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# Immigrants' Social Identity, Racial Hate Crimes and Public Backlash: Evidence from The "San Gennaro Massacre"

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# Immigrants' Social Identity, Racial Hate Crimes and Public Backlash: Evidence from The "San Gennaro Massacre"

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#### Abstract

We study the impact of a racial attack in 2008 by a local Camorra clan against the African community near Naples on the social identity of African immigrants. We find that in Naples and in other municipalities where the degree of insecurity was high or where there was a strong public backlash in Italian civil society against racism and violence, Africans' identification with Italy strengthened after the massacre, while in other municipalities it weakened. This heightened identification with Italy is persistent over time and is not accompanied by a weakening of ethnic identity.

JEL Classification: J15; 015; R23; Z13.

**Keywords:** Immigrants' identity; Racial discrimination; Hate-Crimes; Collective backlash, Cultural integration.

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## 1 Introduction

An increasingly abundant literature in economics and social science generally has shown that the socio-economic integration of immigrants is crucial to preserving cultural and social cohesion in the host society, avoiding ethnic conflicts and fostering economic prosperity in the short and long run (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Letki, 2008; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Esteban et al., 2012; Burchardi et al., 2019; Giavazzi et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2019; Fulford et al., 2020; Sequeira et al., 2020). A key to successful integration of immigrant populations is the newcomers' development of a sense of belonging to the host country and the formation of a non-oppositional social identity, a sense of self not separate from the values and beliefs of the new community of settlement (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Battu et al., 2007; Bisin et al., 2016; Bisin and Tura, 2019; Fouka et al., 2022).

The formation of social identity is a complex and open-ended process based on the way immigrants combine their ancestral culture with new features to which they are exposed during their stay in the host country (Tajfel et al., 1971; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Turner et al., 1987). This takes place within the family and community network through the transmission of values and beliefs rooted in the group of origin, and other habits of thought and norms of conduct considered relevant to acceptance within the new society and/or one's own ethnic group (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Tabellini, 2008; Bisin and Verdier, 2010, 2022). The ancestral values help to forge the deep-lying preferences and life goals that immigrants set for themselves and their families and to shape the long-lasting features of their social identity. However, as social psychology has shown, immigrants' sense of belonging to the new society is also a cognitive process that develops and feeds on their social contacts, interpersonal interactions and experiences where they live (Turner et al., 1994). In this case, the social identity of immigrants can change rapidly in response to events that make certain attributes salient, inducing them to feel closer to or further from the host community or the ancestry group (Shayo, 2009, 2020; Bernard et al., 2016; Giavazzi et al., 2019). In this paper, we focus on the effects that an unexpected episode of racial hatred against a community of immigrants had on their sense of identification with the host society.

The substantial growth of international migratory flows, both regular and irregular, has been accompanied by a sharp increase in racist and xenophobic hate crimes (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2022; OECD, 2022). In the United States, for example, such crimes officially reported by the Department of Justice increased by 60% between 2017 and 2021 (from 4,832 to 7,736). Similar or even sharper upswings in officially recorded racial hate crimes have marked many other Western countries as well: in Germany and the United Kingdom the increase has been over 30%, while in Canada and France they skyrocketed, jumping over 200% between 2017 and 2021. In Italy, the number of these hate crimes recorded by the police soared by 40%

from 828 in 2017 to 1160 in 2021. ¹ While it is clear that only an inclusive and tolerant society can hope to achieve lasting cultural and social integration of immigrants, the way in which episodes of intolerance and xenophobia influence immigrants' social identity and identification with the host country is uncertain. For instance, racial violence perpetrated by a part of society might highlight the need (and benefits) for immigrants not to stay closed in their own ethnic enclave, separated from the respectable part of the local community; and a supportive response on the part of governmental institutions and the manifestation of solidarity by the majority of natives could actually imbue immigrants with a stronger sense of belonging to the local community (Fouka, 2019; Jaschke et al., 2021; Saavedra, 2021).

We examine the impact of the what has come to be known as the "San Gennaro massacre" perpetrated by the Camorra clans against the large African community of Castel Volturno, a small coastal town about 30 kilometers up the coast from Naples in southern Italy, on the social identity of the African immigrants living in the surrounding area. The brutal massacre took place on the evening of 18 September 2008, the day before the feast of Saint Januarius, the patron saint of Naples. Six young African men, who were completely extraneous to any sort of criminal activity, were murdered by the local camorra organization (the so-called "Casalesi clan"), in order to assert the clan's power in the coastal area north of Naples and drive the African community out, for racial reasons. The massacre sparked a sharp reaction from Africans, who rioted in Castel Volturno and demanded a strong and immediate response from the Italian authorities. The massacre and the immigrants' protests received massive press coverage in the national media. In the weeks following, demonstrations of solidarity with immigrants were held in Naples and other Italian cities, with broad and heartfelt participation on the part of associations and Italian citizens in general. What is more, the police response, too, was quick and effective. One of the alleged killers was arrested four days after the massacre, and within the month a blitz against the Casalesi clan held responsible resulted in over a hundred arrests.

We use data from the two waves of the "Integrometro" survey conducted in 2008-2009 and 2015 by the foundation for "Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity" (ISMU), a well-established research institute producing documentation and promoting studies on immigration and ethnic diversity in Italy. We exploit the timing of the interviews in the first survey to determine how the massacre affected African immigrants' sense of attachment to Italy. In order to account for possible time trends unrelated to the massacre as such and unobservable variables related to social identity, we estimate a difference-in-differences (DiD) model, running a before-after comparison of the differences between the sense of social identity of African and non-African immigrant groups (the treatment and control groups, respectively). We find that the massacre resulted in an increase in the percentage of Africans in the Naples metropolitan area around the municipality of Castel Volturno who reported feeling attached to Italy com-

<sup>1.</sup> These figures are drawn from the Hate Crime Reporting of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) at https://hatecrime.osce.org.

pared with different ethnic groups of immigrants living there. We corroborate this result with a number of robustness checks for the outcome variable and for potential selection effects and attenuation bias.

A second question that we address is the mechanism through which this brutal crime may have triggered a change in the self-perceived identity of African immigrants in the area and possibly spilled over to African communities in the rest of Italy. We find evidence for two possible channels: (i) "fear", through which the African immigrants realized the risks of living separated from local civil society in an area dominated by organized crime; and (ii) "solidarity", through which they perceived the closeness of the local Italian community. Consistently, we find that the positive effect on the sense of attachment to Italy spread to African communities in other municipalities where mafia-type organizations are powerful and where demonstrations against racism highlighted Italian citizens' empathy with immigrant groups. By contrast, we find that in municipalities where there were no solidarity rallies and the organized crime is little active, an "animosity" effect prevails and identification with Italy of African immigrants lessens.

Third, in the spirit of the recent literature on cultural change (Giavazzi et al., 2019; Giuliano and Nunn, 2021), we explore whether the increase in attachment to Italian society led to a deeper change in the cultural attitudes of African immigrants that was not only transitory but maintained over time. Taking advantage of the second wave of the survey, we find that the incremental impact on African immigrants' sense of belonging to Italy in the Naples metropolitan area persisted even seven years after the event.

In the last section we explore whether the increase in African immigrants' sense of belonging to Italy is accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of their ethnic identity, leading to a possible cultural clash. In fact, to the extent that the identity response following the massacre was triggered by the awareness of the risks of living separated from the host society rather than by the perception of the possibility of effective integration into a society showing solidarity towards them, it is possible that the forced approach to the host community is associated with a feeling of frustration and a sense of betrayal of the values of the community of origin, thereby reducing the self-esteem and well-being of immigrants (Phinney et al., 1997; Fisher et al., 2020; Dahl et al., 2022). Following the acculturation framework of Berry (1997), we estimate a bivariate probit model for the identification with host and home societies. We find that the identity orientation of African immigrants underwent an abrupt change following the massacre, from predominantly "separated" to predominantly "integrated", without any reduction of their ethnic identity, while the identity orientation of other immigrants, from other ethnic groups, held much more stable.

**Related literature.** Our paper contributes to several lines of research. First, it relates to the empirical literature on the determinants of immigrants' self-perceived (or chosen) social identity. Earlier studies indicate the importance of individual characteristics (country of origin, age, years since arrival, gender, religion, education, employment status) as well as of context

features of the society of arrival and the neighborhood where immigrants live – see for example Constant et al. (2009); Casey and Dustmann (2010); Nekby and Rodin (2010); Bisin et al. (2011); Drydakis (2013). In particular, Georgiadis and Manning (2013) find that immigrants' sense of belonging to the UK is negatively affected by the perceived degree of discrimination in society and government organizations and increases with the extent to which immigrants feel they are treated with respect by natives. Masella (2013) shows that the likelihood that members of minority groups feel they belong more to the host country than to their own ethnic group decreases as ethnic fractionalization and polarization in the host country increases. These studies, however, do not consider how immigrants' chosen identity changes in response to shocks or transient situations.

From this perspective, our paper is closely related to the recent work on how native xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence affect the attitudes and behavior of immigrants – such as intentions to return to the country of origin, use of language, importance of religion, choice of school or preference for homogamous marriage - that reveal the degree of attachment to the host country and cultural integration (so-called "imposed identity"). <sup>2</sup> Gould and Klor (2016) study the increase of hate crimes against Muslims in the United States after the 9/11 attacks, showing that in the states where these crimes increased the most, the local Muslim community experienced a separation effect, increasing their attachment to the group of origin and its culture: the number of marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims, the English language proficiency, and the female labor participation rate of Muslims all declined, while the fertility rate of Muslim women increased. De Coulon et al. (2016) analyze the self-reported settlement intentions of a sample of Romanian immigrants in Italy interviewed a few weeks after a violent crime perpetrated by a Romanian migrant against an Italian woman in a Roman suburb in 2007. Consistent with Gould and Klor (2016), they find that Romanians who had been exposed to the increase in anti-immigrant news reports on state TV in the aftermath of the event had significantly less intention to settle permanently in Italy than before, at least in their own retrospective evaluation. Similarly, Steinhardt (2018) shows that the wave of xenophobic violence against the Turkish community in West Germany in 1992 prompted greater return intentions of immigrants and reduced their proficiency in German, while Abdelgadir and Fouka (2020) show that the French policy of forced assimilation and restrictions on Islamic religious culture, with the headscarf ban passed in 2004, reduced the socio-economic integration of Muslims and strengthened both ethnic and religious identities. Finally, Ferrara and Fishback (2020) analyze the effects of local anti-German sentiment in American counties during World War I, finding that Germans abandoned counties that downgraded their social standing owing to their ethnic identification with the enemy, choosing to move to counties with more moderate anti-German feeling and so avoid the costs of discrimination.

<sup>2.</sup> Other studies have considered the effects of exposure to discrimination, mistreatment, and violent events on economic and behavioral outcomes (Alsan and Wanamaker, 2018; Archibong and Obikili, 2020; Albright et al., 2021; Ameja and Xu, 2022).

While these studies indicate that immigrants respond to natives' intolerance by choosing (consciously or unconsciously) a more separate identity that isolates them from the host community, others have found instead that anti-immigrant hostility and violent intimidation by the local population end up bringing immigrants closer to the indigenous community, strengthening the choice of integration. Fouka (2019), for instance, shows that German immigrants increased their effort to integrate (with the Americanization of names, say, and applications for US citizenship) in the US states that registered the highest levels of anti-German violence during World War I. Similarly, Saavedra (2021) documents that Japanese immigrants in the US increased the Americanization of their children's first names after Pearl Harbor, which had spurred a sharp increase in anti-Japanese sentiment. With reference to present-day experiences, Jaschke et al. (2021) document that refugees assigned to the German regions more hostile to immigrants between 2013 and 2016 converged faster to local culture than those in more tolerant regions, suggesting a stronger effort to reduce the risks and costs of discrimination. Our results supplement this literature by analyzing the effects of racial hate crimes on immigrants' chosen identity and showing that fear and empathy are at work simultaneously, and that which tends to prevail depends on the environment for the immigrants and the local community with which they relate.

This paper is also related to the sociological and political literature on the effects of protests and riots on the formation of the group identity and political orientation of the participants (Klandermans et al., 2008; Kim, 2012; Silber Mohamed, 2013; Branton et al., 2015). The thesis is that participation in riots and protests modifies the group identity of protesters, who become aware of their relationships and their common interests, and of their potential political power if they act as a group. Kim (2012) shows that the riot of Korean Americans following the acts of violence against the Korean community in Los Angeles in 1992 (the so-called "saigu" uprising) produced a cultural trauma that altered the collective consciousness of the Korean community and triggered "the emergence of a new Korean/Asian identity..... Through the victimization of Koreans and the riots, there was a slippage between an identity based on nationality into one incorporating race" (Kim, 2012, p. 2005). Consistent with our findings, Silber Mohamed (2013) and Zepeda-Millán and Wallace (2013) show that after the protests against the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 in the United States, Latinos increased their self-identification as Americans and reduced their sense of racialization, while attachment to the country of origin remained practically unchanged.

Finally, our paper speaks to a strand of research that analyzes how individuals' cultural attitudes respond to events that alter the costs and benefits of deviating from socially prescribed behavior patterns or put forward new beliefs and lifestyles. These events can unfold slowly, shifting cultural attitudes gradually over time (Beaman et al., 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Fernandez, 2013), but they can also occur suddenly, owing to an unexpected shock (in our case, the brutal massacre) that triggers a radical change in incentives, beliefs, and attitudes (Fernandez et al., 2019; Giuliano and Nunn, 2021).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the shock and the context, while Section 3 sets out the background theory and testable hypotheses on the possible effects of the massacre. Section 4 discusses the data and the variables and specifies the identification strategy. Section 5 presents the basic results on the impact of the massacre on the self-identity of the local community of Africans, with some robustness checks. Section 6 extends the analysis to Africans throughout Italy and investigates the channels through which this episode acted on the self-perceived identity of immigrants in the ethnic group victimized and spilled over to the African community in the rest of Italy. Sections 7 and 8 give evidence on the long-term effects of the massacre on Africans' social identity and their identity orientation model, respectively. Section 9 concludes.

#### 2 Context

#### 2.1 The place

Castel Volturno is a small town on the Domitian coast less than 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the metropolitan area of Naples, the largest metropolitan area in southern Italy (and the third largest city in the country). Since 1945 Castel Volturno has been part of the new province of Caserta, but the main reference on which the economic and social activities of the population gravitate remains the metropolitan area and the city of Naples. <sup>3</sup> As at the time of the massacre, Castel Volturno hosts one of the largest African communities in Italy. The majority are irregular immigrants, for the most part natives of Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt who had left in search of a better life and, in many cases, to escape war.

With an economy traditionally based on agriculture, buffalo breeding and fishing, Castel Volturno has experienced a dramatic urbanization process since the 1970s which has led to a growth in construction entrepreneurship and massive real estate speculation largely in the hands of local Camorra families. In just over twenty years, due to the lack of a general zoning plan, thousands of illegal buildings have sprung up in the area.

To increase power and profits, the Camorra clans began to recruit illegal immigrants to work at very low cost on construction sites and in underground or illegal activities. The number of Africans in Castel Volturno increased steadily starting in the early 1980s: poorly paid and exploited, they mostly found seasonal employment as farm workers harvesting tomatoes and vegetables, herdsmen on buffalo farms, construction laborers, dishwashers and porters at hotels and restaurants. Many commute to work outside Castel Volturno, but within the Naples metropolitan area. Their massive presence and precarious living conditions have provoked in-

<sup>3.</sup> Even the symbolic date, the day of the patron saint of Naples, chosen by the local Camorra clan for the brutal assault is an indication of the centrality and importance of Naples for those who live in the Castel Volturno area.

tolerance among the local population. While official data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) report 4000 foreigners residing regularly in Castel Volturno today, out of a total population of about 25,000, unofficial estimates have put the illegal foreign population as high as 15,000. This has complicated the social and economic inclusion of immigrants and strengthened natives' intolerance (see Figure 1 for the distribution of the African community in the surroundings of Castel Volturno and in the remaining municipalities of Campania in 2008). The increase in natives' intolerance has also been fueled by the involvement of a non-negligible number of immigrants in illegal activities, such as drugs and prostitution, controlled either by the Camorra clans or by the so-called "Nigerian mafia".

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

#### 2.2 The massacre

The "San Gennaro Massacre" is one of the most brutal episodes of racial violence in Italian history. It took place in Ischitella, a small township within the municipality of Castel Volturno, on 18 September 2008, the night before Saint Januarius' Day, honoring the patron saint of Naples. Six Ghanaian citizens under 30 - Christopher Adams, Kwame Antwi Julius Francis, Eric Affun Yeboa, El Hadji Ababa, Alex Geemes and Samuel Kwaku - were murdered by a commando of the Casalesi clan (the local Camorra organization), twenty minutes after that same commando had murdered Antonio Celiento, a member of the Casalesi clan who was a police informant. There was only one survivor of the Massacre, Joseph Ayimbora, who, feigning death, recognized the killers and testified against them at the trial. Figure 2 sets out the timeline of the main events of the massacre.

#### [Insert Figure 2 about here]

The investigations and trial records show that none of the victims were involved in criminal activity or affiliated with the local Camorra clans or the "Nigerian mafia"; almost all had regular residence permits for humanitarian reasons. The reason for the massacre was to assert the Camorra's dominance in the area, with the aggravating circumstance of racial hatred, as we can read in the final sentence of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, handed down on January 30, 2014, which confirmed the appellate court's sentence of life imprisonment for the boss and three members of the Casalesi clan and 28 years and 6 months for a fifth member of the commando. <sup>4</sup>

According to the Italian writer Roberto Saviano, author of the best seller *Gomorra*, the massacre was a message from the local Camorra to the African community with a view to the

<sup>4.</sup> Initially, the lower court had identified the terrorist intent as a special feature of the massacre: the Casalesi clan acted to create panic and instill terror in the community, through a violent, indiscriminate and deliberate action, with the aim of undermining the trust of citizens in the State and thus weakening its structures.

approval of a project for the redevelopment of a tourist area in Castel Volturno - a business that would be worth millions of euros. It was an attempted "ethnic cleansing" of the area, expelling immigrants whose presence might have impeded the project. <sup>5</sup> "It was a racist massacre" - the National Anti-Mafia Prosecutor Federico Cafiero de Raho would say ten years later - "to let the immigrants know they had to leave [...]. The clan had important investment projects in the area that, in their view, were impeded by the presence of the immigrants. So they had been told to move away from Castel Volturno: they had not done so, and were hit [...]. The racist component consisted of the intention to drive them out of the territory simply because they were of a different race [...] The Camorra wanted to limit their freedom totally. Seeing them working in those places, such as tailor's shops or other handicraft activities, without the consent of the clan was contrary to what they had been told." <sup>6</sup>

#### 2.3 The protest and the Italian response

The day after the massacre, Africans staged a violent riot in Castel Volturno, protesting against not only the local Camorra and the social protection it enjoyed but also against the local authorities and the national government, demanding recognition of their civil rights and legal protection. The riot attracted the attention of local and national media alike, all calling the Africans' reaction "unprecedented in Italy". It was again Roberto Saviano who, in one of the widest-circulation Italian newspapers, *La Repubblica*, wrote: "The riot brings cameras from all over the world, and the images that are broadcast are those of an entire community that stops everything to demand attention and justice...Those who shouted "basta!" to the Mafia bosses, clans, and families were Africans. <sup>7</sup> The African population has introduced into the daily fabric of southern Italy some essential antibodies to the mafia, antibodies that Italians seem to lack. Antibodies that arise from the elementary desire to live". <sup>8</sup>

In a matter of days the news had spread throughout the nation. This fostered a strong response to the massacre by Italian citizens at the national level. A number of initiatives supporting the Africans were taken. Public demonstrations against racism and xenophobic violence were held in Ancona, Caserta, Parma, Rome and other Italian cities in October. And politicians, intellectuals, and artists took resolute positions, promoting a series of anti-racist initiatives. For instance, a concert was organized two months later in Castel Volturno itself for the South African singer and civil rights activist Miriam Makeba, in support of the African community and against the local Camorra and racism. Further, Italian public action was swift

<sup>5.</sup> *Il coraggio dimenticato* by Roberto Saviano, published in *La Repubblica*, May 13, 2009. Available at the website https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2009/05/13/il-coraggio-dimenticato.html.

<sup>6.</sup> Our translation from the press article: *Intervista al procuratore. La strage di Castel Volturno 10 anni dopo* by Antonio Maria Mira, published in *Avvenire*, September 18, 2018. Available at the website https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/i-casalesi-e-la-strage-dei-migranti-la-camorra-non-ancora-sconfitta.

<sup>7.</sup> Our translation from *Il coraggio dimenticato* by Roberto Saviano (cit.).

<sup>8.</sup> Our translation from *Intervista al procuratore*. *La strage di Castel Volturno 10 anni dopo* by Antonio Maria Mira (cit.).

and effective: the government deployed troops to Castel Volturno to restore public order, and within weeks the killers and their instigators had been apprehended.

From the description of the episode it is evident that although the murder of the six African immigrants in Castel Volturno highlighted the pockets of xenophobia and racist segregation that touched the entire immigrant population regardless of country of origin, there is little doubt that the massacre had strong racial overtones to the African immigrant community that can be identified as the treated group. The victims were Africans, the main immigrant community in Castel Volturno was the African, and those who then rose up against the Camorra, racist violence, and the negligence and indifference of the authorities were Africans. The foreign community placed at the center of the attention of the media and public demonstrations of solidarity organized by Italian associations was African.

#### 2.4 The African community in Italy

At the time of massacre, as stil nowadays, African immigrants were a widespread and itinerant group in Italy, moving temporarily from region to region with the seasonal demand for labor in agriculture and construction. Panel A in Figure 3 maps the presence of African immigrants in Italian provinces. Therefore, it is conceivable that knowledge of the massacre reached other African communities in the country through word of mouth from those who were in Castel Volturno or came into contact with others who experienced the events.

Beyond word of mouth, the news of the brutal racial violence in Castel Volturno and the protests that followed echoed throughout the country, widely covered by national and local media. Yet to the extent that the availability, accuracy, and vividness of both official and informal information about the massacre decreases with distance from Castel Volturno and the community directly victimized, the emotional engagement of African immigrants and the perceived racial relevance of the massacre should also decrease.

In addition to the geographical distance from the massacre, the effects on the perceived value of identification may have spread unevenly among the African communities in Italy due to the "social-context" distance. In particular, the identity response of Africans in Italy can vary according to whether the context in which they were immersed was featured by the strong presence of mafia-type organizations, similar to those responsible for the massacre, or by the solidarity of the Italian citizens mobilized to demonstrate in their favor against racial discrimination. Panel B in Figure 3 reproduces the map of organized crime in Italy. Although, as is known, there is a strong concentration of organized crime in the South, what emerges, interestingly, is that mafia-type crime is spread patchily in the rest of the country with a strong presence, for example, in major cities like Milan, Rome and Turin, but also in smaller realities such as Florence, Genoa, Imperia and Rimini. Finally, the green triangles highlighted in the maps indicate the cities where support demonstrations were organized.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

# 3 Background theory

In this section, we discuss the possible effects that the brutal episode could have on the social identity of African immigrants. In principle, it is difficult to say how a horrific crime of racial hatred such as the Castel Volturno massacre would affect the social identity of African immigrants, i.e., whether it would bring them closer or drive them away from the host community. In fact, the massacre was a multifaceted story that dramatically revealed the dangers of living in certain parts of Italy, the racism of a part of the Italian population, but that also showed how close and supportive an important part of Italian society is to the immigrant community and sensitive to its needs and demands. Such different facets may have evoked various feelings among the African immigrants, influencing the perceived value of identification with Italy in different ways.

The social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) introduced in social psychology by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) and taken up in the economic models of social identity formation (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Shayo, 2009, 2020; Bernard et al., 2016), offer a theoretical guide to explore the effects of the massacre on the identification with Italy of African immigrants in the metropolitan area of Naples and the driving factors underlying the identity response within the African community in Naples and the rest of Italy.

The central tenet of SIT and SCT is that individuals seek to forge a positive sense of self and that the perception of belonging to a social group (i.e. social identity) is a factor in forming one's identity. As Tajfel (1978, p. 63) writes, social identity represents the "part of an individual's self-concept which derives from knowledge of membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value or emotional significance attached to that membership". Identification with a social group is, more or less consciously, a personal choice. A decision on the social groups or groups to identify with is activated by events or situations which make a social identity salient, strengthening the perception of the psychological significance and value of being part of or separate from a group (Oakes, 1987). The sense of belonging and connectedness to a community is a cognitive state, a context-dependent feeling that can then change quickly in response to some occurrence that reinforces or challenges the value of self-ascribed social identity and induces behavior associated with a certain group (Turner et al., 1994). 9

The value of identification with a group, the gain in identity, to use Akerlof and Kranton's terminology, increases with the perceived "status" and "accessibility" to that group (Shayo, 2009; Bernard et al., 2016). The status that people ascribe to a social group and to feeling part of it reflects the group's relative position, in their eyes, with respect to other groups as regards

<sup>9.</sup> Experimental evidence shows that situational cues can make a specific social identity salient and lead people exposed to such activating situations to strengthen their self-identification with the social group made momentarily salient (or "primed") by the situation itself. Studies have documented that choices and preferences of individuals exposed to norms of multiple social-group identities respond to random, experimentally induced, minor manipulations of the identities' salience (Kramer et al., 1993; Bernhard et al., 2006; Benjamin et al., 2010; McLeish and Oxoby, 2011).

one or more dimensions that evoke a sense of personal satisfaction, security and well-being. On the other hand, the accessibility of a social group captures the perceived degree of similarity (or social closeness) between the characteristics and values of the individual and the stereotyped image they have of the characteristics and values of the members of the group.

Therefore, the net effect of the massacre on social identification of African immigrants is ex-ante ambiguous. On the one hand, the brutal manifestation of racial hatred against innocent countrymen may have induced an animosity effect, strengthening Africans' feelings of opposition, contempt and distrust towards Italian society, diminishing the perceived status of belonging to Italy and heightening the perception of the social and cultural distance separating them from Italians. The alarm for their own physical safety could have pushed the African community to withdraw more into itself for self-protection, thus concretely and emotionally isolating themselves from the settlement community. On the other hand, the xenophobic violence could have generated an attachment effect. The latter could derive from two changes in immigrants' beliefs about the status and the accessibility of the host country group. Firstly, the horror of the assassination of six harmless young Africans extraneous to crime at the hands of Camorra clans highlighted the risks of living in an ethnic enclave separate from the host society in areas dominated by organized crime. This heightened sense of threat may have increased the relative "social status" of natives in the eyes of African immigrants, the value of being part of the settlement community and the benefits associated with greater interaction and identification with the majority culture and values of Italian civil society (fear effect). 10 Secondly, the prompt reaction of the Italian authorities to the African protest and their demand for protection and rights, as well as the spontaneous demonstrations of solidarity involving tens of thousands of Italians revealed the real possibility of being heard by the institutions and accepted by natives as part of the national community. These collective reactions to the racial attack may have reduced the perceived distance from the host community and increased the sense of belonging to Italy (*solidarity effect*).

Based on these arguments, we explore whether the massacre had an immediate impact on the identification with Italy of the African immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area and whether the sense of opposition or of attachment prevailed. We then examine the possible mechanisms through which the massacre might have influenced the feeling of attachment, testing for the operation of channels we can label "animosity", "fear" and "solidarity". Third, we examine whether and how the racial salience of the massacre spilled over into African communities in other Italian regions, affecting the formation of their social identity.

As SIT and SCT theories highlights, a person's identification with a social group is a context-dependent position. It can change rapidly in response to exogenous and transient events that alter the perceived social status of the group or the perceived social distance from it (Turner

<sup>10.</sup> Experimental evidence in social identity literature confirms the existence of an "in-group favoritism" in behavior towards members of groups one identifies with as opposed to out-group members, which influences the status ranking of social groups and the value of self-identifying with them.(Bernhard et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009).

et al., 1994; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). However, once shaped, the new self identity can persist over time well beyond the event that triggered it, introducing a cultural change that is transmitted within a community over time (Giavazzi et al., 2019; Giuliano and Nunn, 2021). Accordingly, a further question that we examine is whether the Castel Volturno massacre has affected the social identity of African immigrants even in the medium term, thus being able to constitute a source of a deeper change in the cultural attitudes of immigrants.

Finally, stronger identification with the host country and the adoption of its culture and values, especially when forced from outside, can have negative repercussions on the feelings of self-esteem, moods and subjective well-being of immigrants or ethnic minorities (Fryer and Austen-Smith, 2005; Fouka, 2020; Dahl et al., 2022). In particular, cross-cultural psychology studies suggest that the sense of attachment to the host country and the importance attributed to one's ethnic identity can diverge, following a pattern of cultural assimilation rather than cultural integration (Berry, 1997), and find that, on average, lower attachment to ethnic identity is acompanied by lower self-esteem and self-respect (Phinney et al., 1997; Umaña-Taylor and Shin, 2007; Fisher et al., 2020). Accordingly, we assess the impact that the massacre had on the feelings of self-esteem and subjective well-being of African immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area by estimating a bivariate acculturation model à la Berry (1997) for identification with the host country and the country of origin. Therefore, we test whether the possible increase or decrease in the value attached by Africans to identification with Italy following the massacre reflects a process of cultural assimilation/marginalization, accompanied by the weakening of the Africans' sense of belonging to their own ethnic group, or otherwise captures a process of cultural integration with the host country that does not weaken their ethnic identity and self-respect.

# 4 Data, variables and empirical strategy

# 4.1 ISMU survey

We use the *Integrometro* survey conducted in 2008-2009 and 2015 by the ISMU Foundation, a private Italian research institute that supports initiatives and studies on multi-ethnicity and on the social and economic inclusion of foreigners in Italy. Along with many individual characteristics, the survey provides detailed information on immigrants' preferences and attachment to the host and the home country. <sup>11</sup> The survey also offers data on immigrants' nationality and municipality of residence, which make it possible to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics related to the home country culture and the socio-economic environment where the immigrants live. The comprehensive wealth of the data make the ISMU survey a unique source on the determinants of immigrants' social identity; the other surveys of immigration in Italy generally offer only indirect information on the respondents' social

<sup>11.</sup> A detailed description of the data and of the sampling design is available in Cesareo and Blangiardo (2009).

#### identity. 12

For the 2008-09 wave, the respondents were 12,049 immigrants aged 18 or older, coming from 127 countries and residing, legally or illegally, in 233 Italian municipalities, in 13 of the 20 regions. <sup>13</sup> Since the respondents are concentrated in municipalities in some oversampled regions, for empirical analysis all regressions use sample weights. As reported by Carillo et al. (2023), the shares of immigrants by municipality-ethnicity in the survey are broadly representative of the geographical distribution of ethnic groups in Italy according to ISTAT. Those interviewed in the Campania region numbered 1,019, of whom 898 in the Naples metropolitan area (i.e., neighboring the area of Castel Volturno). Africans make up 35% of our sample - 20% of the foreigners in Naples - while 38% are from Eastern Europe, 18% from Asia and 9% from Central and South America. <sup>14</sup>

#### 4.2 Social identity

We measure the social identity of immigrants by their self-reported sense of attachment to Italy and to their country of origin, exploiting two survey questions: "How much do you feel you belong to Italy (or to your home country)?", with four possible responses: (i) "not at all"; (ii) "not much"; (iii) "fairly much"; (iv) "very much". Our main dependent variable is the indicator *Host* for identification with Italy, which takes the value of 1 for responses of "fairly much" or "very much" to the question on attachment to the host country and 0 otherwise. To examine the identity orientation of immigrants, in Section 8, we build an analogous indicator variable, *Home*, which measures the immigrants' sense of attachment to their country of origin.

For robustness, we consider other dependent variables that capture the sense of identification with Italy and its culture indirectly. Given the differences between female participation rates in education and in the labor market in Italy and in African countries (and in many other sending countries), following Gould and Klor (2016), we use the opinion of respondents on pay gaps and gender education as measures of the degree to which they share Italian culture and values. Specifically, we use the survey question: "To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (a) For the same work, women should be paid less than men; (b) Getting a good degree is more important for a man than for a woman". Accordingly, we create two dummies with value 1 if the respondent agrees "very much" with (a) or (b), and 0 otherwise. We also consider the respondents' preferences and opinions about the future of their children in Italy as indicators of plans for integration. Specifically, we use the questions, "Today, thinking about the future of your children (even if you don't have them) what would you prefer for them?" and "How important do you think it is for the children of immigrants to be able to obtain Italian

<sup>12.</sup> The ISMU survey has been recently used also by Dustmann et al. (2017), Pinotti (2017) and Guriev et al. (2018) and Carillo et al. (2023).

<sup>13.</sup> The regions of residence of immigrants interviewed in the survey are: Abruzzo, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Lombardy, Marche, Molise, Piedmont, Puglia, Sicily, Tuscany, Trentino Alto Adige and Veneto.

<sup>14.</sup> Figures for the 2015 wave, used to test for medium-term effects, are reported in Section 7.

citizenship immediately?" to create two dummies with value 1 if the answer is "I would prefer my child to study in Italy", to the former question and "very much" to the latter.

#### 4.3 Interviews' date

For each respondent, the ISMU data included the exact day of the interview. Our treatment group consists of the African immigrants who participated in the survey after September 18th. There are no interviews with immigrants actually in Castel Volturno itself, but there is extensive coverage of the neighboring municipalities in the Naples metropolitan area, at most 70 kilometers (44 miles) away. The interviews with Africans in the Naples metropolitan area are split almost evenly between before the massacre (85) and after (83); those with non-Africans numbered 310 and 503, respectively (see Figure 4). In the rest of Italy, the interviews of both African and non-African immigrants are more concentrated in the months following the massacre (about 80%).

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

#### 4.4 Empirical strategy

The determination of the causal impact of the massacre on African immigrants' sense of identification with Italy relies on the timing of the interviews (i.e. before or after exposure to this unexpected racial hate event). This identification strategy, dubbed the "Unexpected Event during Surveys Design" (UESD) has gained popularity in the literature. <sup>15</sup> Using the UESD to estimate the causal effect requires that the event under investigation and its timing be exogenous and unexpected, so that survey participants are essentially interviewed randomly before or after the event. In addition, the UESD is based on the assumption that the date of the event affects the outcome only through exposure (excludability assumption) and that the timing of the interviews is unrelated to individual characteristics (observed or unobserved) that are correlated with the outcome variables (ignorability assumption).

In our case, although the site, Castel Volturno, was a dangerous area plagued by mafia violence and racial tensions, the date and the brutality of the massacre were certainly unexpected by the local African community - and all the more so by African immigrants in the surrounding metropolitan area or the rest of Italy - and exogenous to their sense of social identity. And no other relevant events occurred in temporal proximity with the massacre. What is harder to exclude is the presence of calendar effects and omitted variables related to the timing of the

<sup>15.</sup> Muñoz et al. (2020) provides a comprehensive analysis of the UESD methodology. It has been applied increasingly in the political, sociological and economic literature to study the impact of unexpected events â e.g. political announcements, frauds, scandals, terrorist attacks, health pandemics, economic sanctions, protests, riots and the like â on attitudes towards something or someone (e.g. political institutions and leaders, unknown others, ethnic and religious groups, economic and political issues) in addition to the studies cited in Muñoz et al., 2020, a selective review of the literature is provided by Nägel and Nivette, 2022.

interviews and the immigrants' self-reported social identity. For this reason, our preferred identification strategy is a difference-in-differences (DiD) model comparing the changes before and after the San Gennaro Massacre (the "treatment") in the identity outcome of the African immigrants (the "treatment group") with those in the identity outcome of non-African immigrants (the "control group"). Precisely, we estimate the following model:

$$Host_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 A frican_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \gamma A frican_i \times Post_t + \theta^T X + \lambda_l + \eta_c + \varepsilon_{it}$$
 (1)

where Hostit indicates the immigrant's sense of belonging to Italy at time t proxied by the dummy described above, African is a dummy equal to 1 if the immigrant is African and 0 otherwise, and *Post* is a dummy equal to 1 if the immigrant is interviewed after the massacre (after September 18th) and 0 before it. Our parameter of interest is  $\gamma$ , i.e. the differential impact of the massacre on the Africans' sense of belonging to Italy. To adjust for the fact that those interviewed before and after the massacre are different persons, we control for a large number of socio-demographic and "post migration" features that could potentially affect the sense of social identity (the vector X). First, we control for individual characteristics: Age, Gender, Marital status, Presence of Children in Italy and Years since arrival. Second, we control for immigrants' education, with four dummies for completed school levels - No education, Compulsory, High school and Bachelor or above - and one for Proficiency in Italian (the average value of self-reported scores, from 1 to 5, in reading, writing, listening and speaking skills). Third, we control for religion and nationality of friendships of immigrants to capture the role of cultural background and local social interactions: religion is measured by dummies for Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other religions, and Non-religious; the nationality of friendships is measured by four dummies indicating whether the people habitually frequented are Exclusively foreigners, Mostly foreigners, Foreigners and Italians, Mostly Italians. Fourth, to capture legal and economic conditions, we include the variables Irregular status, taking the value of 1 if the immigrant does not have residence permit, and Occupational status, taking the value of 1 if the respondent has a job at the time of the interview (regular or irregular, full or part-time, employee or self-employed). Appendix Table A.1 reports the full list and description of the variables. Finally, to control for possible omitted variables relating to the socio-economic environment and the emotional context where immigrants live and are interviewed, we include a series of indicators,  $\lambda_l$ , that inform on the place where the interview took place. <sup>16</sup> Finally, in the most saturated specification we also include continent-of-origin

<sup>16.</sup> The survey distinguishes between eleven places of interviews: (i) centers providing services and assistance (reception, work, health, counseling service, refectory, public offices); (ii) training centers (Italian courses, professional training courses, schools, universities); (iii) worship centers (churches, mosques, temples); (iv) ethnic shops (kebab shops, Islamic butchers, take-aways, food products); (v) places of entertainment (cinema, discos, sports facilities, bars, restaurants, shopping centers); (vi) meeting places (stations, squares, parks, lakes); (vii) markets (municipal markets, flower markets, fruit and vegetable markets); (viii) workplaces or workforce recruitment (construction sites, textile workshops, restaurants and hotels, gatehouses, agricultural fields and farms);

fixed effects to control for other possible cultural differences among non-African immigrants.

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#### 4.5 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis

Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The sample comprises 9,985 observations, of which 633 immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area. 56% of the immigrants in the sample say they are attached to Italy (Panel B, column 2), with a slightly higher share among the non-Africans (columns 5 and 8). Both groups show a much stronger attachment to their home country; here the highest share is among Africans (92.3% versus 89.9% for non-Africans). On average, immigrants are 35 years old, and 53% are men, with a higher percentage of males among the Africans. More than 40% of the respondents have a high school diploma and 18% have a bachelor's degree or more; the non-Africans are better educated. About 53.5% of the sample are married, and 34% declare that they have children in Italy. Not surprisingly, the sharpest differences between Africans and non-Africans concern religion. Christians account for 62.7% of the non-Africans and 21.8% of the Africans; Muslims are in the majority among the latter (74.6% versus 19.6% among the non-Africans). The average length of stay in Italy is 7.4 years, and is longer for the Africans (8.3 years). The average Italian proficiency score in Italian is 3.5/5. About 73% of the immigrants report being employed (with a higher percentage among non-Africans); 10.7% are irregular immigrants (15.2% of the Africans). Finally, nearly half of the interviewees have exclusively or mostly foreign friends; the percentage is slightly higher (51.6%) for African immigrants.

#### [Insert Table 1 about here]

For immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area, the figures are similar (Table 1, Panel A). The only exceptions are the share of Muslims among the non-Africans, which drops to 8%, and that of undocumented immigrants, which is more than twice that of the rest of Italy among both Africans and non-Africans. Finally, the portion of Africans who report having Italian friends is 63%, significantly more than for non-Africans (48.7%).

In short, these descriptive statistics indicate significant differences between our treatment and control groups, both in Italy generally and in the Naples area specifically. This suggests the need to include control variables in the empirical analysis.

In Table 2, we report the mean values of social identity measures for immigrants interviewed before and after the San Gennaro Massacre and test for univariate difference in means. <sup>17</sup> Consistent with the hypothesis that the event was a significant factor in the formation of social identity, we find that *Host* increased by 40 percentage points among the Africans and by 13

<sup>(</sup>ix) associations and cultural centers; (x) service centers (phone centers, money transfer agencies); (xi) private residences, to take into account potential selection of immigrants interviewed in specific places.

<sup>17.</sup> Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the statistics for all the variables, broken down into the sub-samples of immigrants interviewed before and after the event.

percentage points among the non-Africans in the Naples metropolitan area, both differences statistically significant. When we consider the whole country (Panel B), *Host* increased by 11 points for both immigrant groups, suggesting that the differential effects on social identity did not spread to all Africans in Italy. Finally, the massacre had no significant impact on the average sense of attachment of African immigrants to their home countries, which remains slightly greater than among non-Africans.

#### [Insert Table 2 about here]

For most of the other variables there are no statistically significant variations after the massacre, which is reassuring as to es us about the comparability between the samples of immigrants interviewed before and after. An exception, common on average to African and non-African immigrants throughout Italy, is a lower incidence of irregular immigrants in the post-massacre sample. Otherwise, the before-after differences in the individual characteristics of immigrants are marginal (see Table A.2 in Appendix).

#### 5 The local effects of San Gennaro massacre

Here we set out the results of our main analysis of the effects of the San Gennaro Massacre on the sense of attachment to Italy of the treated group of African immigrants in the metropolitan area of Naples.

#### 5.1 Baseline

Table 3 reports regression results of the baseline model. As a preliminary, column (1) considers a specification based on the before-after analysis on the treaties and finds that the probability of Africans' self-identifying with Italy increased by 19 percentage points in the aftermath of the massacre. Columns (3)-(6) extend the analysis to our preferred difference-in-differences model, estimating four specifications that successively add covariates and fixed effects. The results confirm that Africans' self-identification with Italy is on average weaker than that of other groups of immigrants. More important, the results consistently show that the massacre induced a statistically significant increase in the Africans' sense of belonging to Italy by comparison with other ethnic groups not directly targeted. The impact is also economically meaningful: considering the most saturated specification in column (5), after the massacre the likelihood of Africans' identifying themselves with Italy is 29 percentage points higher (against a mean of the dependent variable equal to 0.6).

[Insert Table 3 about here]

As is well known, the crucial condition for the DiD estimator to yield an unbiased estimate is the absence of any pre-treatment trend in the identity outcome between the treatment and

control groups. First, to check for some parallel trend between African and non-African immigrants, we split the data on social identity before the shock into two periods - up to June 20th and from June 21st to the day of the massacre. As Figure 5 shows, both African and non-African immigrants displayed a parallel decreasing trend in social identity before the shock. After the slaughter of Africans, there was a strengthening of the sense of attachment to Italy among immigrants in the Naples area generally, but the increase was significantly sharper among the treatment group of African immigrants.

#### [Insert Figure 5 about here]

To corroborate the parallel trend assumption, we also take an event study approach, distinguishing two post-massacre periods, from September 19th to November 18th and from November 19th onwards. The results are reported in Figure 6. Once again they confirm that the DiD coefficient is not statistically different from zero before the massacre but turns positive and significant afterward.

[Insert Figure 6 about here]

#### 5.2 Robustness

#### **5.2.1** Measuring social identity

To check the robustness of these baseline results, first we use alternative measures of perceived self-identification with Italian society. We exploit four survey questions concerning cultural values and attitude towards integration in the host society. To gauge agreement with shared values that prevail in Italy, we use the following two questions on the gender gap in pay and education: (i) "Do you agree that men should earn more than women for the same job?"; (ii) "Do you agree that getting a good degree is more important for men than women?". We create two dummy variables with value 1 if the respondent answers "Very much" to the questions (i) and (ii), respectively, and 0 if the answer is "Fairly much", "Not much" and "Not at all". We argue that, given the lower female participation in the labor market and education in many African countries, agreement that it is not unfair for men and women not to have the same educational and job opportunities reflects weaker identification with the values of the host society (Gould and Klor, 2016). Accordingly, a lower likelihood of African immigrants interviewed after the massacre endorsing gender disparities would indicate strengthened self-identification with Italy.

We also consider two survey questions on the willingness to take actions that promote greater social integration in Italy: (iii) "In which country would you like your child to go to school?"; and (iv) "How important is it for your children to get Italian citizenship?". For question (iii) we construct an indicator that takes the value of 1 for the answer "In Italy" and

0 otherwise; for question (iv) the indicator takes the value of 1 if the respondent says "Very much" and 0 if it is "Fairly much", "Not much" or "Not at all".

Table 4 gives the results of the DiD estimation of the effect of the massacre on indicators (i)-(iv) as a proxy for social identity: all the coefficients have the expected sign. The likelihood of Africans' residing in Naples agreeing with gender disparities in earnings falls significantly by 12.5 percentage points more than for non-Africans after the massacre (column 1). And column (2) indicates that the percentage of Africans who said a good education was more important for men than women decreased following the massacre, although the coefficient is smaller and imprecisely estimated.

#### [Insert Table 4 about here]

Turning to the integration attitude indicators in columns (3) and (4), the likelihood of Africans' deeming it very important for their children to study in Italy and to get Italian citizenship increases by, respectively, 17.2 and 9 percentage points.

Summarizing, the analysis appears robust to social identity measures. Overall, the checks confirm that the African immigrants in the area of the massacre show an increased inclination to act in keeping with and intention to integrate into Italy and to share its cultural values.

#### **5.2.2** Possible selection bias

A potential source of bias is that the Camorra attack might have altered Africans' willingness to be interviewed. For example, it is possible that after the massacre, and under the spotlight of the media and authorities, those not legally resident preferred not to expose themselves publicly, either refusing to be interviewed at all or to answer questions on their ties with Italy. In this case, those interviewed after the massacre would over-represent regular immigrants, who are more integrated in the community and the labor market and consequently feel more attached to Italy. Although we control for immigration and employment status, this could, at least in part, drive our finding of increased identification of Africans with Italy. <sup>18</sup>

Unfortunately we do not have information on how many potential interviewees chose not to participate. However, the non-response rates to the identity outcome question are very low both before and after the massacre and are not statistically different, although among Africans there is a slight increase from 1.2% to 3.6% (see Table 5).

#### [Insert Table 5 about here]

We also estimate a DiD model in which the dependent variables are the irregular immigration and irregular employment indicators (value 1 for immigrants not legally resident in Italy

<sup>18.</sup> A relationship between immigrants' labour market outcomes and the self-identification with destination country emerges from many empirical studies (Mason, 2004; Pendakur and Pendakur, 2005; Constant and Zimmermann, 2008; Battu and Zenou, 2010; Nekby and Rodin, 2010; Casey and Dustmann, 2010; Bisin et al., 2011; Drydakis, 2013; Cai and Zimmermann, 2020; Carillo et al., 2023; Piracha et al., 2023).

and for those with unreported job not entitling then to social protection or labour rights). Table 6 shows that the difference between the probabilities of African and non-African respondents being in Italy illegally or having an irregular job do not increase significantly after the massacre.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

#### 5.3 Treatment assignment and attenuation bias

We have assumed that the San Gennaro massacre was a racial-salient event and that the treatment status of immigrants is determined by a minimum threshold of racial salience, which depends in turn on ethnicity. Racial salience cannot be observed, however, which could contaminate our treatment indicator (being an immigrant from Africa). In other words, a possible concern is the possible impact of the massacre on the social identity of *non-African* immigrants. If the non-African community also reacts to the shock and in the same manner as Africans, then we have attenuation bias; in this case the estimated effect on the social identity of the African immigrants (our "treatment" group), would be only a lower bound.

To check for possible biases in treatment assignment we apply a placebo test. Specifically, we consider the sample of non-Africans, distinguishing immigrants by the genetic distance between their countries of origin and Ghana (on the hypothesis that ethnic and ancestral proximity to the victims is the main determinant of racial salience). <sup>19</sup> We replicate the DiD estimates assigning treatment status to immigrants from countries that are in the first decile or else in the first quartile of the distribution of the variable *Genetic distance from Ghana*. In this way we test for the differential impact on the feeling of attachment to Italy of the non-African immigrants who are culturally more similar to the African population of the victims, where racial salience should be more likely to be above some relevant threshold.

The regression (Table 7) rejects this hypothesis; that is, the massacre did not influence the identification with Italy of non-African immigrants who are genetically close to the Ghanaian victims. This corroborates the hypothesis that the massacre had great enough racial salience for African immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area to condition their social identity.

[Insert Table 7 about here]

# 6 Channels and spillover effects

#### 6.1 Channels

According to social identity theory, the strengthening of the identification with Italy within the African community in the Naples area in the aftermath of the racial attack could be due to

<sup>19.</sup> Genetic distance is a measure of differences in genetic composition between two populations. It is used increasingly in economics as an indicator of cultural differences between countries. For details on the genetic distance measure we use in the analysis, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).

heightened perception of the importance of forming part of the local community or a diminished sense of social distance from it (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Shayo, 2009; Bernard et al., 2016). The first channel would be driven by the fear of living apart from the settlement community and its civil society in a palpably insecure environment under the power of organized crime. As for the second channel, an increased sense of access to the local community could have stemmed from the demonstrations of solidarity held by local associations and social groups with extensive participation on the part of Italians, demanding justice and integration against racism.

However, the Camorra is active practically throughout the territory, and the power of the clans can be felt by immigrants in all the municipalities of the Naples metropolitan area. Similarly, the solidarity rallies in Naples in the days following the massacre saw broad participation of associations and citizens from all over the metropolitan area. Further, the considerable mobility of African immigrants in search of temporary work in agriculture or construction makes it implausible that their exposure either to the Camorra or to the solidarity response of civil society could be strictly confined to their municipality of residence.

Therefore, to shed some light on the channels through which the racial salience of the massacre may have affected African immigrants' identification with Italy, we extend the analysis to the national level, estimating the following model:

$$Host_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 A frican_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 Naples_i + \beta_4 Channel_i + \gamma^T DIT + \delta_1 A frican_i \times Post_t \times Naples_i + \delta_2 A frican_i \times Post_t \times Channel_i + \theta^T X + \lambda_l + \eta_c + \mu_p + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(2)

where  $Channel = \{Fear, Solidarity\}$  are the variables capturing either the fear or the solidarity effects stemming from the massacre (see below); DIT denotes the vector of the five double interaction terms  $African \times Post$ ,  $Naples \times Post$ ,  $Channel \times Post$ ,  $African \times Naples$ , and  $African \times Channel$ ; the vector X comprises the same set of individual control variables as the baseline model;  $\lambda_l$ ,  $\eta_c$  and  $\mu_p$  are a set of fixed effects for the place of the interview, the continent of origin and the province of residence of immigrants in Italy.

The fear channel is captured by the relative presence of organized crime in the municipality of residence, measured by the index of mafia presence *MPI\_c* created by Transcrime research center at Cattolica University of Milan for the period 2000-2011. *MPI* is a comprehensive index of the presence and criminal activity of the mafia-type organizations, by municipality. <sup>20</sup> It features five indicators: number of murders and attempted murders by mafia, number of crimes of mafia association membership, dissolution of city governments for mafia infiltration, assets confiscated from the mafia, and number of active mafia groups. The indicators are normalized

<sup>20.</sup> This index is widely used in the crime literature. For a detailed description of the MPI index and a review of the relavant literature see Dugato et al. (2020).

to 100 for the municipality with the highest value, and MPI is the unweighted mean of the five normalized indicators. In our sample, the highest value of MPI (81.7) is for San Gennaro Vesuviano, a municipality in the Naples metropolitan area; the index average of MPI in the area is above the 90th percentile of the nationwide distribution.

The solidarity channel is captured by the mobilization of civil society to demonstrate against racism and urge effective immigrant integration policies. We gathered information by manual Google searches of the main national media, which reported on large street demonstrations in the cities of Ancona, Milan, Modena, Naples, Parma and Rome in response to the Castel Volturno Massacre. Our first solidarity-channel variable, then, is the dummy  $Rally\_D$  with value 1 if the immigrant resides in one of the six municipalities where demonstrations were held. Second, given the possible mobility of immigrants and the participation in demonstrations of natives from other municipalities, we also use the log of 1 plus minimum distance between the immigrant's residence and the six municipalities hosting a demonstration,  $Rally\_md$ .

Our identification assumptions for the fear and solidarity channels are: (i) the coefficient  $\delta_2$  is positive and statistically significant (or negative, for the minimum distance variable) and (ii) the value of  $\delta_1$  decreases when *Channel* and its interaction terms are included. The regression results are reported in Table 8. Column (1) confirms that the Castel Volturno massacre induced a statistically significant increase in identification with Italy within the treatment group of African immigrants living in the area. The response of Africans in other Italian municipalities, instead, was on average not statistically different from that of non-African immigrants. Column (2) controls for the presence of mafia-type organizations in the immigrant's municipality of residence. Consistent with the fear channel, we find that after the massacre the probability that Africans residing in municipalities with a high rate of mafia crime, including those in the Naples area, would feel close to Italy and identify with its values increases, although the coefficient for the interaction with Fear is only significant at the 15% level. The low significance of  $\delta_2$  for the fear channel may reflect a threshold effect of the mafia presence, above which the danger of remaining confined to their own ethnic enclave separated from and in opposition to the rest of society becomes perceptible and the fear mechanism is triggered. However, as noted, the MPI index is above the 90th percentile in all the municipalities of the Naples metropolitan area, so no such threshold effect can be considered. Anyway, as confirmation of a fear channel, the results in column (2) show that, once purged of the fear effect of living in an environment with high Camorra intensity, the DiD coefficient for the impact of the massacre on the social identity of the Africans residing in the Naples area is 25% lower than in the specification that does not control for the fear channel.

#### [Insert Table 8 about here]

Columns (3) and (4) gauge the role of civil mobilization against racism in the aftermath of the massacre, using, respectively, the dummy for a solidarity rally in the municipality of residence and the minimum distance of immigrants from one of the rallies. In both specifications

the coefficients for the solidarity channel show the expected sign (positive for *Rally\_D*, negative for *Rally\_md*), while the DiD coefficient for the Africans living in the area of the massacre is lower, and in column (5) only weakly statistically significant.

Summing up, our findings suggest that the increased identification with Italy on the part of African immigrants in the Naples metropolitan area after the massacre of Africans at the hands of the Camorra was triggered by the vivid perception of both the risks of living apart from the local civil society and the empathy shown by many Italians in numerous, large and heartfelt street demonstrations against racism.

#### **6.2** Spillovers

The non-significance of the coefficient for  $African \times Post$  in the first column of Table 9 indicates that on average the social identity effects of the massacre were limited to the treatment group of African immigrants in the Naples area. However, the coefficients for the triple-DiD variables regarding the fear and solidarity channels also capture the response of African communities in other regions and may conceal the existence of heterogeneous spillover effects.

The vast echo of the massacre in public and private radio/TV stations and in the national and local press, as well as word of mouth among immigrants moving between regions in search of work, certainly helped spread the news of the attack throughout the African community in Italy. Yet, it is possible that the emotional reaction of African immigrants outside the Naples area and the effects on their identity relationship with the host community differed with the local environment.

In order to isolate possible spillover effects, in this section we follow the strategy proposed by Albright et al. (2021), estimating the following equation:

$$Host_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 A frican_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 Naples_i + \beta_4 Spillover_i + \gamma^T DIT + \delta_1 A frican_i \times Post_t \times Naples_i + \delta_2 A frican_i \times Post_t \times Spillover_i + \theta^T X + \lambda_l + \eta_c + \mu_p + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(3)

By construction, the *Spillover* variables take value 0 for immigrants residing in the treatment municipalities of the Naples metropolitan area. In this case  $\delta_1$  captures the direct effect of the massacre on the social identity of Africans there, while  $\delta_2$  captures the indirect (spillover) effects on those living elsewhere. That is, the identification assumptions for the existence of spillover effects are: (i) that  $\delta_2$  is statistically significant and (ii) that the estimated differential impact of the massacre on the social identity of the treatment group ( $\delta_1$ ) increases after removing the attenuation effect generated by the spillover impact on the sense of attachment to Italy of African immigrants outside Naples.

First, we consider the spillovers via geographical proximity to Castel Volturno, on the assumption that formal and informal information about the massacre increases with physical

proximity. We build a dummy  $Proximity\_D$  taking value 1 for immigrants residing in municipalities less than 200 kilometers from Castel Volturno. We also measure proximity as a continuous index ranging from 0 to 1, computed for each municipality as  $Proximity\_c_j = 1 - d_{j,cv}/d_{z,cv}$ , where  $d_{j,cv}$  is the distance of municipality j from Castel Volturno in kilometers and  $d_{z,cv}$  is the maximum distance between Castel Volturno and the municipalities included in our sample (866 kilometers).

Second, we examine possible spillovers working through the fear and solidarity mechanisms described above. Apart from the variables discussed in section 6.1, to take into account of a possible minimum threshold of mafia intensity below which the fear mechanism is not at work in a municipality, we also use the indicator variable *MPI\_D* which takes value 1 for immigrants in municipalities with an MPI above the median for Italian municipalities and 0 for those below it.

Table 9 reports regression results of this spillover analysis. For the sake of comparison, column (1) reproduces the estimate in the absence of the fear and solidarity effects. Columns (2) and (3) show that spillover effects would not appear to have been transmitted to the African community in the rest of Italy according to proximity: the DiD coefficient for proximity to Castel Volturno is statistically insignificant, and the DiD coefficient for Africans in Naples remains broadly unchanged in magnitude and significance. It may be noted in passing that this negative result is reassuring as to the correct definition of the control group.

By contrast, the regression results in columns (4)-(7) indicate the presence of spillovers on the social identity of African immigrants in municipalities marked by strong mafia-type organizations and in those where solidarity demonstrations were held. The coefficient of the direct effect of the massacre on identification with Italy in the Naples area is higher than in the specification with no spillovers, while the coefficient on the triple interaction for the spillover variables is significant and have the expected sign. This result is confirmed in column (8), which includes both spillover channels. Since  $Rally\_D$  is equal to 1 in municipalities where the mafia presence is above the median, the estimated coefficient on  $African \times Post \times Rally\_D$  increases, while that of  $African \times Post \times MPI\_D$  decreases an loses significance. More interesting is that the coefficient on  $African \times Post$  is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that for African immigrants outside Naples in municipalities with weaker mafia presence and less of a show of community solidarity an "animosity" effect may have prevailed, undermining identification with Italian society.

[Insert Table 9 about here]

#### 7 Persistence effects

The analysis to this point shows that the racial hatred that led to the killing of six African immigrants at the hands of the Camorra produced an immediate change in the self-reported

social identity of Africans in the area of the massacre. An interesting question is whether the memory of the massacre prolonged the immediate response, generating longer-term persistence within the African community.

A consolidated strand of the literature holds that the formation of immigrant identity is a long-term process influenced mainly by the transmission of values and beliefs strongly rooted in the group of origin (Bisin and Verdier, 2010, 2022). Much less well explored are the possible long-term effects that one-off events may have on immigrants' self-identification; the question, that is, is whether the emotional response to significant events is destined to hold only in the short run or to instead trigger deeper identity changes that can persist and be passed on to the new arrivals over time.

This section examines the persistence effects of the San Gennaro massacre on Africans' sense of attachment to Italy in the Naples metropolitan area. We exploit data from the 2015 wave of the ISMU survey. This second wave gives the same information on individual characteristics, social and economic conditions and social identity of immigrants as the first wave, on which our analysis of the immediate impact is based. Although the second wave covers a smaller sample of immigrants for a subset of the municipalities included in the 2008 survey, 45% of the interviews (1,660 out of 3,550) were in the Naples metropolitan area.

We augment the baseline model (1) with a difference-in-differences term to test for the persistence, seven years after the event, of a differential impact of the massacre on the social identity of African compared to non-African immigrants:

$$Host_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 A frican_i + \beta_2 Post\_08_t + \beta_3 Post\_15_t + \gamma_1 A frican_i \times Post\_08_t + \gamma_2 A frican_i \times Post\_15_t + \theta^T X + \lambda_l + \eta_c + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$(4)$$

where *Post\_08* and *Post\_15* are dummies taking value 1 for immigrants interviewed in the 2008 and 2015 waves of the ISMU survey, respectively.

To capture the role of the event in transmitting identity values of closeness and integration with the local community, among the African and non-African immigrants interviewed in 2015 we select those whose countries of origin were included in the 2008 survey. The results (Table 10) indicate that the impact on the social identity of Africans persisted in 2015 but was somewhat less strong than on the heels of the massacre. In particular, we find that for the Africans who reside in the Naples metropolitan area the difference between the probability of feeling a strong sense of belonging to Italy seven years after and before the massacre is 16.5 percentage points greater than for immigrants belonging to ethnic groups not directly affected. In column (2), which extends the analysis to ethnic groups not present in the Naples area in the months immediately preceding or following the massacre and thus not directly experiencing the fear and solidarity of those dramatic days, the persistence effect is much smaller and not statistically significant. This offers support for the hypothesis of a persistent impact of transitory shocks

on social identity, through cultural transmission within ethnic groups of the new beliefs and preferences triggered by the shock.

[Insert Table 10 about here]

# 8 Identity orientation

The strengthening of identification with Italy in the African community in the aftermath of the San Gennaro massacre could reflect radically different patterns of adaptation to the norms and values of the host society, engendering positive or negative repercussions on the level of self-esteem and psychological well-being. In particular, it is possible that the increased sense of attachment to Italy following the massacre was experienced by Africans as the renunciation of their own ethnic identity which is forced by the context rather than freely chosen, a sort of betrayal of the values of the community and family of origin. In this case, as the recent literature on social psychology and economic integration has highlighted, a clash of cultures would result which has a negative impact on self-esteem (Phinney et al., 1997; Fisher et al., 2020; Dahl et al., 2022).

Following the acculturation model of Berry (1997), we can distinguish four identity orientations reflecting the immigrant's desire to absorb and conform with the cultural traits of the host country and the desire to retain and strive for the culture of origin (see figure 7). If the strong sense of belonging to the host country is accompanied by an equally strong attachment to the norms and values of the country of origin and the will not to give them up, we have an *integrated* identity orientation. If instead the desire to integrate into the host community goes together with the desire to detach from the community of origin, to which the immigrants no longer feel they belong, we have an *assimilation* identity. Likewise, we can distinguish between a *separated* and a *marginalized* identity orientation depending on whether the weak sense of affinity with host country norms and values is accompanied by either a strong or a weak sense of identification with the community of origin.

#### [Insert Figure 7 about here]

The choice of identity orientation has important consequences for immigrants. The empirical evidence suggests that young and adult immigrants with an integrated identity orientation, connected equally strongly to the host and origin cultures, have greater subjective well-being, better academic performance and economic outcomes than those with separated and marginalized identities and also, albeit less markedly, compared with those who have an assimilated orientation (Phinney et al., 2001; Constant and Zimmermann, 2008; Nekby and Rodin, 2010).

To gauge the impact of the Camorra attack on the broader identity orientation of African immigrants, we use survey information on immigrants' attachment to their ethnic group, based on responses to the question "How much do you feel you belong to your home country?" Given

four possible answers: "far too little", "only a little", "fairly much" and "very much", we create an indicator variable *Home* that takes the value 1 if the respondent indicates "fairly much" or "very much" and 0 otherwise.

As a preliminary we replicate our baseline DiD analysis with Home as dependent variable. The regression for the subsample of immigrants in Naples (first column of Table 11) shows that Africans are more attached to their own ethnic group than other immigrants, but that the murder of the six Africans had no differential effect between immigrants of different ethnic groups.

#### [Insert Table 11 about here]

Taken together with the significant increase in the sense of attachment to Italy, this finding indicates that the identity orientation of African immigrants shifted from segregation/separation towards assimilation/integration. To determine which of these patterns of change was triggered by the massacre, we estimate a bivariate probit model for *Home* and *Host*, which allows for possible correlations between the unobservable factors included in the error terms of each of the two probability models  $\hat{a}$  see columns (2) and (3). The correlation coefficient is negative and statistically significant, confirming that the attachment to home and host countries need to be estimated simultaneously. The effects of the massacre on immigrants' social identity are confirmed: Africans are significantly more inclined to feel attached to Italy than other immigrants, while the attachment to the ethnic groups of origin remains unchanged. Based on the bivariate regression, we compute the average predicted probability of immigrants' being integrated, assimilated, separated and segregated – respectively Pr(Host = 1 and Home = 1), Pr(Host = 1 and Home = 0), Pr(Host = 0 and Home = 1) and Pr(Host = 0 and Home = 0) – before and after the massacre. Table 12 reports the contrast estimate for African and non-African immigrants.

The African immigrants' increased sense of belonging to Italy in the aftermath of the massacre took the form of a shift in their identity orientation from separated to integrated, not assimilated. Specifically, the probability of Africans' nourishing a feeling of identity separation, between the high value attributed to the culture of origin and the relative lack of interest in interacting with the settlement community, plummeted from 68% before to 15% after the massacre. At the same time the probability of an identity integration on the part of Africans that values both the absorption of Italian culture and respect for the original culture and norms jumped by more than 50 percentage points, from 32% to 84%.

#### [Insert Table 12 about here]

A similar shift from separation to integration was also experienced by immigrants of other ethnicities, but with much lower intensity than for African immigrants, leading in fact to a reversal in the model of identity orientation prevalent between the two groups: before the massacre Africans were on average more likely than non-Africans to have a separated identity orientation (+24%) and less likely to have an integrated orientation (-21%), whereas after the massacre the opposite held (-11% and +14% for separated and integrated identity, respectively).

# 9 Conclusions

Notwithstanding the pressing need to foster the integration of immigrants in many European countries and reduce their feelings of opposition to the host countries, little is known about how this process can be affected by the local environment in which the immigrants settle. This lack of study presumably reflects the prevalence, in the economic literature, of the thesis that the formation of immigrants' social identity evolves slowly, involves long-lasting personality traits, and reflects life goals in the medium and long run. Hence researchers' greater interest in immigrants' individual preferences and characteristics and the factors in the intergenerational transmission of social identity.

This paper helps to plug this gap by analyzing the effects of an immediate event - the brutal San Gennaro massacre of 2008 against the African community in a small town near Naples at the hands of the powerful local Camorra clans - on African immigrants' sense of self. The analysis of this case is particularly interesting, given the rapid growth of immigration to Italy in recent decades and the heterogeneity and cultural distance of the ethnic groups arriving, which heightens the risk of social conflict. And owing to its geographical position as "landing country" in the Mediterranean, Italy is a crucial actor in the current political debate on European Union immigration policy.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we compare the change in social identity outcomes of Africans (the treatment group) before and after the massacre with the change in social identity outcomes of non-African immigrants in the same area (the control group). We find that in response to the crime of racial hatred, the heightened perception of the dangers of living apart from the host community and the solidarity received from Italians led the African immigrants in the area to develop a stronger sense of belonging to Italy.

The impact of the massacre on immigrants' social identity spilled over to African communities in the rest of Italy in cities characterized, like Naples, by the strong presence of mafia-type organizations and where the local civil society mobilized against racism. Further, the racial salience of the massacre persisted over time in the African community of the Naples metropolitan area, with a long-term impact on the sense of identification with Italy. Finally, this strengthened attachment to Italy was accompanied by the persistence of a strong attachment to the African countries of origin. That is, the identity orientation of the African community directly affected by the massacre shifted towards integration rather than assimilation.

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## **Figures and Tables**




Figure 1 – African community in Campania region

*Notes.* The Figure displays the Africans spread in Campania at the municipality level. Official statistics for the African population by municipality are from ISTAT at January 2008.

Figure 2 – Timeline of events






Figure 3 – African community, mafia-type criminality and solidarity manifestations in Italy



Notes. Panel A shows the number of African immigrants by NUTS 3 province (NUTS-3) in January 2008 drawn from the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) "Immigrati.stat" (http://stra-dati.istat.it/). Panel B displays the Index of Mafia by NUTS 3 provinces for the period 2000-2011 provided by the Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime (TRANSCRIME) at the Cattolica University of Milan (Italy). It combines murders and attempted assassination by Mafia in 2004-2011, people accused of Mafia association in 2004-2011, municipalities and public administration dissolved for Mafia in 2000-2012, assets confiscated from Mafia in 2000-2011, active groups reported in 2000-2011. In both figures, green triangles indicate the cities where demonstrations in support of the African community took place between September and October 2008. Regional borders are marked by the yellow line.



*Notes.* Above the line, the total number of interviews for African and non-African immigrant groups before and after September 18th, 2008: the first number in brackets refers the number of interviews in province of Naples, while the second number refers to the interviews in the rest of Italy.

Figure 5 – Descriptive parallel trend

*Notes.* The Figure shows the unconditional mean of Host identity for the Africans and non-Africans living in Naples before and after the massacre. Interviews in Naples are concentrated in June and July before the Massacre date. Hence, according to this, we group observations in order to exploit two time periods before the shock (from March to June and from July to Septembre 17th) and one time period after the shock (from September 18th to December).

Trends in host identity

Average Marginal Effects with 95% CIs

Time to San Gennaro massacre

Figure 6 – Dynamic effects of the San Mennaro massacre

*Notes*. The figure shows the dynamics of the effect of the Massacre on the Africans sense of belonging to Italy for foreigners living in Naples in 2008. DiD regression is performed with coefficients estimated within standard 95% confidence intervals. Interviews in Naples are concentrated in June and July before the Massacre date, while from October to December after the event. Therefore, based on this pattern, we exploit two time periods before and two time periods after the shock in order to ensure an equal number of observations in each period.

Figure 7 – Social identity orientation

## Host How much do you feel you belong to Italy?

		in no way – little	enough – very much
Home How much do you feel you belong to your home country?	enough – very much	Separated	Integrated
How much do yo to your hor	in no way – little	Marginalized	Assimilated

Table 1 – Descriptive statistics

		Panel A: Naples							
		All			Africans		Non-Africans		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Variables	count	mean	sd	count	mean	sd	count	mean	sd
Host	633	0.603	0.490	132	0.530	0.501	501	0.623	0.485
Home	630	0.908	0.289	131	0.916	0.278	499	0.906	0.292
Male	633	0.509	0.500	132	0.833	0.374	501	0.423	0.495
Age	633	36.447	9.652	132	34.265	7.875	501	37.022	9.995
No education	633	0.112	0.316	132	0.167	0.374	501	0.098	0.297
Compulsory	633	0.305	0.461	132	0.364	0.483	501	0.289	0.454
High school	633	0.415	0.493	132	0.333	0.473	501	0.437	0.497
BA +	633	0.167	0.374	132	0.136	0.344	501	0.176	0.381
Married	633	0.474	0.500	132	0.379	0.487	501	0.499	0.500
Muslim	633	0.221	0.415	132	0.727	0.447	501	0.088	0.283
Christian	633	0.577	0.494	132	0.205	0.405	501	0.675	0.469
Buddhist	633	0.084	0.277	132	0.000	0.000	501	0.106	0.308
Hindu	633	0.025	0.157	132	0.000	0.000	501	0.032	0.176
Sikh	633	0.008	0.089	132	0.000	0.000	501	0.010	0.099
Other religion	633	0.008	0.089	132	0.008	0.087	501	0.008	0.089
No religion	633	0.077	0.267	132	0.061	0.240	501	0.082	0.274
Children in Italy	633	0.310	0.463	132	0.265	0.443	501	0.321	0.467
Years in Italy	633	7.774	5.606	132	9.280	6.947	501	7.377	5.131
Italian language knowledge	633	3.296	1.033	132	3.347	1.030	501	3.283	1.034
Friend: Foreigners	633	0.180	0.385	132	0.144	0.352	501	0.190	0.392
Friend: Predominantly foreigners	633	0.303	0.460	132	0.227	0.421	501	0.323	0.468
Friend: Mixed	633	0.348	0.477	132	0.402	0.492	501	0.333	0.472
Friend: Predominantly Italians	633	0.169	0.375	132	0.227	0.421	501	0.154	0.361
Irregular legal status	633	0.289	0.454	132	0.371	0.485	501	0.267	0.443
Employed	633	0.793	0.405	132	0.720	0.451	501	0.812	0.39

	Panel B: Italy								
	All			Africans		Non-Africans			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Variables	count	mean	sd	count	mean	sd	count	mean	sd
Host	9,985	0.560	0.496	3,553	0.529	0.499	6,432	0.576	0.494
Home	9,910	0.908	0.290	3,524	0.923	0.267	6,386	0.899	0.301
Male	9,985	0.527	0.499	3,553	0.728	0.445	6,432	0.416	0.493
Age	9,985	35.148	10.127	3,553	34.160	9.094	6,432	35.694	10.616
No education	9,985	0.070	0.255	3,553	0.112	0.315	6,432	0.047	0.212
Compulsory	9,985	0.323	0.468	3,553	0.355	0.479	6,432	0.305	0.460
High school	9,985	0.425	0.494	3,553	0.386	0.487	6,432	0.446	0.497
BA +	9,985	0.182	0.386	3,553	0.147	0.354	6,432	0.202	0.401
Married	9,985	0.535	0.499	3,553	0.522	0.500	6,432	0.542	0.498
Muslim	9,985	0.392	0.488	3,553	0.746	0.435	6,432	0.196	0.397
Christian	9,985	0.481	0.500	3,553	0.218	0.413	6,432	0.627	0.484
Buddhist	9,985	0.032	0.176	3,553	0.001	0.034	6,432	0.049	0.216
Hindu	9,985	0.016	0.126	3,553	0.012	0.107	6,432	0.019	0.135
Sikh	9,985	0.006	0.075	3,553	0.000	0.017	6,432	0.009	0.093
Other religion	9,985	0.010	0.097	3,553	0.009	0.093	6,432	0.010	0.099
No religion	9,985	0.064	0.244	3,553	0.014	0.118	6,432	0.091	0.288
Children in Italy	9,985	0.341	0.474	3,553	0.312	0.463	6,432	0.358	0.479
Years in Italy	9,985	7.398	6.166	3,553	8.382	6.977	6,432	6.855	5.595
Italian language knowledge	9,985	3.469	1.030	3,553	3.439	1.056	6,432	3.485	1.015
Friend: Foreigners	9,985	0.161	0.367	3,553	0.182	0.386	6,432	0.148	0.356
Friend: Friend: Predominantly foreigners	9,985	0.330	0.470	3,553	0.334	0.472	6,432	0.328	0.470
Friend: Mixed	9,985	0.327	0.469	3,553	0.327	0.469	6,432	0.328	0.469
Friend: Predominantly Italians	9,985	0.182	0.386	3,553	0.157	0.364	6,432	0.195	0.397
Irregular legal status	9,985	0.107	0.309	3,553	0.152	0.359	6,432	0.082	0.274
Employed	9,985	0.726	0.446	3,553	0.652	0.477	6432	0.767	0.423

Table 2 – Social identity: univariate analysis

I alici A. Ivabics	Panel	A:	<b>Naples</b>	
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	Africans			Non-Africans		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables	before	after	t-test	before	after	t-test
Host	0.364	0.764	0.400***	0.533	0.684	0.131**
Home	0.935	0.889	-0.046	131	0.906	0.906

Panel B: Italy

		Africans			Non-Africans			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Variables	before	after	t-test	before	after	t-test		
Host	0.435	0.553	0.118***	0.492	0.602	0.110***		
Home	0.925	0.922	-0.002	0.897	0.900	0.003		

*Notes.* \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1.

Table 3 – The effect of the San Gennaro massacre in the Naples metropolitan area

	Dependent variable: Host						
	Before-After on the treated	DiD estimates					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
African		-0.142***	-0.161**	-0.176**	-0.189**		
		(0.0348)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.072)		
Post	0.191***	0.052	0.134***	0.119**	0.135**		
	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.062)		
African $\times$ Post		0.139**	0.239***	0.257***	0.291***		
		(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.068)		
Controls	no	no	yes	yes	yes		
Continent of origin FE	no	no	no	yes	yes		
Place of interview FE	no	no	no	no	yes		
Adjusted $R^2$	0.030	0.010	0.171	0.182	0.180		
Observations	164	866	633	633	633		
Mean dependent	0.527	0.599	0.599	0.599	0.599		

*Notes.* OLS estimates in columns (1)-(5). Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the municipality level; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, + p < 0.15. Column (1) reports simple difference estimates (before-after analysis) of the influence of the massacre on the attachment to Italy of the Africans residing in Naples. We report DiD estimates in columns (2)-(5). In columns (1) and (2) we exclude all the control variables. In column (3) we include immigrants' characteristics as gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status. In column (4) we also add continent of origin dummies. Finally, in column (5) we also include the place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 4 – Robustness: DiD results with alternative measures of host identity

	Dependent variable: Host						
	Men earn more than women	Education is better for men	Children study in Italy	Citizenship children			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
African × Post	-0.127***	-0.012	0.233***	$0.097^{+}$			
	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.058)			
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Place of interview FE	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Adjusted $R^2$	0.019	0.056	0.156	0.108			
Observations	610	614	629	610			
Mean dependent	0.079	0.099	0.479	0.676			

Notes. OLS estimates in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at city level; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, +p < 0.12. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 5 – Percentage of non responses for self-identification with Italy

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Before	After	t-test
	Sept. 18th	Sept.18th	
Africans	0.012	0.036	0.024
Non-Africans	0.041	0.028	-0.013

Table 6 – DiD results for immigrant status

	Dependent variable:		
	Irregular legal status	Irregular employed	
	(1)	(2)	
African × Post	-0.056	-0.040	
	(0.105)	(0.075)	
Controls	yes	yes	
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes	
Place of interview FE	yes	yes	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.207	0.093	
Observations	677	679	
Mean dependent	0.261	0.286	

Notes. OLS estimates in columns (1)-(2). Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at city level; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, \*p < 0.15. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian, (ii) continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 7 – The effect of the San Gennaro massacre on non-African ethnic groups

	Dependent variable: Host					
	Treated:					
	Ethnic groups in the 1th decile of genetic distance from Ghana	Ethnic groups in the 1th quartile of genetic distance from Ghana				
	(1)	(2)				
Treated × Post	0.069	0.059				
	(0.057)	(0.085)				
Controls	yes	yes				
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes				
Place of interview FE	yes	yes				
Adjusted $R^2$	0.168	0.169				
Observations	501	501				
Mean dependent	0.611	0.611				

*Notes.* OLS estimates in columns (1)-(2). Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at city level; \*\*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, + p < 0.15. In all regressions we exclude African foreigners. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 8 – The effect of the San Gennaro massacre: the channels

	Dependent variable: Host						
			Channels				
	Naples	Fear	Solie	darity			
		MPI_c	Rally_D	Rally_md			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
African×Post	0.006	-0.110 <sup>+</sup>	-0.034	0.234*			
	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.104)			
African×Post×Naples	0.253***	0.189***.	0.232***.	$0.139^{+}$			
-	(0.045)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.099)			
African×Post×Fear		$0.003^{+}$					
		(0.002)					
African×Post×Solidarity			0.203***	-0.053**			
•			(0.040)	(0.023)			
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Place of interview FE	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Province FE	yes	yes	yes	yes			
Adjusted $R^2$	0.199	0.201	0.203	0.200			
Observations	9,985	9,984	9,985	9,951			
Mean dependent	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567			

*Notes.* OLS estimates in columns (1)-(4). Standard errors clustered at province level in parenthesis; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, \*p < 0.15. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) province and continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 9 – The effect of the San Gennaro massacre: spillover effects

Dependent variable: Host Spillovers Fear & Proximity to Naples Fear Solidarity Castel Volturno Solidarity Proximity\_D Proximity\_c  $MPI\_D$  $MPI\_c$ Rally\_D Rally\_md Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) African×Post - 0.001 -0.034 0.238\* -0.074\*\* 0.006 0.026 -0.067\*\*  $-0.114^{+}$ (0.041)(0.043)(0.045)(0.032)(0.069)(0.036)(0.139)(0.032)0.234\*\*\* 0.253\*\*\* 0.260\*\*\* 0.289\*\*\* 0.328\*\*\* 0.326\*\*\* 0.371\*\*\*  $African \times Post \times Naples$ 0.017 (0.045)(0.051)(0.033)(0.075)(0.041)(0.049)(0.145)(0.032)African×Post×Proximity C.V. 0.070 -0.057 (0.082)(0.111) $0.003^{+}$ African×Post×Fear 0.140\*0.071 (0.071)(0.002)(0.070)African×Post×Solidarity 0.246\*\*\* -0.054\* 0.322\*\*\* (0.046)(0.030)(0.055)Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Continent of origin FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Place of interview FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Province FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Adjusted  $R^2$ 0.199 0.201 0.200 0.203 0.203 0.204 Observations 9,985 9,984 9,984 9,984 9,984 9,951 9,985 9,984 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 0.567 Mean dependent 0.567

Notes. OLS estimates in columns (1)-(8). Standard errors clustered at province level in parenthesis; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, +p < 0.15, ++p < 0.161. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) province and continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 10 – The long-term effects of the San Gennaro massacre

	Dependent var	riable: <i>Host</i>
	Countries in 2008 sample	All countries
	(1)	(2)
African×Post_08	0.212***	0.204***
	(0.071)	(0.073)
Africans×Post_15	0.165**	0.057
	(0.076)	(0.082)
Controls	yes	yes
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes
Place of interview FE	yes	yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.244	0.237
Observations	1,791	2,038
Mean dependent	0.486	0.471

*Notes.* OLS estimates in columns (1)-(2). Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at city level; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1, + p < 0.15. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) continent of origin dummies and (iii) place of interview dummies. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 11 – The effect of the San Gennaro massacre on immigrants' identity orientation

	OLS	Bip	robit
	Home	Home	Host
	(1)	(2)	(3)
African	0.208***	1.268***	-0.628***
	(0.060)	(0.285)	(0.236)
Post	0.010	-0.135	$0.425^{**}$
	(0.052)	(0.306)	(0.169)
African×Post	-0.059	-0.198	1, 098***
	(0.063)	(0.341)	(0.242)
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Continent of origin FE	yes	yes	yes
Place of interview FE	yes	yes	yes
Adjusted $R^2$	0.161		
ρ			-0.205***
Observations	630	630	630

Notes. OLS estimates in columns (1), bivariate probit estimates in columns (2)-(3). Robust standard errors in parenthesis; \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. The sample is formed by immigrants in Naples. All regressions include (i) immigrants' characteristics - gender, age, education, civil status (a dummy for married status), having children in Italy religion, years spent in Italy, friends' nationality, fluency in Italian and dummies for both legal and worker status, (ii) province fixed effects and (iii) place of interview fixed effects. In all regressions sampling weights are used.

Table 12 – Probability of identity orientation

	`	<i>Identity oriental</i> fore September	,	Pr( <i>Identity orientation</i> ) after September 18th		,
	Africans	Non Africans	Δ	Africans	Non Africans	Δ
Marginalized	0. 002*	0.008	-0. 007	0. 001	0.006	-0.005
Separated	0.678***	0.439***	0.239***	0.153***	0. 268***	-0.114
Assimilated	0.002	$0.022^{**}$	-0.019**	0.009	0. 033*	-0.024**
Integrated	0.318***	0.531***	-0.213***	0.837***	0.694***	0.143**

*Notes.* The probability of identity orientations of Africans and non Africans and the contrast between them are computed using the "margins" and "margins contrast" stata commands based on the bivariate probit estimation for the subsample of Naples reported in table 11. Robust standard errors: \*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1.

## Appendix

## Table A.1 – Variables Description

Home Host	dummy =1 if the respondent answers <i>Enough</i> or <i>Very Much</i> to the question: <i>How much do you feel you belong to your home country?</i> dummy =1 if the respondent answers <i>Enough</i> or <i>Very Much</i> to the question: <i>How much do you feel you belong to Italy?</i>
African Post	dummy =1 if the respondent's nationality belongs to an African country dummy =1 if the respondent is interviewed after the date of the massacre (sentember 18th)
Male	dummy = 1 if the respondent is male
Age	Respondent's age
No education	dummy =1 if the respondent has no educational qualification
Compulsory	dummy =1 if the respondent has attended the compulsory schooling
High school	dummy =1 if the respondent has a high school diploma
BA+	dummy =1 if the respondent is graduated or more
Civil status: married	dummy =1 if the respondent is married
Muslim	dummy =1 if the respondent is Muslim
Christian	dummy =1 if the respondent is Christian
Buddhist	dummy =1 if if the respondent is Buddhist
Hindu	dummy =1 if the respondent is Hindu
Sikh	dummy =1 if the respondent is Sikh
Other religion	dummy =1 if the respondent is affiliated with other religions
No religion	dummy =1 if the respondent is not religious
Children in Italy	dummy =1 if the respondendent has children and they live in Italy with her
Years in Italy	Respondent's # of years spent in Italy
Italian language knowledge	Average reading, writing, listening and speaking score, as self-reported by the respondent (in a scale from 1 to 5)
Friend: foreigners	dummy =1 if the respondent's friends are exclusively foreign
Friend: predominantly foreigners	dummy =1 if the respondent's friends are predominantly foreign
Friend: mixed	dummy =1 if the respondent's friends are equally foreign or Italian
Friend: predominantly Italians	dummy =1 if the respondent's friends are predominantly Italian
Irregular legal status	dummy =1 if the respondent is undocumented
Employed	dummy =1 if the respondent has a job at the time of the interview (formal or informal, full or part-time, as employer or employee)

Table A.2 – Descriptive statistics before and after the Massacre

			Naples	oles					Italy	ly		
		African	1		Non-Afric	can		Africar			Non-Africa	an
Variables	before	after	t-test	before	after	t-test	before	after	t-test	before	after	t-test
	<u>(T</u> )	(5)	(3)	4)	(5)	(9)	$\bigcirc$	(8)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Host	0.364	0.764	0.400***	0.553	0.684	0.131**	0.435	0.553	0.118***	0.492	0.602	0.110***
Home	0.935	0.889	-0.046	906.0	906.0	-0.000	0.925	0.922	-0.002	0.897	0.900	0.003
Male	0.805	0.873	0.068	0.387	0.455	0.068	0.777	0.715	-0.062***	0.446	0.407	-0.039**
Age	33.688	35.073	1.384	38.451	35.759	-2.692**	34.237	34.140	-0.097	35.537	35.742	0.205
No education	0.117	0.236	0.119	0.043	0.147	0.104***	0.121	0.109	-0.012	0.045	0.047	0.002
Compulsory	0.299	0.455	0.156	0.272	0.305	0.032	0.393	0.346	-0.047*	0.351	0.291	-0.060***
High school	0.416	0.218	-0.197*	0.434	0.440	900.0	0.355	0.394	0.039	0.433	0.450	0.018
BA+	0.169	0.091	-0.078	0.251	0.109	-0.142***	0.131	0.151	0.020	0.171	0.211	0.040***
Married	0.351	0.418	0.068	0.515	0.485	-0.030	0.542	0.517	-0.024	0.515	0.550	0.035*
Muslim	0.662	0.818	0.156*	0.081	0.094	0.013	0.819	0.728	-0.091***	0.176	0.202	0.026*
Christian	0.286	0.091	-0.195**	0.715	0.639	-0.076	0.159	0.233	0.074***	0.684	0.610	-0.074***
Buddhist	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.068	0.139	0.071**	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.043	0.051	0.008
Hindu	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.034	0.030	-0.004	0.000	0.014	0.014**	0.014	0.020	900.0
Sikh	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.008	-0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.009	-0.001
Other religion	0.013	0.000	-0.013	0.009	0.008	-0.001	0.004	0.010	900.0	0.007	0.011	0.003
No religion	0.039	0.091	0.052	0.081	0.083	0.002	0.017	0.013	-0.003	0.067	0.098	0.032***
Children in Italy	0.182	0.382	0.200*	0.302	0.338	0.036	0.299	0.315	0.016	0.324	0.368	0.043**
Years in Italy	8.506	10.364	1.857	7.289	7.455	0.166	8.450	8.365	-0.084	6.473	6.971	0.498**
Italian language knowledge	3.269	3.455	0.185	3.304	3.264	-0.040	3.313	3.470	0.157***	3.401	3.511	0.110***
Friend: Foreigners	0.182	0.091	-0.091	0.140	0.233	0.093**	0.184	0.182	-0.002	0.160	0.145	-0.015
Friend: Predominantly foreigners	0.195	0.273	0.078	0.340	0.308	-0.032	0.331	0.334	0.003	0.338	0.325	-0.013
Friend: Mixed	0.351	0.473	0.122	0.374	0.297	-0.077	0.301	0.333	0.032	0.301	0.336	0.035*
Friend: Predominantly Italians	0.273	0.164	-0.109	0.145	0.162	0.017	0.184	0.150	-0.034*	0.200	0.194	-0.006
Irregular legal status	0.519	0.164	-0.356***	0.370	0.177	-0.194***	0.235	0.131	-0.104***	0.117	0.071	-0.045***
Employed	0.623	0.855	0.231**	0.809	0.816	0.007	0.659	0.650	-0.009	0.801	0.756	-0.045***