                  |
|                    | coeff. | std.err. | z-stat | p-value   | non-IV estimates |
| const              | 4.776  | 1.228    | 3.890  | 0.000 *** | 4.973 *          |
| MALE               | 0.128  | 0.064    | 2.001  | 0.045 **  | 0.132 ***        |
| AGE                | 0.321  | 0.219    | 1.471  | 0.141     | 0.380 ***        |
| AGE2               | -0.061 | 0.026    | -2.340 | 0.019 **  | -0.067 ***       |
| TIME               | 0.056  | 0.237    | 0.236  | 0.814     | 0.024            |
| CITIZENSHIP        | 0.289  | 0.130    | 2.226  | 0.026 **  | 0.293 ***        |
| RELATIVES          | 0.305  | 0.154    | 1.978  | 0.048 **  | 0.314 ***        |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.058 | 0.085    | -0.690 | 0.490     | -0.049 **        |
| SCHOOLING_3        | -0.028 | 0.110    | -0.259 | 0.796     | -0.015           |
| SCHOOLING_4        | 0.120  | 0.142    | 0.843  | 0.399     | 0.132 **         |
| GDP_PC             | -0.279 | 0.037    | -7.562 | 0.000 *** | -0.278 ***       |
| DISTANCE           | -0.425 | 0.085    | -4.984 | 0.000 *** | -0.431 ***       |
| GOOD_ENG           | 0.100  | 0.086    | 1.162  | 0.245     | 0.122 ***        |
| FIRST_ENG          | -0.226 | 0.078    | -2.908 | 0.004 *** | -0.236 ***       |
| CITY               | -0.077 | 0.174    | -0.441 | 0.659     | -0.179           |
| CHILD              | -0.171 | 0.089    | -1.917 | 0.055 *   | -0.177 ***       |
| SPOUSE             | 0.282  | 0.091    | 3.106  | 0.002 *** | 0.226 *          |
| FAMILY_N           | -0.103 | 0.095    | -1.088 | 0.276     | -0.156 **        |
| $\sigma$           | 1.119  | 0.032    | 35.490 | 0.000 *** | 1.252 ***        |
| $\rho$             | -0.071 | 0.220    | -0.325 | 0.745     | -0.480           |

Note: QMLE standard errors (see White (1982)). The log-likelihood is equal to -4382.30 in the IV estimation and to -2221.19 in the simple double-hurdle model. The total number of cases is 2168 with 654 censored observations. The  $\chi^2_2$  Wald test statistic for exogeneity for income and consumption is 28.598 (p-value: 6.17e-7). The  $\chi^2_4$  overidentifying restriction test statistic is 6.087 (p-value: 0.193). First-stage F-tests: 89.965 (income), 97.703 (consumption).

consumption.

All our instrumental variables have a very significant impact on income and consumption and estimated coefficients have the expected signs. In addition, the Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity for income and consumption, suggesting the importance of accounting for reverse causality and simultaneity between such variables and remittances, while the over-identification test supports the validity of the chosen instruments. The customary  $F$ -tests on the reduced forms show no sign of instrument weakness.

Moving on to the main equation of the remittance model, the amount of money transferred to the family of origin depends positively on migrants' pre-transfer income and negatively on consumption expenditure. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level of confidence but the coefficient for consumption is almost twice as large (in modulus) than that for income. In particular, the coefficient on income, measuring the elasticity of remittances to pre-transfer immigrant's income, is never significantly different from 1. It is worth noting that pure altruistic models of remittance behaviour suggest that remittances are a superior good, while in a pure exchange motivation scenario remittances are a normal good; consequently, our findings are at odds with predictions of pure altruistic models of remittances, while they are reasonably consistent with exchange-driven models where optimal remittances are broadly proportional to income<sup>19</sup>.

By contrast, the elasticity of remittances to consumption is approximately equal to  $-2$ . In addition, a joint test for  $\beta_y = -\beta_c$  rejects the null with a  $p$ -value of 0.0024. This means that, income and other regressors being equal, when immigrants increase their consumption what they cut is remittances more than savings in the host country. However, this also indicates that an increase in an immigrant's income followed by a proportionally identical increase in his/her consumption, leaving the average propensity to consume unchanged, results in a decrease in the amount of money he/she transfers to the family of origin.

## 4.2 Other determinants of remittances

The effects of immigrants' gender and age on remittances are broadly in line with the majority of previous studies. Male immigrants tend to transfer back home significantly greater amounts of money than females and are also more likely to remit<sup>20</sup>, while the age of immigrants is not significantly correlated with the intensity of transfers to the family of origin (Funkhouser, 1995; Osili, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). However, older immigrants are more likely to remit, albeit at a decreasing pace<sup>21</sup>.

---

<sup>19</sup>See the Appendix for two simple log-utility models with altruistic and exchange motivations.

<sup>20</sup>The greater propensity to remit of males is consistent with the findings of (Funkhouser, 1995; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009). By contrast, Lucas and Stark (1985), Osaki (2003) and Naufal (2008) found that it is females who remit more.

<sup>21</sup>A joint test of significance of  $AGE$  and  $AGE2$  coefficients shows that the relation with the probability to remit is non-monotonic. An inverted U relationship between immigrants' age and remittances is also documented in Hoddinott (1994) and Clark and Drinkwater (2007).

Time elapsing from the arrival of immigrants to Australia has no significant effect on remittance decisions. This is in accordance with previous findings of Brown (1997), Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Dustmann and Mestres (2009) and is consistent with the altruistic motivation to remit, even if it should be noted that our sample includes only recently arrived immigrants.

The citizenship status of immigrants can be relevant to explaining remittance decisions, even if its effects are ambiguous. For example, to the extent that application for citizenship indicates the willingness of immigrants to reside permanently, or for a long time, in the host country we expect a negative relationship with transfers to the home country. However, if the citizenship status goes along with more stable and protected occupations in the host country and with access to wider forms of social protection, we might observe that 'citizen' immigrants are more inclined to remit. Our findings confirm the existence of opposite effects for citizenship. In particular, we find that immigrants who did apply for Australian citizenship are more likely to remit but, on average, they also remit smaller sums. This suggests that they are more likely to consider Australia their permanent country of residence and relax contacts with the family of origin. At the same time, however, by being well integrated in Australian society, immigrants who have obtained Australian citizenship can afford to send money back home with higher frequency than non-citizen immigrants<sup>22</sup>.

With regard to schooling variables, we find that the probability of immigrants remitting money is not significantly correlated with their level of educational attainment. However, in the main equation the coefficients on schooling dummies are significantly negative and increasing in modulus, suggesting that, income being equal, the more educated are the immigrants the greater is the amount of money they transfer home. The positive correlation between education and remittances has been already documented in the literature by, for example, Lucas and Stark (1985), Hodinott (1994), Funkhouser (1995) and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999), and has been taken as an important piece of evidence in favour of the exchange (repayment) motivations to remit.

Unsurprisingly, as any remittance theory predicts, we find that the presence of close relatives in the country of origin affects both the decisions on whether to remit and the amount actually remitted in a positive way<sup>23</sup>.

The distance from the home country and the cost of contacts with the origin family have inconsistent effects on remittances. For example, altruistic senders might be discouraged from transferring money back home if their sentiment decreases with the distance from the family. Similarly, selfish senders might be discouraged from remitting faraway, if we admit that the enforcement of exchanges with relatives at home can become more difficult with the distance. However, by saving on visit expenses,

---

<sup>22</sup>In a similar vein, the effects of legal status of the immigrant on remittances are not consistent across the literature. For example, Konica and Filer (2009) report that legal Albanian emigrants remit more than their illegal counterparts; by contrast, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Markova and Reilly (2007) found an opposite correlation for the case, respectively, of documented Mexican and Bulgarian emigrants.

<sup>23</sup>Again in Funkhouser (1995) family relationships are shown to be relevant both to the decision whether to remit and to the amount of money remitted. See also Clark and Drinkwater (2007).

immigrants, whether altruistic or selfish, can afford to send more money back home. Further, if remittances repay migration costs, transfers to the home country should increase with geographic distance. Our results show that distance plays a significant role both in the main equation and in the selection process. The farther the country of origin from Australia, the lower the propensity to remit and the lower the amount of money remitted<sup>24</sup>.

As we stated, the LSIA survey does not contain information on the immigrants' family of origin. In order to circumvent this deficiency to some degree, we exploit the cross-sectional nature of the dataset by introducing country-level variables. In particular, in the baseline model we control for the per capita GDP in the immigrant country of origin. Regression results show that GDP exerts opposite effects in the main equation and the selection equation: the income of immigrants being equal, the probability for origin-households to receive a transfer is lower if they live in a rich country; however, on average the amount of money they receive is higher than for recipients in poor countries. To the extent that GDP in the home country captures the living condition of the family of origin, our evidence is consistent with predictions of the exchange bargaining-type model of Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998). As they show, in contrast to the pure altruism hypothesis, for exchange motivated immigrants an increase in the income of recipients may raise the amount transferred, as the bargaining power of the latter is higher, but decreases the likelihood of remittances, as the benefits of participating in the exchange with migrants are lower for recipients.

With regard to the instrumental variables included in the selection equation (recall that in this case we estimate the reduced form), *CHILD* and *FIRST\_ENG* are negatively associated with the likelihood of immigrants sending money back home, while *SPOUSE* has a positive effect. Consistent with the previous literature (Clark and Drinkwater, 2007; Bollard, McKenzie, and Morte, 2009; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009), the presence of children in Australia reduces the probability of immigrants remitting. Somewhat surprisingly, instead, immigrants whose spouses are in Australia are more likely to send remittances<sup>25</sup>. A possible explanation for this finding is that when both wife and husband migrate, relatives of the enlarged family in the country of origin are left devoid of the help of both the adult sons and this increases their financial needs. Moreover, since we are estimating a reduced form, the positive sign of *SPOUSE* could hide the positive effect of immigrant income on the probability to remit. Finally, immigrants whose best spoken language is English are less likely to transfer money back home than others. To the extent that *FIRST\_ENG* captures the strength of social and cultural links to the country of origin, people who still do not consider English as their first language, after three years spent in Australia, probably view their homeland as the main centre of their interests and are therefore more likely to remit.

---

<sup>24</sup>A similar result is found in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2008), where the aggregate amount of remittances between pairs of countries are explained by means of a gravity model, showing that altruism is less of a factor that commonly considered.

<sup>25</sup>This is in contrast with all the previous literature (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007)).

## 5 Robustness checks

### 5.1 Non-IV, Heckit and Tobit estimates

In the last column of Table 1, we report estimation results from the non-IV double-hurdle model. The comparison with coefficients from IV estimates provide a clear confirmation of the need to address the endogeneity of immigrants' income and consumption. First, when *INCOME* and *CONSUMPTION* are not instrumented, neither coefficient appears to be significant. Moreover, the income elasticity of remittances is suspiciously much lower than 1<sup>26</sup> and the elasticity to consumption has the wrong sign. Moreover, the effect of education on the amount remitted is economically and statistically less significant than in IV estimates; gender influences the likelihood of remitting but not the amount remitted, and the distance from the country of origin only makes remittances less likely.

To validate our choice to use a double-hurdle model, we perform two Vuong tests comparing this model with, respectively, the Heckit and Tobit models. Table 8 in the Appendix reports the results from the three different models. In order to use homogeneous specifications, we compare the double-hurdle model with the Tobit and Heckit models on the basis of the unrestricted reduced form, thus avoiding to impose over-identification restrictions from the outset. The Vuong test clearly favours the double-hurdle model versus the Tobit model. A selection mechanism needs therefore to be included in the model, non remitters are not simply immigrants financially constrained and we need to model the decision whether to remit as a separate step from the decision concerning the amount to remit. However, the Vuong test fails to reject the equivalence of the double-hurdle model and the two-step Heckman procedure<sup>27</sup>.

Since the double-hurdle model accommodates both the case of immigrants who do not remit because they are unwilling to send money back home and the case of immigrants who are financially constrained, while the Heckit model considers all non-remitters as people who do not want to remit, we can read the result of the Vuong test as evidence that in our sample most non-remitters (if not all) fall into the category of people who are not interested in remitting, instead of being financially constrained.

### 5.2 Country-specific fixed effects

Ideally, one may want to control for unobserved characteristics of the country of origin by using a complete set of country dummies. In our case, however, this is not possible for two reasons.

The most important reason is that, after adjusting for missing values, we have 102 different origin countries, but most of these countries are represented by a very small

---

<sup>26</sup>Interestingly, a very similar result has been found by Sinning (2007). Using a non-IV double-hurdle model he reported that the elasticity of remittances to income ranges from 0.09 to 0.53.

<sup>27</sup>If we look at the estimated coefficients, double-hurdle and Heckit provide practically identical indications. By contrast, significance and magnitude of coefficients are quite different when using the Tobit estimator.

number of households, often with no remitting households at all. Clearly, the inclusion of dummy variables for such countries would cause unsurmountable identification problems and would make little sense anyway.

Secondly, even if we had a large enough sample size for each country, we already have a few country-specific variables in our baseline specification (distance, for one) and including a complete set of country dummies would obviously force us to drop those variables because of collinearity problems.

Hence, we decided to test the robustness of our baseline specification by means of the inclusion of a limited set of country-specific dummies, for those countries from which we had at least 15 households and 5 remitting households.<sup>28</sup> In practice, this is equivalent to grouping all the remaining countries into a residual “other countries” category. This choice led us to including 30 country dummies; it is worth noting that those 30 countries are the origin country for 1637 households out of 2168, so in fact our limited set of country dummies covers 75.5% of our sample.

Results are not reported for the sake of brevity; however, they can be briefly summarised as follows.

- Country effects are very significant: the maximised log-likelihood for the model with country dummies equals  $-4249.25$ . Compared with the maximised log-likelihood for the baseline model, this yields an *LR* statistic of 266.1, which leads to rejecting the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at any significance level.
- However, the remaining coefficients are remarkably stable. Elasticities of remittances with respect to income and consumption turn out to be 0.946 and  $-2.026$ , respectively (both significant at the 1% level). All other coefficients are also very similar to the ones in the baseline specification. The only minor exception is the coefficient of *GDP\_PC* in the remittance equation, which equals 0.195 with a *p*-value of 10.7%, while the coefficient to *GDP\_PC* in the selection equation remains negative and very significant ( $-0.285$ , with a standard error of 0.056), thus lending strong support to the idea that income in the home country affects remittances mainly via the decision whether to remit or not, rather than via the amounts.
- All diagnostics tests (see subsection 5.1) remain virtually unchanged.

### 5.3 Controlling for other macroeconomic characteristics

In the baseline specification we control for the economic conditions of recipients only by means of per capita GDP in the home country. Here, we add two more macroeconomic variables that can be correlated with the average income capacity of recipients: the average growth of GDP in the period between 1992 and 2000 (*GDP\_GROWTH*) and GDP volatility expressed as the standard deviation of  $\Delta \ln \text{GDP}$  in the same period (*GDP\_VOLATILITY*). Both these variables contribute to capture the insurance motivation to remit due, respectively, to the long-run prospects and short-run uncertainty in

---

<sup>28</sup>Other thresholds were tried, with no appreciable differences.

Table 2: IV dependent double-hurdle model: macro variables

| Main equation          |            |            |            |
|------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| const                  | 17.198 *** | 16.413 *** | 16.593 *** |
| MALE                   | 0.234 **   | 0.241 **   | 0.237 **   |
| AGE                    | 0.387      | 0.350      | 0.346      |
| AGE2                   | -0.060     | -0.056     | -0.055     |
| TIME                   | 0.186      | 0.153      | 0.162      |
| CITIZENSHIP            | -0.629 *** | -0.581 **  | -0.588 **  |
| RELATIVES              | 0.482 *    | 0.482 *    | 0.468 *    |
| SCHOOLING_2            | -0.345 **  | -0.335 **  | -0.336 **  |
| SCHOOLING_3            | -0.690 *** | -0.681 *** | -0.683 *** |
| SCHOOLING_4            | -0.933 *** | -0.930 *** | -0.935 *** |
| GDP_PC                 | 0.199 **   | 0.203 **   | 0.207 **   |
| GDP_VOLATILITY         | -0.024     |            | -0.009     |
| GDP_GROWTH             |            | 0.029      | 0.025      |
| DISTANCE               | -0.315 **  | -0.279 *   | -0.281 *   |
| INCOME                 | 0.849 ***  | 0.914 ***  | 0.025      |
| CONSUMPTION            | -1.948 *** | -1.980 *** | 0.905 ***  |
| Selection equation     |            |            |            |
| const                  | 4.633 ***  | 4.877 ***  | 4.505 ***  |
| MALE                   | 0.135 **   | 0.129 **   | 0.135 **   |
| AGE                    | 0.334      | 0.328      | 0.330      |
| AGE2                   | -0.063 **  | -0.062 **  | -0.063 **  |
| TIME                   | 0.032      | 0.052      | 0.031      |
| CITIZENSHIP            | 0.289 **   | 0.288 **   | 0.290 **   |
| RELATIVES              | 0.332 **   | 0.312 **   | 0.330 **   |
| SCHOOLING_2            | -0.054     | -0.057     | -0.054     |
| SCHOOLING_3            | -0.022     | -0.028     | -0.019     |
| SCHOOLING_4            | 0.134      | 0.123      | 0.136      |
| GDP_PC                 | -0.279 *** | -0.281 *** | -0.278 *** |
| GDP_VOLATILITY         | 0.019      |            | 0.023      |
| GDP_GROWTH             |            | -0.006     | 0.006      |
| DISTANCE               | -0.414 *** | -0.433 *** | -0.404 *** |
| GOOD_ENG               | 0.109      | 0.098      | 0.115      |
| FIRST_ENG              | -0.206 *** | -0.225 *** | -0.204 **  |
| CITY                   | -0.080     | -0.080     | -0.082     |
| CHILD                  | -0.168 *   | -0.169 *   | -0.168 *   |
| SPOUSE                 | 0.281 ***  | 0.279 ***  | 0.284 ***  |
| FAMILY_N               | -0.098     | -0.104     | -0.098     |
| $\sigma$               | 1.121 ***  | 1.118 ***  | 1.120 ***  |
| $\rho$                 | -0.113     | -0.100     | -0.123     |
| Endog. test (p-value)  | 0.00       | 0.00       | 0.00       |
| Overid. test (p-value) | 0.128      | 0.093      | 0.060      |
| Log-likelihood         | -4380.31   | -4379.03   | -4377.87   |
| Total cases            | 2168       | 2168       | 2168       |
| Uncensored             | 654        | 654        | 654        |

Note: Robust standard errors are reported.

the parental family's income<sup>29</sup>. For example, a positive coefficient on income volatility in the selection equation would indicate that, *ceteris paribus*, the probability of being a remitter rises if the home country is exposed to stronger economic fluctuations. Results reported in Table 2 show that neither average GDP growth nor volatility prove significant in any specification, even if the sign of coefficients is consistent with the insurance motive. In any event, the robustness of the other results, and in particular the high significance of the coefficients on income and consumption, are confirmed.

## 6 Remittances, financial development and institutional quality

In the last part of our study, we analyse the nexus between remittance behaviour and the degree of financial development and institutional quality in the immigrants' country of origin.

This issue has recently attracted great research effort in the macroeconomic literature on remittances. The effects of financial and institutional development in the home country on the decisions to remit are diverse and inconsistent. On the one hand, the development of financial institutions is likely to influence the level of immigrants' trust in the country of origin as a sound environment in which to invest their own savings and send remittances. Such a channel of influence is especially important for selfish remitters, for whom a solid and trustworthy economic environment can be key factors in determining the geographical allocation of savings. In this vein, Freund and Spatafora (2005) and Niimi and Ozden (2006) indeed show that the level of financial development of the home country seems to have a crucial and positive impact on remittance inflows; similarly, Bettin and Zazzaro (2009) stress the complementarity between remittances and financial systems' efficiency in the economic growth of developing countries. On the other hand, a substitution mechanism could also be at work (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009): where credit markets do not function properly and borrowers are constrained in their access to credit, remittances allow recipient households to bridge financial constraints.

The same ambiguity holds for the quality of institutions: well functioning home institutions might encourage migrants to transfer greater sums of money to relatives at home; however, the presence of good institutions can render remittances less urgent. Consistently, the available evidence is mixed. Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin (2009) find evidence in favour of complementarity between remittances and the quality of institutions of developing countries: the positive correlation between the two seems to imply that the growth enhancing effect by remittances is stronger where institutions are sound<sup>30</sup>. On the contrary, Abdih, Chami, Dagher, and Montiel (2008) suggest that remittance inflows and institutional quality can be substitutes, as a great abundance of money remitted increases corruption and worsens the functioning

---

<sup>29</sup>In fact, GDP growth also control for the rate of return of capital in the home country, which is a relevant factor for non-altruistic remitters.

<sup>30</sup>In a similar vein, Papaioannou (2009) shows that international financial flows from banks are positively affected by the quality of institutions of the recipient country.

Table 3: IV dependent double-hurdle model: financial variables

| Main equation      |            |            |            |
|--------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| const              | 19.716 *** | 19.369 *** | 19.278 *** |
| MALE               | 0.303 ***  | 0.307 ***  | 0.296 ***  |
| AGE                | 0.321      | 0.332      | 0.293      |
| AGE2               | -0.054     | -0.054     | -0.049     |
| TIME               | -0.145     | -0.118     | -0.171     |
| CITIZENSHIP        | -0.572 **  | -0.593 **  | -0.511 *   |
| RELATIVES          | 0.469 *    | 0.473 *    | 0.468 *    |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.365 **  | -0.369 **  | -0.376 *** |
| SCHOOLING_3        | -0.605 *** | -0.611 *** | -0.616 *** |
| SCHOOLING_4        | -0.819 *** | -0.893 *** | -0.829 *** |
| GDP_PC             | 0.054      | 0.048      | -0.020     |
| DEPOSITS           | 0.147 ***  |            |            |
| CREDIT             |            | 0.144 *    |            |
| LIQUID_LIAB        |            |            | 0.384 ***  |
| DISTANCE           | -0.256 *   | -0.204     | -0.148     |
| INCOME             | 1.065 ***  | 1.047 ***  | 1.006 ***  |
| CONSUMPTION        | -2.251 *** | -2.247 *** | -2.153 *** |
| Selection equation |            |            |            |
| const              | 5.694 ***  | 5.515 ***  | 5.388 ***  |
| MALE               | 0.113 *    | 0.113 *    | 0.111      |
| AGE                | 0.206      | 0.203      | 0.214      |
| AGE2               | -0.047 *   | -0.046 *   | -0.048 *   |
| TTIME              | -0.053     | -0.040     | -0.033     |
| CITIZENSHIP        | 0.291 **   | 0.287 **   | 0.283 **   |
| RELATIVES          | 0.197      | 0.210      | 0.216      |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.029     | -0.028     | -0.026     |
| SCHOOLING_3        | -0.021     | -0.023     | -0.023     |
| SCHOOLING_4        | 0.133      | 0.110      | 0.109      |
| GDP_PC             | -0.310 *** | -0.300 *** | -0.274 *** |
| DEPOSITS           | 0.052      |            |            |
| CREDIT             |            | 0.033      |            |
| LIQUID_LIAB        |            |            | 0.001      |
| DISTANCE           | -0.415 *** | -0.411 *** | -0.432 *** |
| GOOD_ENG           | 0.022      | 0.034      | 0.039      |
| FIRST_ENG          | -0.223 *** | -0.227 *** | -0.222 *** |
| CITY               | 0.000      | -0.005     | -0.010     |
| CHILD              | -0.188 **  | -0.184 *   | -0.185 *   |
| SPOUSE             | 0.275 ***  | 0.278 ***  | 0.274 ***  |
| FAMILY_N           | -0.111     | -0.116     | -0.112     |
| $\sigma$           | 1.112 ***  | 1.114 ***  | 1.109 ***  |
| $\rho$             | 0.011      | -0.020     | -0.015     |
| Endog test         | 0.000      | 0.000      | 0.000      |
| Overid test        | 0.352      | 0.299      | 0.498      |
| Log-likelihood     | -3846.88   | -3848.46   | -3839.23   |
| Total cases        | 1939       | 1939       | 1935       |
| Uncensored         | 584        | 584        | 584        |

Note: Robust standard errors are reported.

of public and private institutions.

In what follows, financial development is measured, alternatively, by the three standard ratios introduced in the literature by King and Levine (1993): the share of bank deposits (*DEPOSITS*), the share of bank credit to the private sector (*CREDIT*) or the share of liquid liabilities of the financial system (*LIQUID LIAB*), all expressed as a percentage of the country GDP<sup>31</sup>. These variables enter the model of remittance dated back to the year of the interview<sup>32</sup>.

With regard to the home-country institutional quality, it is measured by four indexes of risk rating by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): economic risk rating (*ECON\_RISK*), political risk rating (*POLIT\_RISK*), financial risk rating (*FIN\_RISK*) and the composite risk index (*COMP\_RISK*) which results from the synthesis of the previous ones. The financial and economic risk indexes are based on a 0-50 scale, *POLIT\_RISK* on a 0-100 scale. The grades from the three indices are then weighted to produce the Composite Risk Index. Regardless of the scale, the highest overall rating indicates the lowest risk, and the lowest rating indicates the highest risk. Also institutional variables enter equation (9) dated back to the year of the interview.

Out of the three different proxies we use for financial development, *DEPOSITS* and *LIQUID LIAB* are highly significant (1% level), while *CREDIT* is significant at the 10% level (see table 3). The coefficients are always positive in line with the view of finance and remittances as complements, for which countries with more developed financial systems are able to attract larger amounts of remittances. Once we control for financial development, the level of per capita GDP does not play a significant role in the remittance main equation anymore. In the selection equation, however, financial variables do not exert any significant effect on the probability of being a remitter, while per capita GDP is still a powerful explanatory variable. Since per capita GDP is meant as a proxy for the living conditions of relatives in the country of origin, we could conclude that while altruistic motivations matter in terms of propensity to remit, the amount of money remitted is primarily determined by a different set of factors regarding the solidity of the country of origin and its investment opportunities.

Whatever the proxy used for financial development, regression results confirm the importance (and the endogeneity) of immigrant income and consumption for remittance decisions. Estimated coefficients are always significant at the 1% level and their size is slightly larger than in the basic specification (1.006-1.065 for income and 2.153-2.251 for consumption).

Moving on to institutional quality variables, the effects on remittances are mixed (see Table 4). The composite risk index has no effects on the main and selection equations, nor has the economic risk index. By contrast, the political and financial risks in the home country exert significant but opposite effects on immigrants' decisions to remit. Consistent with findings for financial development, where financial risks are low, remittance inflows are greater on average. However, the soundness of financial markets

---

<sup>31</sup>*DEPOSITS*, *CREDIT* and *LIQUID LIAB* are constructed from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.

We draw these ratios from Beck, Demirgüç-Künt, and Levine (2000).

<sup>32</sup>We also tested the robustness of our results by using the mean value of each of the three financial variables over the period, and results proved qualitatively identical.

Table 4: IV dependent double-hurdle model: institutional variables

| Main equation      |            |            |            |            |
|--------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| const              | 19.263 *** | 19.038 *** | 18.902 *** | 17.965 *** |
| MALE               | 0.254 **   | 0.250 **   | 0.253 **   | 0.241 **   |
| AGE                | 0.005      | 0.022      | -0.036     | -0.059     |
| AGE2               | -0.009     | -0.010     | -0.004     | -0.003     |
| TIME               | -0.112     | -0.183     | -0.079     | -0.097     |
| CITIZENSHIP        | -0.552 **  | -0.496 *   | -0.540 **  | -0.496 *   |
| RELATIVES          | 0.508 *    | 0.543 **   | 0.486 *    | 0.443 *    |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.292 **  | -0.285 **  | -0.295 **  | -0.278 *   |
| SCHOOLING_3        | -0.714 *** | -0.667 *** | -0.707 *** | -0.628 *** |
| SCHOOLING_4        | -0.928 *** | -0.886 *** | -0.926 *** | -0.855 *** |
| GDP_PC             | 0.234 **   | 0.386 ***  | 0.190 **   | 0.128      |
| CRI                | -0.589     |            |            |            |
| PRR                |            | -2.355 *** |            |            |
| ERR                |            |            | 0.025      |            |
| FRR                |            |            |            | 2.835 ***  |
| DISTANCE           | -0.358 *   | -0.379 *   | -0.346 *   | -0.343 *   |
| INCOME             | 1.017 ***  | 1.122 ***  | 0.986 ***  | 1.037 ***  |
| CONSUMPTION        | -2.129 *** | -2.204 *** | -2.076 *** | -2.077 *** |
| Selection equation |            |            |            |            |
| const              | 6.460 ***  | 6.421 ***  | 6.653 ***  | 6.745 ***  |
| MALE               | 0.136 **   | 0.141 **   | 0.137 **   | 0.141 **   |
| AGE                | 0.382 *    | 0.362      | 0.381 *    | 0.388 *    |
| AGE2               | -0.069 **  | -0.067 **  | -0.069 **  | -0.070 **  |
| TIME               | 0.000      | 0.042      | -0.023     | 0.009      |
| CITIZENSHIP        | 0.270 **   | 0.275 **   | 0.266 **   | 0.259 **   |
| RELATIVES          | 0.162      | 0.144      | 0.174      | 0.163      |
| SCHOOLING_2        | -0.015     | -0.017     | -0.012     | -0.018     |
| SCHOOLING_3        | 0.043      | 0.046      | 0.039      | 0.024      |
| SCHOOLING_4        | 0.253      | 0.249      | 0.249      | 0.229      |
| GDP_PC             | -0.263 *** | -0.329 *** | -0.246 *** | -0.251 *** |
| CRI                | -0.171     |            |            |            |
| PRR                |            | 0.605      |            |            |
| ERR                |            |            | -0.834     |            |
| FRR                |            |            |            | -1.106 *   |
| DISTANCE           | -0.586 *** | -0.591 *** | -0.598 *** | -0.602 *** |
| GOOD_ENG           | 0.072      | 0.073      | 0.078      | 0.067      |
| FIRST_ENG          | -0.145 *   | -0.165 **  | -0.139 *   | -0.155 *   |
| CITY               | -0.060     | -0.041     | -0.060     | -0.046     |
| CHILD              | -0.147     | -0.143     | -0.148     | -0.143     |
| SPOUSE             | 0.276 ***  | 0.283 ***  | 0.271 ***  | 0.273 ***  |
| FAMILY_N           | -0.158     | -0.165     | -0.158     | -0.165     |
| $\sigma$           | 1.134      | 1.129      | 1.135      | 1.128      |
| $\rho$             | -0.110     | -0.045     | -0.122     | -0.110     |
| Endog test         | 0.00       | 0.00       | 0.00       | 0.00       |
| Overid test        | 0.19       | 0.31       | 0.17       | 0.15       |
| Log-likelihood     | -3963.84   | -3949.04   | -3967.5    | -3965.73   |
| Total cases        | 1967       | 1967       | 1967       | 1967       |
| Uncensored         | 573        | 573        | 573        | 573        |

Note: Robust standard errors are reported.

acts as a substitute for the likelihood of immigrants remitting. Political instability in the country of origin, instead, urges immigrants to help relatives at home, but the sums remitted tend to be small.

## 7 Conclusions

In this paper, we provided empirical evidence about remittance strategies of a panel of immigrants from 125 different countries who recently settled in Australia. By means of a simultaneous-equation model, we set remittances in the broader context of households' work and consumption decisions, hence addressing the potential problem of endogeneity, that has seldom been investigated in the existing literature. The censored nature of the remittance variable is dealt with by estimating a double-hurdle model that provides higher generality than the customarily used Tobit and Heckit models. A LIML estimator was developed to contemplate endogenous regressors (in our case, earnings and consumption) and deal with the selection mechanism at the same time. Our results show that endogeneity is indeed affecting both immigrants' pre-transfer earnings and consumption as determinants of remittance behaviour. Once we take it into account, the evidence goes in favour of exchange motives governing remittances, even if altruistic motivation cannot be excluded. Thanks to the cross-country dimension of our dataset, the last part of our analysis explored the relationship between remittance strategies and the level of financial development and the quality of institutions of immigrants' countries of origin. Although this nexus has already been explored in a number of recent macro studies, ours is the first contribution to investigate it at a micro level in the context of household decisions.

## References

- ABDIH, Y., R. CHAMI, J. DAGHER, AND P. MONTIEL (2008): "Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?," Working Paper 29, IMF.
- AGGARWAL, R., A. DEMIRGUÇ-KÜNT, AND M. S. MARTINEZ PERIA (2006): "Do workers' remittances promote financial development?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3957, The World Bank.
- AGGARWAL, R., AND A. W. HOROWITZ (2002): "Are International Remittances Altruism or Insurance? Evidence from Guyana Using Multiple-Migrant Households," *World Development*, 30(11), 2033–2044.
- AMEMIYA, T. (1985): *Advanced Econometrics*. Harvard University Press.
- AMUEDO-DORANTES, C., AND S. POZO (2006): "Remittances as insurance: evidence from Mexican immigrants," *Journal of Population Economics*, 19(2), 227–254.
- BECK, T., A. DEMIRGUÇ-KÜNT, AND R. LEVINE (2000): "A New Database on Financial Development and Structure," *World Bank Economic Review*, 14, 597–605.

- BETTIN, G., AND R. J. LUCCHETTI (2009): "Instrumental Variable Interval Regression," in *Econometrics with gretl. Proceedings of the gretl Conference 2009*, ed. by I. Díaz-Emparanza, P. Mariel, and M. V. Esteban, EHUCHAPS, chap. 6, pp. 91–107. Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
- BETTIN, G., AND A. ZAZZARO (2009): "Remittances and Financial Development: Substitutes or Complements in Economic Growth?," MoFiR Working Paper 28, Money and Finance Research Group.
- BLUNDELL, R., J. HAM, AND C. MEGHIR (1987): "Unemployment and Female Labour Supply," *Economic Journal*, 97(388a), 44–64.
- BLUNDELL, R., AND R. J. SMITH (1994): "Coherency and estimation in simultaneous models with censored or qualitative dependent variables," *Journal of Econometrics*, 64(1–2), 355–373.
- BOLLARD, A., D. MCKENZIE, AND M. MORTE (2009): "The Remitting Patterns of African Migrants in the OECD," Discussion Paper Series 21/09, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, University College London.
- BROWN, R. P. (1997): "Estimating Remittance Functions for Pacific Island Migrants," *World Development*, 25(4), 613–626.
- CARDOSO, A. R., E. FONTAINHA, AND C. MONFARDINI (2008): "Children and Parents Time Use: Empirical Evidence on Investment in Human Capital in France, Italy and Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3815, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- CARLING, J. (2008): "The Determinants of Migrant Remittances," *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 24(3), 581–598.
- CATRINESCU, N., M. LEON-LEDESMA, M. PIRACHA, AND B. QUILLIN (2009): "Remittances, Institutions and Economic Growth," *World Development*, 37(1), 81–92.
- CHAMI, R., C. FULLENKAMP, AND S. JAHJAH (2005): "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development?," *IMF Staff Papers*, 52(1), 55–81.
- CLARK, K., AND S. DRINKWATER (2007): "An Investigation of Household Remittance Behaviour; Evidence from the United Kingdom," *The Manchester School*, 75(6), 717–741.
- COTTRELL, A., AND R. J. LUCCHETTI (2009): *Gretl User's Manual*, available at <http://gretl.ecn.wfu.edu/pub/gretl/manual/en/gretl-guide-a4.pdf>.
- COX, D., Z. ESER, AND E. JIMENEZ (1998): "Motives for private transfers over the life cycle: An analytical framework and evidence for Peru," *Journal of Development Economics*, 55(1), 57–80.

- CRAGG, J. G. (1971): "Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods," *Econometrica*, 39, 829–844.
- DAVIDSON, R., AND J. G. MACKINNON (1984): "Model specification tests based on artificial linear regressions," *International Economic Review*, 25, 485–502.
- DE CLEMENTI, A. (1994): "Rimesse e mercati," *Parolechiave*, 6, 89–104.
- DELPYERRE, M., AND B. VERHEYDEN (2009): "The investment motive for remittances and return prospects of international migrants: theory and empirical evidence," Paper presented at the "Poverty Traps" conference, Naples, 30-31 October 2009.
- DUSTMANN, C., AND J. MESTRES (2009): "Remittances and Temporary Migration," Discussion Paper Series 09/09, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, University College London.
- ESTEVEZ, R., AND D. KHOUDUR-CASTÉRAS (2009): "Remittances, Capital Flows and Financial Development during the Mass Migration Period, 1870-1913," Working Paper 12, CEPII.
- FREUND, C., AND N. SPATAFORA (2005): "Remittances : transaction costs, determinants, and informal flows," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3704, The World Bank.
- FUNKHOUSER, E. (1995): "Remittances from International Migration: a Comparison of El Salvador and Nicaragua," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 77(1), 137–146.
- GIULIANO, P., AND M. RUIZ-ARRANZ (2009): "Remittances, Financial Development and Growth," *Journal of Development Economics*, 90(1), 144–152.
- HAGEN-ZANKER, J., AND M. SIEGEL (2007): "The Determinants of Remittances: A Review of the Literature," Working Paper 07/03, Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University.
- HATTON, T. J., AND J. G. WILLIAMSON (1998): *The Age of Mass Migration. Causes and Economic Impact*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- HODDINOTT, J. (1994): "A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 46, 459–476.
- ILAHY, N., AND S. JAFAREY (1999): "Guestworker migration, remittances and the extended family: evidence from Pakistan," *Journal of Development Economics*, 58(2), 485–512.
- JONES, A. M. (1989): "A Double-Hurdle Model of Cigarette Consumption," *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 4(1), 23–39.
- (1992): "A Note on Computation of the Double-Hurdle Model with Dependence with an Application to Tobacco Expenditure," *Bulletin of Economic Research*, 44(1), 67–74.

- KING, R., AND R. LEVINE (1993): "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3), 717–753.
- KONICA, N., AND R. K. FILER (2009): "Albanian Emigration: Causes and Consequences," *South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, 7(1), 75–98.
- LIANOS, T. P. (1997): "Factors Determining Migrant Remittances: The Case of Greece," *International Migration Review*, 31(1), 72–87.
- LUCAS, R. E., AND O. STARK (1985): "Motivations to remit: evidence from Botswana," *Journal of Political Economy*, 93(5), 901–918.
- LUETH, E., AND M. RUIZ-ARRANZ (2008): "Determinants of Bilateral Remittance Flows," *The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics*, 8(1).
- MARKOVA, E., AND B. REILLY (2007): "Bulgarian migrant remittances and legal status: some micro-level evidence from Madrid," *South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, 5(1), 55–69.
- MASULLO, G. (2001): "Economia delle rimesse," in *Storia dell'emigrazione italiana. Partenze*, ed. by P. Bevilacqua, A. De Clementi, and E. Franzina. Donzelli, Roma.
- MENJIVAR, C., J. DA VANZO, L. GREENWELL, AND R. B. VALDEZ (1998): "Remittance behaviour among Salvadoran and Filipino immigrants in Los Angeles," *International Migration Review*, 32(1), 97–126.
- MERKLE, L., AND K. F. ZIMMERMANN (1992): "Savings, Remittances and Return Migration," *Economics Letters*, 38(1), 77–81.
- NAUFAL, G. S. (2008): "Why Remit? The Case of Nicaragua," IZA Discussion Paper Series 3276, Institute for the Study of Labor.
- NIIMI, Y., AND C. OZDEN (2006): "Migration and remittances : causes and linkages," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4087, The World Bank.
- OSAKI, K. (2003): "Migrant Remittances in Thailand: Economic Necessity or Social Norm?," *Journal of Population Research*, 20(2), 203–222.
- OSILI, U. O. (2007): "Remittances and Savings from International Migration: Theory and Evidence using a Matched Sample," *Journal of Development Economics*, 83(2), 446–465.
- PAPAIOANNOU, E. (2009): "What drives international financial flows? Politics, institutions and other determinants," *Journal of Economic Development*, 88(2), 269–2811.
- RAPOPORT, H., AND F. DOCQUIER (2006): "The Economics of Migrants' Remittances," in *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, ed. by S. Kolm, and J. Mercier Ythier, vol. 2, pp. 1135–1198. Elsevier.

- SINNING, M. (2007): "Determinants of Savings and Remittances: Empirical Evidence from Immigrants to Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 2966, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- SOLIMANO, A. (2003): "Development Cycles, Political Regimes and International Migration: Argentina in the 20th century," *Macroeconomía del Desarrollo* 22, CEPAL, Naciones Unidas.
- STARK, O. (2009): "Reasons for Remitting," Discussion Papers 52800, University of Bonn, Centre for Development Research (ZEF).
- VUONG, Q. H. (1989): "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-nested Hypotheses," *Econometrica*, 57(2), 307–33.
- WHITE, H. (1982): "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models," *Econometrica*, 50(1), 1–25.
- YANG, D. (2009): "International Migration, Remittances and Investment: Evidence From Philippine Migrants' Exchange Rate Shocks," *Economic Journal*, 118(4), 591–630.
- YANG, D., AND H. CHOI (2007): "Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines," *The World Bank Economic Review*, 21(2), 219–248.
- ZAICEVA, A., AND K. F. ZIMMERMANN (2007): "Children, Kitchen, Church: Does Ethnicity Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6491, CEPR, London.

## A Two simple models of pure altruistic and selfish remittances

In this appendix we present two very simple models for immigrants' pure-unilateral-altruistic and pure-exchange remittances and savings decisions. Consider an immigrant who lives for two periods. During the first period the immigrant is assumed to earn an income  $Y_m$  that he/she can allocate over consumption, savings in the host country and remittances to the origin family. The immigrant maximises a time-separable and log-linear utility function defined over first- and second-period consumption and, alternatively, origin-family utility in the first period (altruistic transfers) or services acquirable from remittances back home (selfish transfers).

### A.1 Pure altruism

In this case, the maximisation problem is:

$$\max_{C_1, C_2, R} U_m = \ln(C_1) + \rho \ln(C_2) + \gamma \ln(C_p)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} C_p &= Y_p + R \\ Y_m &= C_1 + \delta C_2 + R \\ R &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where  $C$  and  $Y$  stand for consumption and income,  $m$  and  $p$  for immigrant and parental family,  $R$  is the amount of money remitted,  $\rho$  and  $\delta$  are the individual and market inter-temporal discount factors, and  $\gamma$  is the relative degree of altruism. From the first order conditions, it is easy to verify that:

$$R = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma + \rho} Y_m - \frac{1 + \rho}{1 + \gamma + \rho} Y_p \right\}$$

and the elasticity of  $R$  with respect to  $Y_m$

$$\epsilon = \frac{\gamma Y_m}{\gamma Y_m - (1 + \rho) Y_p} > 1$$

## A.2 Pure selfishness

$$\max_{C_1, C_2, R} U_m = \ln(C_1) + \rho \ln(C_2) + \beta \ln(S)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} S &= \alpha R \\ Y_m &= C_1 + \delta C_2 + R \\ R &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where  $S$  is the amount of services in the home country acquired by remittances,  $\beta$  is its relative utility and  $\alpha$  is the relative price. From the first order conditions, it is easy to verify that:

$$R = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta + \rho} Y_m$$

and the elasticity of  $R$  with respect to  $Y_m$  is equal to 1.

## B Auxiliary tables and figures

Table 5: Main countries of origin of immigrants in LSIA 1

| Country of Origin      | Number of households | Share of remitters | Avg. remittance (AUS \$) |
|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| United Kingdom         | 315                  | 14.3%              | 3,650                    |
| China                  | 148                  | 37.8%              | 3,882                    |
| India                  | 135                  | 37.0%              | 3,583                    |
| Vietnam                | 134                  | 47.8%              | 1,320                    |
| Philippines            | 131                  | 58.0%              | 2,205                    |
| Former Yugoslavia      | 114                  | 48.2%              | 2,243                    |
| Hong Kong, China       | 109                  | 22.0%              | 6,267                    |
| South Africa           | 106                  | 14.2%              | 5,690                    |
| Sri Lanka              | 96                   | 50.0%              | 1,464                    |
| Iraq                   | 88                   | 62.5%              | 3,296                    |
| Malaysia               | 82                   | 35.4%              | 4,278                    |
| Indonesia              | 79                   | 30.4%              | 1,473                    |
| Fiji                   | 77                   | 35.1%              | 2,033                    |
| Germany                | 70                   | 10.0%              | 2,129                    |
| Myanmar                | 69                   | 40.6%              | 1,788                    |
| Ukraine                | 68                   | 27.9%              | 1,403                    |
| Lebanon                | 67                   | 23.9%              | 1,425                    |
| Korea, Rep.            | 64                   | 10.9%              | 1,379                    |
| Afghanistan            | 63                   | 58.7%              | 2,389                    |
| Cambodia               | 62                   | 37.1%              | 1,061                    |
| Japan                  | 62                   | 8.1%               | 11,100                   |
| Russian Federation     | 62                   | 32.3%              | 2,935                    |
| Poland                 | 61                   | 19.7%              | 1,900                    |
| Iran, Islamic Rep.     | 60                   | 16.7%              | 3,580                    |
| Italy                  | 60                   | 6.7%               | 1,925                    |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 56                   | 53.6%              | 1,605                    |
| Egypt, Arab Rep.       | 56                   | 23.2%              | 2,908                    |
| Turkey                 | 56                   | 37.5%              | 1,390                    |
| United States          | 56                   | 10.7%              | 2,150                    |
| Romania                | 55                   | 41.8%              | 1,761                    |

Note: the average amount of remittances is computed on remitters only.

Figure 2: Share of remitters and average log remittances by log GDP of country of origin




Table 6: Descriptive statistics

| Variable       | Mean   | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev. |
|----------------|--------|---------|---------|-----------|
| REMITTANCES    | 1.919  | 0       | 9.953   | 2.974     |
| INCOME         | 10.505 | 8.232   | 11.177  | 0.689     |
| CONSUMPTION    | 9.907  | 7.122   | 10.955  | 0.395     |
| MALE           | 0.416  | 0       | 1       | 0.493     |
| AGE            | 3.793  | 1.800   | 8.700   | 1.158     |
| TIME           | 3.444  | 3.039   | 4.868   | 0.127     |
| CITIZENSHIP    | 0.927  | 0       | 1       | 0.260     |
| RELATIVES      | 0.946  | 0       | 1       | 0.227     |
| SCHOOLING.2    | 0.505  | 0       | 1       | 0.500     |
| SCHOOLING.3    | 0.221  | 0       | 1       | 0.415     |
| SCHOOLING.4    | 0.114  | 0       | 1       | 0.318     |
| GDP_PC         | 8.814  | 6.208   | 10.594  | 0.986     |
| GDP_VOLATILITY | 2.880  | 0.556   | 15.004  | 2.361     |
| GDP_GROWTH     | 2.546  | -7.324  | 8.629   | 2.552     |
| CRI            | 0.703  | 0.310   | 0.913   | 0.121     |
| PRR            | 0.703  | 0.260   | 0.940   | 0.144     |
| ERR            | 0.346  | 0.095   | 0.500   | 0.066     |
| FRR            | 0.357  | 0.130   | 0.495   | 0.064     |
| CREDIT         | 0.960  | -4.004  | 0.779   | 1.011     |
| DEPOSIT        | 0.959  | -5.905  | 1.166   | 1.061     |
| LIQUID_LIAB    | 0.694  | -2.658  | 1.168   | 0.666     |
| DISTANCE       | 9.269  | 7.825   | 9.777   | 0.390     |
| GOOD_ENG       | 0.621  | 0       | 1       | 0.485     |
| FIRST_ENG      | 0.187  | 0       | 1       | 0.390     |
| CITY           | 0.974  | 0       | 1       | 0.161     |
| CHILD          | 0.543  | 0       | 1       | 0.498     |
| SPOUSE         | 0.750  | 0       | 1       | 0.433     |
| FAMILY_N       | 1.117  | 0       | 2.773   | 0.487     |

Table 7: Baseline model: first-stage estimates

| First stage for log income      |        |          |         |           |
|---------------------------------|--------|----------|---------|-----------|
|                                 | coeff. | std.err. | z-stat  | p-value   |
| const                           | 9.074  | 0.476    | 19.050  | 0.000 *** |
| MALE                            | 0.019  | 0.025    | 0.746   | 0.456     |
| TIME                            | 0.102  | 0.088    | 1.161   | 0.245     |
| AGE                             | 0.141  | 0.092    | 1.524   | 0.128     |
| AGE2                            | -0.028 | 0.011    | -2.589  | 0.010 *** |
| SCHOOLING_2                     | -0.184 | 0.031    | -5.857  | 0.000 *** |
| SCHOOLING_3                     | -0.304 | 0.044    | -6.918  | 0.000 *** |
| SCHOOLING_4                     | -0.206 | 0.054    | -3.809  | 0.000 *** |
| CITIZENSHIP                     | -0.046 | 0.048    | -0.955  | 0.340     |
| RELATIVES                       | -0.005 | 0.055    | -0.091  | 0.927     |
| GOOD_ENG                        | 0.215  | 0.035    | 6.132   | 0.000 *** |
| FIRST_ENG                       | 0.248  | 0.029    | 8.609   | 0.000 *** |
| CITY                            | 0.100  | 0.074    | 1.343   | 0.179     |
| CHILD                           | -0.442 | 0.033    | -13.340 | 0.000 *** |
| SPOUSE                          | 0.176  | 0.034    | 5.095   | 0.000 *** |
| FAMILY_N                        | 0.598  | 0.036    | 16.510  | 0.000 *** |
| GDP_PC                          | 0.085  | 0.016    | 5.448   | 0.000 *** |
| DISTANCE                        | -0.037 | 0.035    | -1.066  | 0.287     |
| First stage for log consumption |        |          |         |           |
|                                 | coeff. | std.err. | z-stat  | p-value   |
| const                           | 8.183  | 0.271    | 30.200  | 0.000 *** |
| MALE                            | 0.009  | 0.015    | 0.584   | 0.559     |
| TIME                            | 0.144  | 0.054    | 2.689   | 0.007 *** |
| AGE                             | 0.140  | 0.047    | 2.996   | 0.003 *** |
| AGE2                            | -0.021 | 0.005    | -3.887  | 0.000 *** |
| SCHOOLING_2                     | -0.080 | 0.020    | -4.040  | 0.000 *** |
| SCHOOLING_3                     | -0.123 | 0.026    | -4.699  | 0.000 *** |
| SCHOOLING_4                     | -0.149 | 0.034    | -4.440  | 0.000 *** |
| CITIZENSHIP                     | -0.064 | 0.028    | -2.306  | 0.021 **  |
| RELATIVES                       | -0.011 | 0.032    | -0.349  | 0.727     |
| GOOD_ENG                        | 0.070  | 0.018    | 3.937   | 0.000 *** |
| FIRST_ENG                       | 0.122  | 0.017    | 7.200   | 0.000 *** |
| CITY                            | 0.159  | 0.037    | 4.242   | 0.000 *** |
| CHILD                           | -0.055 | 0.021    | -2.569  | 0.010 **  |
| SPOUSE                          | 0.168  | 0.021    | 8.019   | 0.000 *** |
| FAMILY_N                        | 0.277  | 0.024    | 11.620  | 0.000 *** |
| GDP_PC                          | 0.066  | 0.009    | 7.746   | 0.000 *** |
| DISTANCE                        | -0.003 | 0.020    | -0.145  | 0.885     |

Table 8: Reduced-form double-hurdle model vs. Heckit and Tobit

|                              | Double hurdle | Heckit     | Tobit      |
|------------------------------|---------------|------------|------------|
| Main equation                |               |            |            |
| const                        | 8.678 ***     | 8.678 ***  | 32.767 *** |
| MALE                         | 0.253 **      | 0.253 **   | 0.970 **   |
| TIME                         | -0.043        | -0.042     | 0.481      |
| AGE                          | 0.247         | 0.247      | 2.543 *    |
| AGE2                         | -0.043        | -0.043     | -0.461 **  |
| SCHOOLING_2                  | -0.249 *      | -0.249 *   | -0.483     |
| SCHOOLING_3                  | -0.585 ***    | -0.585 *** | -0.466     |
| SCHOOLING_4                  | -0.611 ***    | -0.611 *** | 0.355      |
| CITIZENSHIP                  | -0.554 **     | -0.554 **  | 1.834 **   |
| RELATIVES                    | 0.522 *       | 0.522 *    | 2.214 **   |
| GDP_PC                       | 0.137         | 0.137      | -1.830 *** |
| DISTANCE                     | -0.308 *      | -0.308 *   | -3.026 *** |
| GOOD_ENG                     | 0.249 **      | 0.249 **   | 0.703      |
| FIRST_ENG                    | -0.048        | -0.048     | -1.502 *** |
| CITY                         | -0.419        | -0.419     | -0.500     |
| CHILD                        | -0.173        | -0.173     | 1.818 ***  |
| SPOUSE                       | -0.189        | -0.189     | -0.896     |
| FAMILY_N                     | -0.122        | -0.122     | -1.140 **  |
| $\lambda$                    |               | -0.081     |            |
| Selection equation           |               |            |            |
| const                        | 4.795 ***     | 4.795 ***  |            |
| MALE                         | 0.130 **      | 0.130 **   |            |
| TIME                         | 0.052         | 0.052      |            |
| AGE                          | 0.331         | 0.331      |            |
| AGE2                         | -0.062 **     | -0.062 **  |            |
| SCHOOLING_2                  | -0.058        | -0.058     |            |
| SCHOOLING_3                  | -0.031        | -0.031     |            |
| SCHOOLING_4                  | 0.109         | 0.109      |            |
| CITIZENSHIP                  | 0.290 **      | 0.290 **   |            |
| RELATIVES                    | 0.304 **      | 0.304 **   |            |
| GOOD_ENG                     | 0.092         | 0.092      |            |
| FIRST_ENG                    | -0.225 ***    | -0.225 *** |            |
| CITY                         | -0.073        | -0.073     |            |
| CHILD                        | -0.114        | -0.114     |            |
| SPOUSE                       | -0.169 **     | -0.169 **  |            |
| FAMILY_N                     | 0.288 ***     | 0.288 ***  |            |
| GDP_PC                       | -0.275 ***    | -0.275 *** |            |
| DISTANCE                     | -0.431 ***    | -0.431 *** |            |
| Log-likelihood               | -2219.949     | -2219.949  | -2936.272  |
| Vuong Test vs. double-hurdle |               | 0.108      | 26.819     |
| Vuong Test p-value           |               | 0.543      | 1          |
| Total cases                  | 2168          | 2168       | 2168       |
| Uncensored                   | 654           | 654        | 654        |

Note: