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Abstract

Increased immigration in Italy has been coupled with a change in the composition of the stock of immigrants by nationality. Migrants that come from different coun- tries and cultures bring with them different languages, habits, norms, religions and, in general, interact differently with the local population, thereby generating different responses to immigration. I study the relationship between this changes in the identity of the migrants and the electoral outcomes in Italy computing several measures of distance between immigrants and natives with respect to the language spoken, to religion and to genetic factors that, being correlated with the vertical transmission of norms and values, proxy for a wide range of both cultural and individual traits. I find that the increased distance between immigrants and natives is associated with more votes for nationalist, anti-immigration political parties.

JEL classification: D72, J61.

Keywords: Elections, Culture, Language, Religion.

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1 Introduction

Immigration increased a lot in Italy in the past 15 years. Back in 2002, the foreign born Italian residents were just 1,341,209, or roughly 2.3% of the population. In 2018 they were 5,144,440 accounting for 8.5% of the population. In the same period, the number of men and women crossing the Mediterranean on shabby boats to reach the Italian coast, putting their lives at risk and, often, losing it while traveling, also increased dramatically. This increase was partly a consequence of the Syrian War, that generated a massive displacement of individuals who later tried to get to Europe seeking asylum. An additional explanation is the collapse of the Libyan regime, that made it very difficult to control the coastline and, therefore, the human traffickers that hoarded migrants from countries such as Eritrea, Gambia, Somalia and Sudan willing to reach Europe. These events put inevitably immigration on top of the political agenda. The nationalist political parties, among which the most prominent is arguably Lega Nord (Lega henceforth) headed by Mr. Matteo Salvini, tried to take political advantage from this events, promising to stem what they conveniently defined as an invasion of the Italian territory. In the 2018 political elections, Lega, as well as other anti-immigration parties, were indeed extremely successful. Lega alone obtained roughly 5.7 million votes, or 17% of the total, and it was the second most voted party after the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5s henceforth), which obtained 32% of the votes. By any means, a great electoral success that actually allowed Mr. Salvini to become ministry of the interior, with responsibility over the administration of immigration policy, as well as deputy prime minister.

In a previous contribution, Barone, D'Ignzaio, De Blasi and Naticchioni (2016), using panel data at the municipal level, found a causal relationship between increased immigration and votes for center-right parties in Italy. Their identification is based on the *Enclave* theory (Card 2001) or *Chain Migration* hypothesis, according to which immigrants tend to settle where other immigrants of the same nationality already live, typically because of family reunions and because expat communities provide help for housing and job market placement. Basically the number of immigrants in the past is used to instrument the current number of immigrants, based on the assumption that it is exogenous to current political outcomes. Similar results, with similar identification strategies, appear in Mendez and Cutillas (2014) for Spain, Halla

et al. (2013) for Austria, Gerdes and Wadensjo (2008), Harmon (2017) and Dustman et al. (2016) for Denmark, Otto and Steinhardt (2014) for the city of Hamburg and Edo et al. (2018) for France.

However, in Italy not only the number of immigrants changed over the past years, but, crucially, also their identity. For instance, at the national level, 13.6% of all immigrants in Italy 2004 were from Albania and 12.7% from Morocco. In 2017, the share of Albanians was only 8.9% and the share of Moroccans 8.3%. Conversely, immigrants from Romania were 8.9% of the total in 2004 and 23% in 2017. Immigrant from different countries, in turn, have more or less difficulties learning the language, carry different social norms, religious practices, foods and, in general, foster strong opinions against them at different degrees among the natives. One possible explanation of this differential response of natives to immigration is racism. For instance black immigrants from Sub-Saharian Africa are typically more scourged upon than white immigrants from countries like Spain or France. Another explanation is that immigrants are often perceived as a threat to the religious identity of the host country. In this respect, catholic immigrants are more tolerated and, therefore, integrate more easily than Muslims. Since the identity of the migrants is a crucial determinant of the natives response to immigration, it is therefore important to account for it to better understand the electoral response to immigration.

In this paper I study these effects of the changes in the identity of the Italian immigrants on the votes for nationalist parties. To define the identity of the migrants and, more crucially, to measure their distance from the native population, I rely on three metrics based on religion, on the spoken language and on genetic similarity (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994), which is also a proxy for cultural distance because it is related to the vertical transmission of values and norms across generations (Desmet et al. 2011; Spolaore and Wacziarg 2015). For all metrics, I compute weighted average distances between Italians and immigrants, in all municipalities, using as weights the the immigrants' shares by nationality. I focus on the last four political elections, namely 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018, constructing a panel at the municipal level.

Since the immigrants' settlement decisions, and so their shares by nationality, are endogenous to political outcomes, for instance because they might avoid areas with high concentrations of nationalists where they can be discriminated, I construct an instrument for the

immigrants' share following the logic of the *Enclave* theory as in previous works. However, since I need an instrument for the shares of immigrants by nationality, rather than for their total number, I need to slightly modify the computations. In a nutshell, in most of the previous literature, an instrument for the number of immigrants is constructed using the shares of immigrants by nationality in a reference year to artificially redistribute new immigrants of that same nationality on the national territory. The problem is that, in case the number of immigrants of given nationality was zero in the reference year in a city, then the procedure implies that no immigrant of that nationality will ever settle there. But this is problematic in my sample because, in Italy, the increased in the number of immigrants has been coupled with a geographic diffusion. For instance, immigrants from Afghanistan in 2004 were present in 51 cities only, while in 2017 in more than 1000. Therefore the instrument will have a value of zero in more than 950 cities, where the actual value is positive, which significantly lowers its predictive power. To avoid this problem, I constructed an instrument allowing new immigrants to settle geographically close to the city where other immigrants of the same nationality already live, rather than exactly there. Putting it differently, the number of immigrants that settle in a given city depends on how far this city is from the main destination city for immigrants of the same nationality in a reference year in the past. In a nutshell, if Milano is the major destination city, say, for Egyptian immigrants, then there will be more new immigrants from Egypt that decide to settle in a city in the outskirts of Milano rather than in Napoli. I called this modification the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis. Similarly to Card (2001), the identification assumption is that the settlement decisions in the past are exogenous to current political outcomes.

I find that the distance between immigrants and natives is positively and significantly associated with the votes for nationalist parties. In particular, weighted average genetic and linguistic distances between immigrants and natives are positively associated with the votes for Lega, for extreme-right parties and for center-right parties, even after controlling for the immigrant share and for a wide range of covariates. Conversely, religious distance is positively associated with the votes for center-right and extreme-right parties only, but not with the votes for Lega. All in all, the empirical results suggest that the increased distance between immigrants and natives is, among other factors, responsible for the recent electoral success of

anti-immigration, nationalist parties in Italy.

A small note before proceeding. In what follows I will use the term nationalism as synonymous with anti-immigration, although it must me clear that nationalist parties do not push for stricter immigration policies only, but typically also for stricter trade policies and, in general, for identitarian policies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related works in the literature. Section 3 summarizes the theoretical background. Section 4 describes the dataset, composed by data on electoral outcomes (subsection 4.1), immigration (subsection 4.2) and distances between immigrants and natives (subsection 4.3). Section 5 describes the empirical model and, in subsection 5.1, the procedure to construct the instrument for the distances. Section 6 summarizes the empirical results, while section 7 analyzes their robustness and extends them. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

As already mentioned, the closet work in the literature is Barone et al. (2016), who find, in a panel of Italian municipalities between 2001 and 2008, a positive relationship between immigration and the votes for center-right parties. The main differences with their work is that I explicitly focus on the changes in the composition of the stock of migrants, and, in particular, on their cultural identity, rather than on their number alone. When they discuss the potential mechanism behind their result, they acknowledge the possibility of increased cultural diversity, and they try to assess this channel using data on the shares of Catholics in a small number of origin countries. They interact this variable with the immigrants' share in the main regression, finding that the effect of immigration is stronger in case of more religious diversity. I propose instead a wider and more systematic treatment of cultural diversity between immigrants and natives. Moreover, I consider a more recent sample which, given the steady increase of the shares of immigrants on the national territory and given the electoral success of Lega in the last election, makes immigration even more relevant to understand electoral outcomes. Finally, I also propose a new methodology to construct an instrument for the shares of immigrants, rather than for their numbers, extending the logic of the *Enclave*

theory to spatially close cities.

The other closest work in the literature is Brunner and Kuhn (2018). They exploit the nature of the direct democratic system in Switzerland, where citizens have been recently called to vote in many occasions about specific immigration policies, to study the effect of immigration on anti-immigration votes. They cluster immigrants in two separate groups, respectively culturally distant culturally similar to the Swiss natives, following Inglehart and Baker (2000), so looking at the importance of traditional rather than secular values and on the importance of self-expression as opposed to survival. For both dimensions, the clustering is based on the answers to World Values Survey questions. They find a positive relationship between the share of culturally distant immigrants and anti-immigration votes. Differently from their contribution, I have a continuous treatment of the cultural distance between immigrants and natives, which allows for a deeper analysis. In addition, I account for a richer set of cultural characteristics of the immigrants. Moreover, I can also control for municipality fixed effects in my regression, which account for unobserved municipality level heterogeneity that can affect both immigrants settlement patterns and anti-immigration votes.

Similar results to Barone et al. (2016), with a similar identification, appear in Halla, Wagner and Zweimller (2013) for Austria. They find that the increased inflow of immigrants is positively associated with voting for the Freedom Party of Austria, whose policy platform is heavily based on an anti-immigration agenda. As for the channel, they identify the deterioration in the quality of the public schools in the cities with bigger immigrants' shares. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) also find a positive relationship between immigration and xenophobic vote exploiting variability at the district level within the city of Hamburg. They also find a significant decrease in the vote share for the political parties that explicitly campaigned in favor of more liberal immigration policies. Gerdes and Wadensjo (2008), Harmon (2017) and Dustman, Vassiljeva and Piil(2016) found similar results for Denmark. The last two works, propose different identifications, exploiting, respectively, the availability of houses for rental (since Danish does not allow immigrants to buy houses) and a quasi-random assignment of refugees across Danish municipalities. Similarly, Edo et al. (2018) found a positive relationship between immigration and far-right vote in French presidential elections, using again historical settlement patterns of immigrants to instrument their current location choices. They also find

that this result is driven by low educated, non-European immigrants, therefore pointing to labor market competition and cultural diversity as potential channels.

Mendez and Cutillas (2014) find instead no effect of immigration on the Spanish election results in the period 1996-2011. However, when they split the sample according to the nationality of the migrants, separately considering the share of immigrants and the shares of African immigrants, they find a positive effect of African immigrants on votes for anti-immigration parties. One way to interpret this evidence is that culturally distant migrants, along linguistic and religious traits, foster an anti-immigration sentiment more than culturally similar ones. I find similar results for Italy, but I propose a more systematic treatment of cultural diversity.

Two recent works find instead a negative relationship between immigration and right wing voting. In particular, Steinmayr (2016) finds that, in Austria, more refugees are associated with less votes for nationalist parties. The identification is based on the availability of suitable building to host refugee in the municipality. This is evidence in favor of the so-called contact hypothesis, according to which racial and ethnic prejudice is reduced when individuals are in closer contacts. Similarly, Vertier and Viskanic (2018) found that, in France, the relocation of refugees from the so-called Calais jungle to temporary shelters reduced the votes for nationalist parties in the 2017 presidential election in the cities where immigrants were relocated.

Mayda, Peri and Steingress (2016) also found contrasting effects of immigration on electoral outcomes in the US. More specifically, naturalized immigrants typically vote democrat, so their increase fosters democrat votes. However there are more republican votes if the share of non-naturalized immigrants increases.

With respect to all these previous works, my contribution is the more systematic study of the relationship between the identity of the migrants and the electoral outcomes through the construction of distance measures that account for linguistic, religious and genetic traits. A further contribution of my paper is a new procedure to construct an instrument for the shares of immigrants based on the geographic distance with the most important destination cities for immigrants of given nationality. This instrument is useful when the number of cities where immigrants decide to settle increases over time.

Several studies based on survey data also find a significant empirical relationship between immigration and an anti-immigration sentiment. In particular, Dustman and Preston (2001)

find that, in England, a higher concentration of minorities leads to a more negative attitude towards them. In two related contributions Mayda (2006) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) find that skilled individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration, especially in richer countries that experienced an inflow of unskilled individuals. Card et al. (2012) find that the attitudes toward immigration are influenced both by concerns over labor market outcomes and over compositional amenities such as their neighborhood characteristics. Along the same lines, Kaufmann (2017), finds that changes in the immigrants share are associated with an anti-immigration sentiment. Differently from these contributions, I focus instead on a particular expression of anti-immigration feelings, namely the votes for nationalist parties.

The paper is also related to the literature on cultural distance. Among others, Desmet et al. (2011) use the World Values Survey to construct a measure of cultural distance between countries, showing that this distance is related to the genetic distance measure by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) show, in turn, that genetic distance is itself positively associated with income differences across countries, mostly because it is a barrier to the diffusion of innovations. These work are the reason why I chose to focus on genetic distance. Bisin and Verdier (2000 and 2001) propose instead a theory for the persistence of cultural traits across minorities and therefore, for the failure of cultural assimilation, based on parent's preferences for children values and marriage patterns. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) show instead that genetically and, therefore, culturally closer populations are more prone to war.

Few recent works tried to explain the raise of populist parties in Europe. In particular, Guiso et al. (2017) and Guiso et al. (2018) show that economic insecurity and the failure to cope with negative economic shocks lead to populist vote. Similarly, Rodrik (2017) argues that globalization leads to left-populism because of trade or finance shocks and right-populism because of immigration. Since Lega is arguably a right-populist party, this work is also related to this strand of literature.

3 Theoretical Background

There are several channels through which immigration might foster a nationalist, anti immigration vote. The first is racism. According to this interpretation, natives might vote in favor of stricter anti-immigration policies simply because they don't like immigrants. Moreover, an anti-immigrants sentiment is often spurred by prejudice, which is a fundamental component of racism. For instance, immigrants are often thought to be more prone to crime than natives, even if there is no evidence that they actually are (see Bianchi et al. 2012 for Italy). Another channel is related to the group conflict theory (Sherif 1953), or the perception of immigrants as a threat to the cultural identity of the natives. The preeminent example is perhaps religion. Basically an increased inflow of immigrants with different religious beliefs is often associated with an increased difficulty of transmission of religious values to children, for instance because the schools, attended by immigrants' children, might be forced to ease down on the teaching christian religious studies. Sometimes there is also the fear of a transformation of the cities landscape, say if the immigrants build a mosque or if they decide to open an ethnic shop or street food stall in the historical city center. For instance, Swiss citizens in 2009 voted in favor of a ban to the construction of new minarets and the city of Genova, in Northern Italy, enacted a ban on new kebab shops in the city center.

Crucially, these channels through which immigration affects electoral outcomes depend on the identity of the immigrants. More specifically, black immigrants from Sub-Saharian Africa are more likely to foster racism and prejudice than, say, German immigrants, because of their different skin color. Moreover, culturally more distant immigrants can be perceived as more dangerous to the natives cultural identity. For instance, Muslim immigrants are more easily identified as a threat than Catholic immigrants simply because their are at risk of building a minaret or calling into question the necessity to teach Catholic religion in public schools. My measures of average genetic, linguistic and religious distance between immigrants and natives are meant to capture the effect of immigration on electoral outcomes through these channels. More specifically, genetic distance measures the degree of relatedness between two populations, so it will be bigger, say, between Sub-Saharian African countries, whose majority of the population is black, then for Western European countries. Moreover, since genetic

distance is also related to the vertical transmission of values (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009), it is also a proxy measure for cultural diversity (Desmet et al. 2011). Linguistic and religious distance, on the other hand, are two alternative measures of cultural diversity.

Other channels through which immigration affects nationalist vote include labor market competition for unskilled jobs (Borjas 2003; Mayda 2006), since immigrants are typically either non-skilled or employed in low-skill occupations, and compositional amenities (Card et al. 2012), since immigrants have access to schools, hospitals and, in general, welfare services. Thus natives vote in favor of anti-immigration parties simply to avoid competition in the labor market and because they feel that less immigrants will improve the quality of their neighborhood[1]. Both channels depend on the development stage of the origin countries, as immigrants from less developed countries are more likely to be unskilled and, because of their limited wage prospects, more likely to access welfare. As shown by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), genetic distance is also correlated with income differences across countries. Therefore, given that Italy is a developed country, the bigger the genetic distance between Italian natives and immigrants, the more likely that those immigrants are unskilled and, more generally, poor. In other words, genetic distance does also capture the effect of immigration on the anti-immigration sentiment through the labor market competition channel and the compositional amenities channel.

Conversely, immigration might also reduce nationalist vote. This is the so-called Contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), according to which intercultural exchanges and communication reduces prejudice against immigrants. Basically the more natives interact with immigrants the more they start thinking of them as fundamentally similar and, therefore, the less they feel threatened. My empirical results, however, does not support this theory.

[1]However immigration might actually favor the natives whose skills are complementary to the immigrants. For intace, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show an increase in wages and real estate wealth for Americans living in cities that experienced an increased immigrants inflow. Moreover, given that immigrants pay taxes and social security contributions, and given that they are typically younger than natives, they might actually contribute with a positive balance to welfare and to the pension system.

4 Data

I merged the Italian Ministry of the Interior ELIGENDO data on electoral outcomes with data on immigration by nationality of origin from ISTAT, the Italian statistical institute. Both electoral outcomes and immigration data are available at the municipality level. I focus on the universe of Italian municipalities, roughly 8072, excluding, for simplicity, the small towns that merged administratively over the sample period. I focus on the last four national political elections, namely 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018. To account for the slow formation of beliefs and, thus, political preferences, I merge the electoral outcomes with the average value of all other variables computed between the electoral year and the year before. For instance, the electoral results in 2013 are merged with of the average share of immigrants between 2012 and 2013. Since I do not have detailed immigration data by nationality for 2018, I merged the electoral results in 2018 with covariates in 2017 only.

4.1 Elections in Italy

Data on the electoral results are from the Italian Ministry of the Interior ELIGENDO database, freely available for download. I consider three alternative definitions of nationalist vote. The first entails considering only the votes to Lega, arguably the most prominent anti-immigration party in Italy. Lega was born in 1989 from the union of six small independentist parties in northern Italy, under the impulse of Mr. Umberto Bossi, who has been the head and charismatic leader of the party ever since. Its political agenda has been focused on increased autonomy for northern regions, both politically and economically, on Euro-skepticism and, in general, on souverainism. With the election of Mr. Matteo Salvini to secretary, there has been however a shift towards more extreme right-wing positions, especially with respect to immigration. In fact the latest political campaign by Lega that preceded the 2018 elections was heavily based on the proposal of more restrictive immigration policies.

The second definition of nationalist vote entails constructing an artificial coalition, summing to the votes for Lega the ones for other extreme, right-wing, parties who propose restrictive immigration policies and, most importantly, whose rhetoric is heavily biased against immigrants. I will refer to this artificial coalition as the Extreme-Right. Not all parties com-

peted in all elections, mostly because they did not survived for such a long period of time. The exact list is included in table 1. The parties in the 2018 Extreme-Right artificial coalition include Fratelli D'Italia, historically bonded to the post-fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano, together with Casa Pound and Forza Nuova, two right-populist, openly neo-fascit, political movements. The third definition of nationalist vote entails again constructing an artificial coalition but, this time, summing to the votes for Lega the ones for more moderate Center-Right political parties. I call this artificial coalition Cdx. The reason why I construct this artificial coalition is to be comparable to Barone et al. (2016), who consider only those. Once again, not all parties competed in all elections, and the exact list is in table 1.

For simplicity, in what follows, as well as in the regression analysis, I will discuss the electoral results for just one of the two chambers that compose the Italian Parliament, The Camera dei Deputati. Despite the slightly different electoral rules, the results for the other chamber, the Senato della Repubblica, are almost identical.

The most striking evidence, is the staggering electoral success of all nationalist parties in the 2018 elections. Lega alone was the second most voted political party in Italy with 17% of the votes. In some northern cities, it actually had more than 50% of the votes. Interestingly, Lega gained consensus also in southern Italian cities, where they were almost non-existent less than 5 years ago. Just to give a couple of examples, in Napoli, the biggest city in southern Italy, almost 2.6% of the voters chose Lega in 2018, while only 0.14% of them did so in 2013. In Bari, the second largest southern Italian city, Lega got an astonishing 5% in 2018, while in 2013 they collected only the 0.05%. Most likely, the switch from an anti-southern-Italians to an anti-immigrants rhetoric was a crucial determinant of this success, together with the persistence of an economic crises that fostered an anti-establishment and, more specifically, an anti-European sentiment. The standard deviation of the distribution of the votes for Lega is however quite high, 10%, most likely as a consequence of the different importance of Lega in northern and southern Italy.

The other right-wing, nationalist parties who proposed restrictive immigration policies were also very successful in the 2018 elections. For instance, the artificial coalition that I defined Extreme-Right got almost 23% of the votes, again with a pretty high standard deviation of 11%. The real winner of the 2018 election has been however the M5s. Given its

ambiguous positions towards immigration, and given that it competed in the last two political elections only, I decided to consider it only marginally in section 7.

4.2 Immigration in Italy

The immigration data are from the Italian National Statistic (ISTAT) data warehouse, freely available online. Data on immigrants by nationality, at the municipality level, are available from 2004 to 2017. Importantly, I consider only the regular immigrants because there is no systematic information on irregular immigration. However, according to the *Chain Migration* hypothesis, immigrants tend to settle where other immigrants of the same nationality already live, so the number of irregulars should be positively correlated with the number of regulars. Nevertheless it is also possible that, due to asymmetric enforcement on the national territory, it is easier to be irregular in some areas of the country and this asymmetry might actually be endogenous to political outcomes, for instance because mayors from Lega might push for stricter enforcement on their territory. In line with the previous literature, I have to necessarily abstract from such issues due to data limitations.

Looking at the total number of immigrants, it is evident that the immigrant share increased almost everywhere in Italy. In 2004, Immigrants were just 3% of the population while, in 2018, they account for 8.5%. Looking at the distribution over cities, the median immigrant share increased from 2.4% in 2004 to 5.8% in 2017. The standard deviation of the distribution also increased from 2.7% to 4.3%, which indicated also a bigger dispersion of immigrants on the national territory. Big cities, however, are still preferred by immigrants and even there the share of immigrants increased sharply. In Milano, the share of immigrants increased from 8.8% in 2004 to 18.7% in 2017. In Roma, it rose from 4.8% in 2004 to 13% in 2017. The increase was however sharper in the cities were immigrants were just a small share of the population. For instance, in Napoli, there was an increase in the immigrants' share from 1% in 2004 to 5.7% in 2017. In Catania, the increase was from 1.7% to 4.4%. To give a graphical idea of the increase, figure 1 plots the probability distribution of immigrants, which clearly shifted to the right from 2004 to 2017.

The increase in the number of immigrants determined also a significant change in the composition of the stock of immigrants by nationality. Table 2 reports the total fraction of

immigrants for the first 35 nationalities of origin in 2004 and 2017. Back in 2004, 13.6% of all immigrants where from Albania while, in 2017, only 8.9. Similarly, immigrants from Morocco were 12.7% in 2004 and 8.3% in 2017. Conversely, Romanians increased from 8.9% in 2004 to 23.2% in 2017. Chinese immigrants also increased, although less dramatically, from 4.4% in 2004 to 5.6% in 2017. This significant shift in the composition of the stock of immigrants is actually what motivates my empirical analysis.

Together with the increase in the share of immigrants, and with their changed identity, there has also been an increase in the number of nationalities of origin in many cities, especially in smaller ones. For Instance, in Roma in 2004 there were immigrants from 166 countries while in 2017 from 173; In Milano the increase was fro 143 nationalities in 2004 to 156 in 2017. Torino and Firenze similarly experienced modest increases. Conversely in Anzio, a city in the outskirts of Rome, the increase was from 84 nationalities in 2004 to 107 in 2017. In Cirò marina, a beach destination in Calabria, the increase was from 27 nationalities in 2004 to 44 in 2017. The average number of nationalities of origin increased from 17.8 in 2004 to 25.7 in 2017. This an increase in the number of cities where immigrants decided to settle, which accounts for a dispersion on the national territory, is actually the reason why I need to construct an ad hoc instrument for my regressions.

4.3 Distances Between Immigrants and Natives

To measure the distance between immigrant and natives I follow Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015), focusing on three dimensions: language, religion and genetics.

The measure of linguistic distance is from Dyen et al. (1992). The idea is counting, for each pair of languages, the number of words with similar meanings and with the same root. Such words are defined cognate. For instance, acqua in Italian and agua in Spanish both come from the Latin word aqua, so they have the same root and the same meaning and, therefore, are cognate. The measure of linguistic proximity is then computed as the percentage of cognate words for 200 common meanings/words and for nearly all major spoken languages. However this distance is computed at the language level, not at the country level. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009 and 2015) aggregated it at the country level using the ethnic composition by country in Alesina et al. (2003). The aggregation is performed either considering the

largest ethnic group only (plurality aggregation) or a weighted average by ethnicities (weighted aggregation). Given my empirical analysis, I considered the weighted aggregation. This he measure of linguistic distance can therefore be interpreted as the percentage of similar words for two randomly selected individuals from two countries. Since it measures similarity between languages, I will refer to it as a measure of linguistic proximity rather than distance.

The measure of religious distance is from Mecham, Fearon and Laitin (2006). They propose a classification of religions in broad categories, which is then used to construct a religion tree. For instance, Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox are both Christians, while Musilm and Christians are monotheistic religions etc. Starting from this tree, they compute a measure of religious distance as the difference between the maximum number of common classification/nodes minus the actual number of common classifications for each religion pair (standardized to be between 0 and 1). Similarly to linguistic distance, this measure is only available at the religion level, but Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) aggregate it at the country level using the ethnic composition in Alesina et al. (2003). The measure can be interpreted, similarly to the linguistic distance, as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from two countries share the same religion.

The last metric for distance hinges on genetic similarity and is based on the works by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). In a nutshell, genetic distance can be interpreted as a measure the time since two populations had a common ancestor. When two population separate, their genes change because of random drift and/or natural selection, so comparing their genes entails measuring for how long the populations have been separated from each other. The more similar their genetic composition, the more related they are. For instance, two siblings are more related (less distant) than two cousins because they have a more recent common ancestor. Importantly, the focus is on neutral genes, which are affected by random drifts only and not by directional selection. In other words, the genetic distance measures does not evaluate the importance of specific genes and it is not related to specific somatic characters.

There are three reason why I use genetic distance in my analysis. First because it is a general measure of the relatedness between populations and, regardless of the fact that it is computed with respect to neutral genes only, the more genetically different two populations

are, the more likely it is that the individuals will have different characteristics, such as the skin colors, that might foster racism and prejudice. Second, because it is correlated to the vertical transmission of values and norms across generations. In fact, as shown by Desmet et al. (2011) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015), genetic distance is indeed correlated with how people respond to the World Values Survey questions. In other words, the smaller is the genetic distance between two populations, the more similar are the average opinions over a wide range of subjects spanning from religiosity and children education to the role of women and the importance of democracy and freedom. Therefore genetic distance is a proper proxy for cultural distance. Third, because genetic distance is correlated with income differences, so the bigger is genetic distance between Italian natives and immigrants, the more likely it is that immigrants come from less-developed countries and, therefore, the more likely it is that they will compete for low-skilled occupations and access welfare. Once again, these genetic distance measures, available for population pairs, are aggregated by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) at the country level following the same logic described for linguistic distance.

For all three metrics of distance, I compute a weighted average distance between immigrants and natives in all municipalities and election years using, as weights, the shares of immigrants by nationality. Namely, the weighted average distance is computed as

$$D_{jt} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} S_{jt}^{k} D^{k} \tag{1}$$

where D^k is the distance between Italians and Immigrants of nationality k for all the $K = 180$ nationalities of origin of the immigrants who are currently residents within Italian borders and S_{jt}^k is the share of immigrants of nationality k in municipality j and election year t.

Two caveats before proceeding with the analysis. First, when constructing my measure of distance I consider, as an input, the distance between an average individual in Italy and an average individual in a foreign country. This is potentially problematic because immigrants might have different characteristics from other individuals in their origin countries, which is perhaps the reason why they emigrated or why they chose Italy. For instance, they might speak, or be familiar with, Italian, so that the measure of linguistic proximity is effectively a lower bound for the actual proximity. This concern, however, does not apply to genetic

distance, which is computed starting from neutral genes.

Second, I consider the distance at the time of immigration, without taking into account the time that the immigrants spent in the country. This is again potentially problematic because earlier immigrants, or immigrants of nationalities with a more rooted historical presence in Italy, might actually be more integrated, with a smaller effect on the anti-immigration sentiment. However the sharp increase in immigration in the past years suggests that indeed many immigrants came to Italy recently and that immigration in many small towns is a very recent phenomenon.

5 Empirical Model

The empirical model is the following:

$$V_{jrt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{jrt} + \beta_2 D_{jrt} + X'_{jrt}\Gamma + \theta_j + \lambda_{rt} + \varepsilon_{jrt} \tag{2}$$

where V_{jrt} is the vote share for a nationalist party (or artificial coalition) in municipality j, region r and election t, I_{jrt} is the ratio of immigrants to population, D_{jrt} is the weighted average distance between immigrants and natives, either genetic distance, linguistic proximity or religious distance, X_{jrt} are control variables that account for the economic cycle, firm dynamics, education, population[2], social capital, religiosity and crime, θ_j is a municipality fixed effect and λ_{rt} an election-by-region fixed effect, which accounts both for elections specific factors and for the slight different presence of political parties in different regions/elections.

The problem with the empirical specification 2 is that the spatial distribution of immigrants is endogenous to political outcomes. At a very basic level, immigrants might avoid settling in a city with a lot of nationalists simply because they are afraid of discrimination. My strategy to deal with this endogeneity entails constructing an exogenous instrument based on the logic of the *Enclave* theory, but modified to take into account the distance between each municipalities and the most important destination municipality for each nationality of origin. I describe in detail this procedure in the next subsection.

[2]It is important to control for population because immigrants inflows might actually induce natives outflows (Card 2001; Cattaneo, Fiorio and Peri 2015.

5.1 Spatial Migration Chains

The *Enclave* theory, or *Chain Migration* hypothesis, states that immigrants typically settle in the cities where other immigrants of the same nationality already live. First for family reunions, as extended family members and friends join earlier immigrants. Second because an existing community of immigrants of the same nationality might make it easier to find a house and a job or, more generally, the transition to a new country. Furthermore, immigration decisions are often based on information gathered through previous immigrants, which might thus recommend the cities where they actually decided to live as ideal destinations, perhaps also because it is the only one they know. As a consequence of the his theory, the number of immigrants of given nationality in a city should be correlated over time and, therefore the number of immigrants in the past, being exogenous to current electoral outcomes, can be used as an instrument for the current number of immigrants.

Let's start with an example that will help understand both the procedure to construct an instrument for the number of immigrants based of this migration chains and the reason why it will not work in my empirical context. Suppose that there two cities, say Milano and Roma, and two origin countries of the migrants, say Egypt and Albania. Suppose that, in a reference year in the past, there are 50 immigrants from Egypt and 70 immigrants from Albania in Milano and 50 from Egypt and 30 from Albania in Roma. Thus, in Milano, there are 50% of all Egyptians and 70% of all Albanians. These two shares are then used to artificially distribute incoming immigrants on the national territory. Suppose that, in a later year, there are 30 incoming immigrants from Egypt and 40 incoming immigrants from Albania. Distributing them according to the shares in the reference year, I have $40(0.5) = 15$ Egyptian in Milano, $40(0.5) = 15$ Egyptians in Roma, $30(0.7) = 28$ Albanians in Milano and $40(0.3) = 12$ Albanians in Roma. The instrument for the total number of immigrants in this later year is 43 immigrants in Milano and 27 immigrants in Roma. The instrument for the shares of Egyptians (only one share is relevant since there are two nationalities) is instead 34.8% in Milano and 55.5% in Roma. This procedure of artificially distributing immigrants according to the shares in a reference year is then repeated for all years for which an instrument is needed. The resulting variable will be exogenous because it does not depend on contemporaneous political variables.

The problem with this procedure is that, if the share of immigrants of given nationality is zero in a city in the reference year, then the artificial redistribution will deliver a zero share of that nationality in all years in that city. In Italy, together with the increase in the number of immigrants, there has also been an increase in the number of nationalities of origin in most cities. For instance, in 2004 there were 149 cities only with immigrants from Gambia, while in 2017 more than 1500. Thus an instrument constructed looking at the historical shares by nationality will actually have a value of 0 for the share of Gambians in the 1351 cities where it is actually positive, with little to no predictive power. More generally, when the number of municipalities where new immigrants of given nationality settle increases, an instrument constructed according to the migratory chains logic will not be able to predict the actual shares of immigrants. Most previous studies were just interested in the total number of immigrants, not the shares, so they did not stumble into this problem.

I propose a solution that extends the logic of the migration chains in a very intuitive way. The starting observation is that immigrants settle *close to* the cities where other immigrants of the same nationality already live rater then exactly there. In a nutshell, I use the distance from the cities that, for historical reasons, are the main destination for immigrants of given nationality, to construct an instrument according to what I call the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis. The identification assumption, similarly to the *Enclave* theory, is that the reasons why a municipality is the most important destination for a given nationality dis the result of past shocks that are unlikely to be endogenous to current political outcomes. In what follows, I explain in detail the algorithm that I use to construct the instrument.

The first step entails identifying the most important destination cities for all 180 nationalities of origin of Italian immigrants. I decided to focus on the 5 most important cities that, on average (over nationalities), account for 23% of all immigrants, although with significant differences. For instance, the cumulative share of immigrants from the Philippines in the 5 most important destination cities is 57%; for Sri Lanka 45%. Conversely, it is only 20% for Romania, 12% for Russia and 9% for Senegal. The reason why I decided to focus on the first 5 cities, rather than, say, 4 or 6, is the result of a trade-off between the predictive power of the final instrument and the complexity of the computations. Then I regressed, in a reference year and for all nationalities, the number of immigrants on a polynomial of the minimum distance

between each municipality and the main destination city. More formally, the regression that I run for each nationality k is:

$$I_{j0}^{k} = P(h, d_j^k) + \eta_j \tag{3}$$

with:

$$d_j^k = min\{d_j^{k_1}, d_j^{k_2}, d_j^{k_3}, d_j^{k_4}, d_j^{k_5}\} \tag{4}$$

I_{j0}^{k} is the number of immigrants of nationality k in municipality j and reference year $t = 0$, $d_j^{k_z}$ is the distance between municipality j and the z^{th} most important destination city for immigrants of nationality k and $P(h, .)$ is a polynomial of order h. In the benchmark computations I used $h = 3$, but the results appeared robust to higher orders. Basically the decision of a new immigrant to settle in a given city depends on how far the city is from the closest destination hub for immigrants of the same nationality. For instance, if the most important destination city for Egyptians is Milano, there will be more new immigrants from Egypt settling in Monza than Salerno. As reference year I use 2004 because it is the first for which I have detailed information on the immigrant composition by nationality for all municipalities. This might be problematic because it is close to the first observation that I use in the regression. However, one of the consequences of the *Enclave* theory is that the settlement decisions of new immigrants are persistent over time, which mitigates the concern. In fact the status of most important destination city by nationality is highly persistent in the sample and almost never changes. In other words, given this persistence, it is reasonable to assume that the reasons why a city is the most important destination for immigrants of given nationality are deeply rooted and, therefore, exogenous to current political outcomes. In the previous regressions, the minimum distance is significantly associated to the number of immigrants for all nationalities except two.

Once I run the regressions, I can compute the predicted number of immigrants in each city in the reference year, $\hat{I}_{j0}^{k}$. The problem with this quantity is that it predicts a positive number of immigrants in (many) more cities compared to where they actually settle. To avoid this geographic over-dispersion, I correct this predicted number using the relative number of cities

where immigrants of give nationality reside in 2017. The corrected prediction for the number of immigrants is thus:

$$\bar{I}^k_{j0} = \begin{cases} \hat{I}^k_{j0} & \text{prob} \quad \alpha_k \\ 0 & \text{prob} \quad (1-\alpha_k) \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

where $\alpha_k = (J^k/J)$ is the relative number of cities with immigrants from country k in year $T = 2017$, the latest in the sample. Operationally, for each municipality, I draw a uniform random variable between 0 and 1 and I accept the predicted number of immigrants only if the value of the random variable is below α_k. Next I compute the fraction of immigrants of nationality k in each municipality as follows:

$$\hat{F}^k_j = \frac{\bar{I}^k_{j0}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \bar{I}^k_{j0}} \tag{6}$$

This shares allow me to artificially redistribute new entrants on the territory. I define new entrants in Italy as:

$$N^k_t = D^k_{t-x} E^k_t \tag{7}$$

where E^k_t are all emigrants from country k in year t, including the ones that did not come to Italy, and D^k_{t-x} is the share of emigrants from country k that came to Italy in year $t-x$, which, in my case, is 1995. The reason why I did not consider the total number of immigrants in any given year is that also immigration at the country level can be endogenous to political outcomes. Then I can start artificially attributing new entrants to municipalities according to the predicted fractions in a recursive fashion, to then obtain an instrument for the shares of immigrants by nationality. Namely the artificial shares are:

$$\hat{S}^k_{jt+1} = \frac{N^k_{t+1}\hat{F}^k_j + I^k_{jt}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K}(N^k_{t+1}\hat{F}^k_j + I^k_{jt})} \tag{8}$$

where I^k_{jt} are the immigrants of nationality k in municipality j and year t from the previous stage of the recursive computation. Finally, I construct the instrument for the weighted average distance between immigrants and natives simply using, as weights, the artificial shares

rather than the actual ones:

$$\hat{D}_{jrt} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \hat{S}^{k}_{jrt} D^{k} \tag{9}$$

Table (3) summarizes the first stage regression results. The predictive power of the instrument is quite remarkable for all distance metrics. Summarizing, I constructed this instrument based on the idea that immigrants tend to settle close to the cities where other immigrants of the same nationality already live. The identification assumption is that, since the status of most important destination city for most nationalities is persistent, there are historical reasons that determined this settlement pattern that are unlikely to be endogenous to current political outcomes.

6 Results

I start running a regression similar to Barone et al. (2006), where nationalist votes are regressed on the immigrants share and control variables. Differently from this paper, my sample includes includes the political elections held in 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018, while they consider 2001, 2006 and 2008. Moreover, I have, together with municipality fixed effects as in Barone et al. (2006), region-by-election fixed effects, rather than election only. The strategy used to instrument the immigrant shares is instead the same as Barone et al. (2006), except that I use 2004 as reference year. The regression results are reported in table 4. Despite the differences in the empirical setting, and the different control variables used, the result by Barone et al. (2006) still stands: immigration increases the vote share for the Cdx artificial coalition (column 6 of table 4). However I do not find any statistical relationship between immigration and the vote share to Lega and to the Extreme-Right artificial coalition, which propose the harshest anti-immigration agenda.

The main result of the paper is reported in table 5. I regress the vote shares for nationalist parties on the immigrant shares and on the average genetic distance between immigrants and natives, controlling for municipality fixed effects, election-by-region fixed effects and for a wide set of covariates. Genetic distance is positively and significantly associated with the vote share for nationalist parties. The result holds when I consider Lega alone, which is the

most prominent anti-immigration party, but also when I consider the Extreme-Right and Cdx artificial coalitions. To give a sense of the magnitude of the result, let's perform the following, rather extreme, thought experiment. Suppose that, in a given municipality, all immigrants are from Spain and, thus, both culturally and genetically very close to Italians (genetic distance equal to 60). Suppose that those immigrants are suddenly replaced by an equal number of immigrants from Kenya, which are culturally and genetically more distant (genetic distance equal to 2212). The results predict an increase of the vote share for Lega by 7.96 pct points and for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition by 10.3 pct points. Alternatively, 1 standard deviation increase of the average genetic distance between immigrants and natives increases the vote share of Lega (Extreme-Right) by 2.76 (3.59) pct points.

I also consider two other metrics for cultural distance: linguistic proximity and religious distance. The results are reported, respectively, in table 6 and 7. The results for linguistic proximity are indeed similar: less linguistic proximity between immigrants and natives is associated with more votes for nationalist parties. Let's perform the same thought experiment to gauge the magnitude of the effect implied by the regression results. This time, I will replace immigrants from France (0.44 linguistic proximity) with immigrants from Ghana (0 linguistic proximity). The vote share increase for Lega (Extreme-Right) is 4.7 (7.4) pct points. In terms of standard deviations, 1 std decrease of linguistic proximity increases votes for Lega (Extreme-Right) by 1.5(2.3) pct points. There is however no robust empirical relationship between religious distance and the vote share for Lega and Cdx. I find a relationship for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition only, although of small magnitude. In particular, 1 std increase in religious distance increases the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition by 1.7 pct points.

Summarizing, the increased distance between immigrants and natives explains the increased vote share for nationalist parties.

As for the control variables, the immigrant share itself it is not significant anymore once I include in the regression the average distance between immigrants and natives. One possible explanation of this result is the positive correlation between immigration and distance, although the unconditional correlation, in the sample, is only 20%. Even considering single electoral years, the biggest unconditional correlation coefficient is 23% in 2017. Another pos-

sibility is that, in the regression summarized in tables 5, 6 and 7, the immigrant share is not instrumented. This choice reflects my willing to ease the interpretation of the main regression results and, in the particular, of the first stage. I also tried running another regression instrumenting both the immigrant share and the distance. In particular, I instrumented the immigrant share exactly as I did for the replication reegression of Barone et al. (2016) summarized in table 4. The results are exactly the same as in the baseline regression: once I control for distance, the immigrants share not anymore a significant determinant of nationalist vote.

Among the other controls, it is interesting to remark the negative relationship between real gdp and nationalist vote and the positive relationship between unemployment and nationalist vote. Similarly, there is a negative relationship between the rate of new firms and nationalist vote and a positive relationship between the rate of bankrupt firms and nationalist vote. The most likely explanation for this pattern is that economic and job insecurity is blamed on immigrants. Similarly, thefts and robberies are also positively associated with nationalist votes, most likely because crime is also blamed on immigrants. In fact the increase in crime is typically a corner stone of the anti-immigration parties rhetoric. Importantly, these last results about the control variables must not be interpreted in causal terms but only as correlations.

7 Robustness and Extensions

I performed the analysis looking at alternative measures of distance. For genetic distance, I tried the alternative aggregation based on plurality groups, obtaining exactly the same results. For linguistic proximity, I tried an alternative measure based on linguistic trees computed by Fearon (2003). Similarly to the religious distance measure, the idea is to classify languages according to families to then compute the relative number of common nodes for each pair of languages. Those measures are then aggregated at the country level by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) using the ethic composition by country in Alesina et al. (2003). The results for the Extreme-Right and Cdx artificial coalitions are robust, although the result for Lega is not. For religious distance, I tried an alternative religious tree construction based on the World Christian Database. Consistently with the main results, I could not find any robust empirical relationship between religious distance and votes for nationalist parties.

As an additional way to measure the changed composition of the stock of immigrants, I computed an immigrant fractionalization index. The logic is similar to Alesina et al. (2003), but, instead of using the population composition by ethnicity, I use the immigrants' shares by nationality to compute the index. More formally, the immigrants fractionalization index H_{jt} is:

$$H_{jt} = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} (S_{jt}^{k})^2 \tag{10}$$

Where S_{jt}^{k} is the shares of immigrants from country k in municipality j and election t To avoid endogeneity concerns, I instrumented the shares S_{jt}^{k} with the shares $\hat{S}_{jt}^{k}$ (see section 5.1). The results are summarized in table 8. I found a positive and significant relationship between immigrants fractionalization and nationalist vote, but the effect is quantitatively small. In particular, 1 std deviation increase of fractionalization increases the vote share for Lega (Extreme-Right) by 1.1 (1.6) pct points. One possible explanation of this result is that more fragmented immigrant communities generate unrest and conflicts more easily. Another possible explanation is the fear of multiculturalism. I also tried including the immigrants fractionalization index in the main regressions, without any significant change in the results.

I also included, as an additional control, the weighted average geographic distance between Italy and the immigrants' origin countries. The reason is that Giuliano, Spilinbergo and Tonon (2014) find a high correlation between genetic distance and geographic distance, which actually implies that my main result could be spurious, basically a consequence of the increased geographic proximity between Italy and the origin country of the migrants. I considered two alternative measures of geographic distances, either between the capital cities and between the most important cities, computing weighted averages exactly as I did for other distances. Including geographic distance in the regressions does not change the results. Moreover, if I include geographic distance instead of the other distances, instrumenting it exactly in the same way, I will not find any statistical relationship. Taken together, this results stress that there is indeed something specific to cultural and genetic distance over and above geography.

I tried restricting the sample excluding small municipalities below 1 thousand individuals and big municipalities above 500 thousand individuals, because bigger cities and small villages might actually respond differently. The results were indeed very similar. Ia also tried

restricting the sample geographically. When restricting the sample to southern Italy (including Islands), genetic distance is significant for the Cdx artificial coalition only. Conversely, I obtain strong results when running the regression for northern regions only. I believe the most likely explanation for this result is the lower historical presence and, thus, electoral importance of Lega in southern regions, due to their anti-southern-Italians rhetoric that defined their earlier political agenda. I also tried restricting attention to the last two political elections, held in 2013 and 2018, to better take into account the presence, among the Italian parties, of the M5s, whose populist propaganda might also have benefited from immigration. I found robust results for Lega and no significant empirical relationship between immigration and votes for M5s.

I also tried regressing the vote share for center-left parties on the immigrants share and on the average distance between immigrants and natives, but I could not find any robust empirical relationship. Conversely, and in line with Barone et al. (2016), I found a negative and significant relationship between voters turnout and the immigrant share even when controlling for average distance. Religious distance is itself negatively and significantly associated with voters turnout, while genetic distance and language proximity are not statistically associated with voters turnout.

8 Conclusion

Previous studies identified the increased number of immigrants as one of the determinants behind the electoral success of nationalist, anti-immigration parties in Italy, Denmark, Austria and France. However, the increase in the number of immigrants is often associated with a changed composition of the stock of immigrants by nationalities and, therefore, by a different cultural identity of the immigrants. In this work I show that this change in the identity of the migrants and, in particular, their increased cultural and genetic distance from the natives, is indeed positively associated with nationalist vote in Italy. The result is stronger for linguistic distance and for genetic distance, but weaker for religious distance. I also showed that immigrants fractionalization is positively associated with nationalist vote.

The conclusion is that, if immigration progresses as it did in the past 20 years, we are bound

to see an increased electoral success of nationalist political movements and perhaps also more restrictive policies against immigrants and, sadly, also refugees, with vast adverse consequences for the welfare of many individuals. Moreover, also native residents can be hurt, since the population of many western European countries, including Italy, is rapidly aging, with an increased pressure on the pension, health and, more generally, social security systems, which has been alleviated by the increased inflow of younger immigrants with higher fertility rates. Perhaps the only possibility is promoting integration policies that, by increasing the proximity of immigrants and natives and pruning prejudice, might also help stemming anti-immigration feelings. In other words, integration policies might reduce the perceived distance between immigrants and natives. Another possibility to stem this nationalist way is to implement a policy mix that attempts to balance the need to provide international assistance to displaced individuals forced to live their countries and the protection of the low skilled natives whose job market prospects can be negatively affected by a massive inflow of low skilled migrants.

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Table 1: **Artificial Coalitions**

Extreme-Right	2006	Lega, Alternativa Sociale Mussolini, Fiamma Tricolore, Destra Nazionale
	2008	Lega, La Destra, Forza Nuova
	2013	Lega, Fratelli D'Italia, La Destra, Forza Nuova, Casapound, Italia agli Italiani, Fiamma Tricolore, Rifondazione Msi
	2018	Lega, Fratelli D'Italia, Forza Nuova, Casapound, Italia agli Italiani
Cdx	2006	Lega, Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Unione di Centro, Nuovo PSI, PLI
	2008	Lega, Il Popolo delle libertà, Unione di Centro, Popolari Uniti, PLI
	2013	Lega, Il Popolo delle libertà, Fratelli d'Italia, MIR, Intesa Popolare, Popolari Uniti
	2018	Lega, Forza Italia, UDC, Fratelli d'Italia, Il Popolo della Famiglia

Table 2: **Origin Country, Fraction**

2004		2017	
Albania	13.61	Romania	23.18
Morocco	12.75	Albania	8.89
Romania	8.95	Morocco	8.34
China	4.37	China	5.59
Philippines	3.64	Ukraine	4.65
Tunisia	3.45	Philippines	3.30
Ukraine	2.92	India	3.00
Serbia	2.60	Moldova	2.69
Macedonia	2.58	Bangladesh	2.43
Senegal	2.34	Egypt	2.24
India	2.26	Pakistan	2.14
Perù	2.17	Sri Lanka	2.08
Egypt	2.04	Senegal	2.01
Polonia	2.03	Perù	1.97
Sri Lanka	1.98	Polonia	1.92
Germany	1.74	Tunisia	1.87
Ecuador	1.69	Nigeria	1.76
Ghana	1.47	Ecuador	1.65
Pakistan	1.40	Macedonia	1.35
Bangladesh	1.38	Bulgaria	1.16
France	1.33	Ghana	0.95
Nigeria	1.33	Brazil	0.90
Moldova	1.24	Kosovo	0.82
Brazil	1.13	Serbia	0.79
UK	1.06	Germany	0.73
Bosnia	1.01	Russia	0.72
Croatia	1.00	France	0.58
Algeria	0.78	Dominican Rep.	0.56
Russia	0.72	UK	0.54
USA	0.71	Cote D'Ivoire	0.52
Spain	0.71	Bosnia	0.51
Colombia	0.70	Spain	0.47
Dominican Rep.	0.70	Cuba	0.42
Argentina	0.66	Algeria	0.41
Bulgaria	0.58	Turkey	0.38

Notes: Ratio of immigrants of given nationality to total immigrants. Source: ISTAT.

Table 3: **Instrumenting Cultural Distance**

	Gen Dist		Lang Prox		Relig Dist	
Gen Dist instr	0.4247***	0.4323***				
	(0.0342)	(0.0353)				
Lang Prox instr			0.3353***	0.3589***		
			(0.0391)	(0.0404)		
Relig Dist instr					0.7503***	0.7773***
					(0.0309)	(0.0318)
R^2	0.065	0.088	0.394	0.416	0.201	0.211
obs	31512	30739	29408	28652	31512	30739
municipalities	7961	7795	7550	7385	7961	7795
F	153.6	149.4	73.54	79.07	586.2	597.4
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Notes: Dependent variable is in columns. Gen Dist is the weighted average genetic distance between immigrants and natives (see text). Gen Dist Instr is the instrumented weighted average genetic distance computed with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Lang Prox is the weighted average linguistic proximity between immigrants and natives (see text). Lang Prox Instr is the weighted average linguistic proximity computed with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Relig Dist is the weighted average religious distance between immigrants and natives (see text), Relig Dist Instr is the weighted average religious distance computed with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis. (see text). Control variables included: Unemployment rate; real gdp adjusted for inflation; thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens; age dependency ratio; percentage of population above 65; average age; percentage of the population with: college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education); percentage of the population regularly attending religious services; percentage of the population that does volunteer work; rate of dismissed firms in the year; rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Table 4: **Immigration and Nationalist Vote**

	Lega		Ext-Right		Cdx	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Imm/Pop	1.4983	-0.8115	-0.7439	2.5034	-1.8594	13.516***
	(4.3854)	(4.5282)	(5.0998)	(5.3959)	(5.0155)	(5.5937)
R^2	0.845	0.892	0.816	0.859	0.863	0.891
Obs	31802	31157	31802	31157	31802	31157
Municipalities	8047	7931	8047	7931	8047	7931
F (first stage)	539	516	539	516	539	516
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is Lega, the vote share to Lega. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Ext-Right, the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition (see text). Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is Cdx, the vote share for the Center-Right artificial coalition (see text). Imm/pop is the ratio of immigrants to total population (pct terms), instrumented according to the *Enclave theory* (see text). Control variables included: Unemployment rate; real gdp adjusted for inflation; thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens; age dependency ratio; percentage of population above 65; average age; percentage of the population with: college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education); percentage of the population regularly attending religious services; percentage of the population that does volunteer work; rate of dismissed firms in the year; rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Table 5: **Genetic Distance and Nationalist Vote**

	Lega		Ext-Right		Cdx	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gen Dist	0.011***	0.0037***	0.0099***	0.0048***	0.0043*	0.0101***
	(0.0017)	(0.0014)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)	(0.0026)	(0.0027)
Imm/Pop		0.6659		-1.4849		-5.8985
		(2.6004)		(3.0901)		(4.0044)
Pop		-0.0395**		-0.0427		-0.0621
		(0.0176)		(0.0268)		(0.0472)
Unemp		0.0688***		-0.0346		-0.1711***
		(0.0177)		(0.0227)		(0.0333)
Gdp		-0.0032***		-0.0053***		-0.0016***
		(0.0001)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)
Thefts		0.0602***		0.0345**		-0.0796***
		(0.0110)		(0.0145)		(0.0172)
Robberies		0.7291***		1.8812***		1.8691***
		(0.1404)		(0.2296)		(0.2906)
Agedep		0.9308***		0.2845***		0.2902**
		(0.0877)		(0.1020)		(0.1509)
Pop65		-2.7194***		-1.3756***		-2.5373***
		(0.3017)		(0.3526)		(0.5091)
Ageavg		1.4941***		1.3234***		3.2431***
		(0.3433)		(0.3982)		(0.5663)
College		10.8189***		23.8001***		15.5086***
		(1.0372)		(1.6649)		(1.0406)
High		-8.7393***		-2.4604***		-7.1364***
		(0.7239)		(0.6877)		(0.4118)
Element		-4.9596***		-0.5578		2.4533***
		(0.8080)		(1.3164)		(0.8269)
Church		7.7459***		12.0695***		4.7045***
		(0.3431)		(0.6046)		(0.3787)
Volunt		8.5236***		9.6121***		4.9079***
		(0.3753)		(0.6703)		(0.4231)
Bankrupt		0.1467***		0.1633***		-0.0229
		(0.0201)		(0.0281)		(0.0381)
Newfirms		-0.5121***		-0.8043***		-0.3055***
		(0.0688)		(0.0856)		(0.1158)
R^2	0.829	0.893	0.806	0.859	0.863	0.888
Obs	31512	30739	31512	30739	31512	30739
Municipalities	7961	7795	7961	7795	7961	7795
F (first stage)	153.6	149.4	153.6	149.4	153.6	149.4

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is Lega, the vote share to Lega. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Ext-Right, the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition (see text). Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is Cdx, the vote share for the Center-Right artificial coalition (see text). Gen Dist is the weighted average genetic distance between immigrants and natives (see text), instrumented with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Imm/pop is the ratio of immigrants to total population (pct terms). Pop is total population. Unemp is the unemployment rate. Gdp is real gdp adjusted for inflation. Thefts and Robberies per, respectively, the number of thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens. Agedep is the age dependency ratio. Pop65 is the percentage of population above 65. Ageavg is the average age. College, High anel Element are, respectively, the percentage of the population with college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education). Church is the percentage of the population regularly attending religious services. Volunt is the percentage of the population that does volunteer work. Bankrupt is the rate of dismissed firms in the year. Newfirms is the rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Table 6: **Linguistic Proximity and Nationalist Vote**

	Lega		Ext-Right		Cdx	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Lang Prox	-24.9229***	-10.6989**	-28.5771***	-16.7445***	-22.3098**	-25.8991***
	(6.5121)	(5.3074)	(7.7881)	(6.6921)	(10.2212)	(9.6636)
Imm/Pop		2.7278		0.0695		-0.8273
		(2.5722)		(2.9776)		(3.7076)
Pop		-0.0426**		-0.0471*		-0.0686
		(0.0194)		(0.0293)		(0.0506)
Unemp		0.0729***		-0.0191		-0.1504***
		(0.0183)		(0.0237)		(0.0356)
Gdp		-0.0032***		-0.0053***		-0.0017***
		(0.0001)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)
Thefts		0.0567***		0.0351**		-0.0682***
		(0.0110)		(0.0147)		(0.0173)
Robberies		0.8462***		2.0659***		2.1769***
		(0.1789)		(0.2726)		(0.3678)
Agedep		0.9315***		0.2986***		0.2967*
		(0.0903)		(0.1067)		(0.1559)
Pop65		-2.8035***		-1.5663***		-2.5376***
		(0.3065)		(0.3650)		(0.5211)
Ageavg		1.5708***		1.4377***		2.9606***
		(0.3591)		(0.4240)		(0.5927)
College		10.1862***		23.0199***		14.4232***
		(0.8952)		(1.5112)		(0.7537)
High		-8.8884***		-2.7601***		-8.0097***
		(0.6245)		(0.6028)		(0.4154)
Element		-5.3309***		-1.1101		1.3571**
		(0.6974)		(1.1921)		(0.5857)
Church		7.8161***		12.1753***		5.0067***
		(0.3303)		(0.5623)		(0.2614)
Volunt		8.5809***		9.7721***		5.3359***
		(0.3593)		(0.6218)		(0.2929)
Bankrupt		0.1277***		0.1587***		0.0055
		(0.0205)		(0.0293)		(0.0402)
Newfirms		-0.5045***		-0.7872***		-0.4514***
		(0.0713)		(0.0902)		(0.1252)
R^2	0.824	0.893	0.7949	0.856	0.859	0.887
Obs	29408	28652	29408	28652	29408	28652
Municipalities	7550	7385	7550	7385	7550	7385
F (first stage)	73.54	79.07	73.54	79.07	73.54	79.07

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is Lega, the vote share to Lega. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Ext-Right, the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition (see text). Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is Cdx, the vote share for the Center-Right artificial coalition. Lang Prox is the weighted average linguistic proximity between immigrants and natives (see text), instrumented with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Imm/pop is the ratio of immigrants to total population (pct terms). Pop is total population. Unemp is the unemployment rate. Gdp is real gdp adjusted for inflation. Thefts and Robberies per, respectively, the number of thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens. Agedep is the age dependency ratio. Pop65 is the percentage of population above 65. Ageavg is the average age. College, High anel Element are, respectively, the percentage of the population with college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education). Church is the percentage of the population regularly attending religious services. Volunt is the percentage of the population that does volunteer work. Bankrupt is the rate of dismissed firms in the year. Newfirms is the rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Table 7: **Religious Distance and Nationalist Vote**

	Lega		Ext-Right		Cdx	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Relig Dist	-0.3387	0.7883	3.5939**	3.2747**	2.4828	1.2446
	(1.3927)	(1.2978)	(1.7894)	(1.7168)	(2.4641)	(2.3791)
Imm/Pop		4.1782*		2.4699		3.8901
		(2.2296)		(2.5076)		(3.0895)
Pop		-0.0405**		-0.0438*		-0.0649
		(0.0182)		(0.0272)		(0.0491)
Unemp		0.0661***		-0.0394*		-0.1783***
		(0.0105)		(0.0225)		(0.0325)
Gdp		-0.0032***		-0.0053***		-0.0016***
		(0.0001)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)
Thefts		0.0699***		0.0434**		-0.0615***
		(0.0105)		(0.0141)		(0.0161)
Robberies		0.7077***		1.8473***		1.8134***
		(0.1376)		(0.2254)		(0.2844)
Agedep		0.8923***		0.2283**		0.1879
		(0.0868)		(0.1001)		(0.1455)
Pop65		-2.5891***		-1.1899***		-2.1897***
		(0.2984)		(0.3458)		(0.4885)
Ageavg		1.4836***		1.3009***		3.2181***
		(0.3408)		(0.3946)		(0.5511)
College		10.8981***		23.9849***		15.6912***
		(0.9076)		(1.5418)		(0.7049)
High		-8.6982***		-2.2941***		-7.0409***
		(0.6208)		(0.5659)		(0.2938)
Element		-4.9354***		-0.4351		2.4827***
		(0.7071)		(1.2202)		(0.5568)
Church		7.7897***		12.1069***		4.8314***
		(0.3446)		(0.6003)		(0.3247)
Volunt		8.5684***		9.6392***		5.0421***
		(0.3736)		(0.6618)		(0.3535)
Bankrupt		0.1466***		0.1648***		-0.0238
		(0.0198)		(0.0278)		(0.0377)
Newfirms		-0.5148***		-0.8158***		-0.3095***
		(0.0684)		(0.0849)		(0.1143)
R^2	0.845	0.896	0.816	0.862	0.864	0.893
Obs	31512	30739	31512	30739	31512	30739
Municipalities	7961	7795	7961	7795	7961	7795
F (first stage)	586.2	597.4	586.2	597.4	586.2	597.4

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is Lega, the vote share to Lega. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Ext-Right, the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition (see text). Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is Cdx, the vote share for the Center-Right artificial coalition (see text). Relig Dist is the weighted average religious distance between immigrants and natives (see text), instrumented with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Imm/pop is the ratio of immigrants to total population (pct terms). Pop is total population. Unemp is the unemployment rate. Gdp is real gdp adjusted for inflation. Thefts and Robberies per, respectively, the number of thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens. Agedep is the age dependency ratio. Pop65 is the percentage of population above 65. Ageavg is the average age. College, High anel Element are, respectively, the percentage of the population with college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education). Church is the percentage of the population regularly attending religious services. Volunt is the percentage of the population that does volunteer work. Bankrupt is the rate of dismissed firms in the year. Newfirms is the rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Table 8: **Immigrants Fractionalization and Nationalist Vote**

	Lega		Ext-Right		Cdx	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Immfrac	3.0277	6.0903***	4.9675*	8.9363***	7.3024***	12.0151***
	(2.3654)	(1.1502)	(2.6348)	(1.5986)	(2.6185)	(2.0987)
Imm/Pop		4.3053*		3.4611		5.8513
		(2.2683)		(2.5152)		(3.0633)
R^2	0.841	0.887	0.811	0.851	0.859	0.884
Obs	32102	31245	32102	32102	32102	32102
Municipalities	8079	7938	8079	8079	8079	8079
F (first stage)	178.3	228.5	178.3	178.3	178.3	178.3
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is Lega, the vote share to Lega. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Ext-Right, the vote share for the Extreme-Right artificial coalition (see text). Dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is Cdx, the vote share for the Center-Right artificial coalition. Immfrac is the immigrant fractionalization index (see text), instrumented with artificial immigrant shares based on the *Spatial Migration Chain* hypothesis (see text). Imm/pop is the ratio of immigrants to total population (pct terms). Control variables included: Unemployment rate; real gdp adjusted for inflation; thefts and robberies 100(k) citizens; age dependency ratio; percentage of population above 65; average age; percentage of the population with: college or higher education, high school education and elementary or no education (excluded category: middle school education); percentage of the population regularly attending religious services; percentage of the population that does volunteer work; rate of dismissed firms in the year; rate of new firms in the year. See text for data sources. Municipality and election-by-region fixed effects included. Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level. *** significant at 1% level. * significant at 5% level. * significant at 10% level.

Figure 1: **Empirical Distribution of Immigrants**



Source: ISTAT